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Abstract 
This thesis explores censorship and self-censorship in online news production in China. 
It presents an analysis drawn from observation in the online newsroom and interviews 
with online news workers and cyber police officers in China. In addition, it studies the 
mechanisms of online censorship and protocols of news censorship in an online 
newsroom context. This involves an analysis of journalistic activities in the process of 
online news production, self-censorship of online news workers, and power flows 
between the Chinese authorities and online news media in determining the output of 
online news content. 
 
Although the Chinese “free press” is enshrined in the Constitution of The People’s 
Republic of China as a right, the mechanism of online news censorship is shaped under 
the influence of an anti-liberal theory of limited freedom of speech. Confucius, the 
proclaimer of this theory, devalues individual liberty, advocating the ‘right to speak’ is a 
benefaction of the ruling class, and this “freedom” can be compromised for the welfare 
of the state. It is a view shared by Confucius’ successors. This theory, therefore, 
conceptually sets up a distinctive paternalistic protocol of online news censorship in 
China, as the online news workers are instructed to censor and self-censor online content 
under the influence of administrative interference. 
 
Through thematic analysis of field notes, which covers a four-week period of observation 
and recording in the online newsroom of Wenzhou News, a local online news organisation 
in China, the hierarchical structure and general workflow in this online newsroom are 
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illustrated. By further analysing interviews conducted with online journalists, editors, 
web administrators and cyber police officers, this thesis draws on the perspectives of 
online news workers and censors towards the protocol of online news censorship, through 
which the power matrix between the Chinese government, the Communist Party of China, 
and online news media are triangulated. 
 
By analysing and constructing technological and social modes of censorship in the online 
environment, this thesis sets up a conceptual framework of the protocols of online news 
censorship in China, draws detailed processes of online news production under the 
pressure of censorship, and explores the concept of “harmonisation” within the online 
newsroom where specific ideological motivations and structural operationalisation 
influence the output of online news content. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Objectives and research questions 
The aim of this research is to explore and critically discuss issues of censorship and self-
censorship in China’s online news industry. Its central focus is on the online news 
production processes and mechanisms of censorship that are applied by the Chinese 
online news workers and cyber police, or ‘cybercops’ (Tang, 2005), a police force that 
specialises in monitoring and censoring online content in China (Fries, 2000; Liang & Lu, 
2010; Tang, 2005). In order to study censorship and self-censorship activities in China’s 
online news, further context is required. This thesis will examine the environment of 
online news censorship in the newsroom of the Wenzhou News, a local online news media 
organisation in China. It will do so in order to examine broader questions of freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press in the People’s Republic from the perspective of the 
online news workers who work in the online newsroom environment. The research will 
answer research questions as follows: 1) What are the mechanisms of online censorship 
used by the Chinese authorities? 2) How are these mechanisms or protocols 
operationalised? 3) How do online news workers experience and perceive censorship? 4) 
How does this impact on their journalistic work? These questions are further explored in 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 and will be expanded as follows: 
 
Firstly, an investigation into the cyber police was carried out with the aim to answer a 
number of sub-questions: Who are the censors and the cyber police? What are the roles 
and responsibilities of these cyber police officers? How do these censors monitor and 
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filter online content? Finally, how do they enforce censorship and exert pressure upon 
online news? To answer these sub-questions, the thesis will define the cyber police’s 
functions and their institutional role in censorship of the Internet in China, the systematic 
protocols of censorship for the online news media, and provide an account of the 
strategies that the cyber police use in filtering and censoring online news content. 
 
Secondly, the focus is on investigating the protocols of censorship in online news media 
in China from the perspective of news workers. By observing journalists and online news 
production in the newsroom of the local online news media organisation Wenzhou News, 
and interviewing Chinese online news workers, the research clarifies and answers sub-
questions as follows: What are the hierarchical structures and power flows in an online 
newsroom in China? How does this influence the protocols of online censorship? To what 
extent does the power flow between the online news media and the Chinese authorities 
determine the output of online content? To answer these questions, this research will 
provide a representation of the hierarchical structure of the online news operation and 
how it influences the autonomy of online news workers in the processes of online news 
production. Furthermore, it will identify the roles and responsibilities of online journalists, 
editors and web administrators in terms of responding to pressure of censorship. 
 
Lastly, by defining and highlighting censorship protocols enforced during the attempted 
reporting of “critical” news, this thesis presents an account of how censorship is manifest 
across different levels and layers of online news production processes. Drawing from 
empirical data of interviews with online news workers, the triangular models of restriction 
and coordination will be developed and detailed. This model will demonstrate how online 
news media, cyber police and the publicity department restrain but coordinate in the 
processes of online news production and influence the output of online news content.  
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1.2 Research Questions in focus  
1.2.1 The hierarchy of online news media 
The hierarchical structure of online news media is illustrated, and the different 
professional roles in the newsroom, including online journalists, editors and chief editors, 
photographers, correspondents, supervisors, and directors are identified. The reason for 
having a framework of hierarchy and corresponding position for each professional role is 
that the hierarchy defines the autonomy that these roles have in the online newsroom. 
Here, the term ‘autonomy’ specifically refers to the extent to which an individual news 
worker can influence the decision-making processes regarding online news content. In 
practice, high-positioned roles possess more autonomy in the newsroom than lower ones, 
and therefore they have more influence in making decisions on online news content. In 
relation to analysing the protocol of online news censorship, this hierarchy is a significant 
factor as it determines the process of online news production: who instructs whom? Who 
makes the final decision on a news story? What is included or excluded before a story 
goes to the public? This hierarchy is significant and distinctive in the context of online 
news media in China because it ensures that the construction of online news media is 
controlled by the authorities, and therefore the output of online news content can be 
monitored and censored via mechanisms of Internet censorship. 
 
1.2.2 The Commentary function of online news workers 
This research also explores and discusses the commentary roles that online news workers 
have in the newsroom. Besides their journalistic practice, such as news information 
gathering, interviewing, recording and editing, online news workers also act as user-
generated content monitors and public opinion orientaters. The obligation of monitors 
requires online news workers to monitor and filter the user-generated content on their 
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website, and delete the content they judge as ‘inappropriate’. The scope  of inappropriate 
comments is vague and depends on the judgment of individual news workers engaged in 
the role. Based on their journalistic experience, online journalists and editors appear to 
have a preconception of what constitutes being ‘inappropriate’, and they are constantly 
reminded and supervised by their superiors in the newsroom on specific issues and events. 
For example, online journalists and editors understand that anti-Socialist content is 
politically sensitive, and obscene images and hate speech also need to be detected and 
deleted. But they would be reminded by their chief editors and supervisors in times of 
highly politically sensitive events that specific names or locations that are related to the 
events would demand heightened monitoring and attention. Content that identified these 
names and locations would need to be noted, filtered and examined more carefully. The 
obligation of ‘public opinion orientaters’ refers to what I call ‘pseudo commentators’; that 
is, online journalists and editors use common user accounts, pretend to be public users, 
and post online content on their own news story pages. In doing so, they hope to shape 
and synchronise the atmosphere of public discussions and therefore, in their own words, 
orientate public opinion.  
 
1.2.3 The role of the supervisor of online news production 
This study also clarifies the nature of the supervisor role in the online news environment, 
as the existence of a supervisor is seen as a significant method for the Party’s infiltration 
of the online news media in China. The Communist Party has an undeniable influence 
over the online news media and supervisors are ranked higher than the editors and online 
journalists, therefore they possess substantial power in the newsroom. Supervisors are 
required to be in charge of ideology control and to implement administrative instructions. 
All supervisors are members of either the Party or the Youth League, and the personal 
files (Dang-An) of online news workers, which are classified as confidential, are kept and 
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stored by supervisors. The supervisory role is also seen as a symbol of control of China’s 
online news. Due to the existence of such supervisors, there is a process of administrative 
self-censorship in the online newsroom. The news content that is produced by online 
journalists and edited by news editors has to go through this process because ultimately 
the primary targeted readership is not the public, but the authorities.  
 
1.2.4 Triangular model of online news censorship 
This research pays close attention to the protocols of how the online news is produced 
and how the different kinds of online news workers function in the online newsroom. By 
observing and recording these activities, and interviewing online news workers, this 
research develops a triangular model of online news censorship which consist of two 
matrices of coordination and restriction. In the triangular model, which is going to be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 7:4, three forces are involved in the power flow: online news 
media, the Party, and the government.  
 
The triangular model of coordination and restriction is a key finding of this research, as 
it illustrates the power flow and dynamics between the forces that actors possess, which 
have a significant influence in determining the content of news stories. The influence on 
public opinion is a significant reason for online news media gaining its influence over the 
public in the process of online news production, and the chance to triangulate in relation 
to the Party and the government. Thus, the triangular model explains not only how and 
where the external pressure of censorship comes from but also how online news media 
process the pressure and counteract external interference from the authorities.  
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1.2.5 Protocols of online news censorship 
This research develops a model of online censorship in China and details how it functions. 
It includes different levels of online censorship from technological means (such as the 
Great Firewall and pre-installed software in personal computers), a government-based 
public security system (such as cyber police), to different censorship layers within the 
process of news production and journalists’ self-censorship at the stage of conceiving and 
writing the news stories, as Figure 1 demonstrates. 
 
Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1 Mechanisms of online news censorship in China 
Censorship means 
used by the 
authorities 
Censorship means 
used in online news 
Figure 1 Mechanisms of online news censorship in China 
Manual/social 
Combined technology 
with manual process 
Technological 
Technological means of Internet surveillance: The 
Great Firewall, pre-installed software in personal 
computers
Government-based public security 
monitoring: Cyber police
Administrative gatekeeping: 
supervisors, semantic filtering 
of websites, internal 
instructions and briefings
Editorial self-
censorship: Editors 
and journalists in 
the process of news 
production
Conception of 
news: 
journalists' 
personal 
experience and 
judgment
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These different modes of online censorship are applied by either technological or social 
methods, or by a combination of the two. The establishment of the Great Firewall and 
pre-instillation of filtering software are of course technological interventions. Cyber 
police and administrative interference, including supervision in the newsroom, the 
semantic filtering system on news websites, and internal instructions and briefings, are 
examples of technological and social methods, combined. Both, the cyber police and 
online news, use filtering systems for the surveillance and monitoring of online news 
content. Lastly, social censorship methods are detected and enforced through editorial 
self-censorship and news conception processes. 
 
1.2.6 Perspectives of the censors (the cyber police) 
This research also examines censorship from the perspective of cyber police officers and 
deals with issues relating to Internet surveillance of online news and common users, 
privacy violation and disciplinary management of online news media. The aim of 
studying the mechanisms of online censorship from the perspective of censors is to 
identify the systematic protocols of censorship they operationalise in the process of 
censoring the online news media. As Figure 1 indicates, activities of the cyber police 
encompass a combined set of processes involving technological and social elements. It 
directly interacts with the online news and exerts pressure on online news workers.  
 
The cyber police are also the main force within the triangular model, where the dynamic 
flow of autonomy of different professional roles occurs in the matrix of the censorship of 
online news content. The cyber police influence the online news content through frequent 
communication with web administrators of online news, and their capacity to sanction 
enables them to interfere in the process of news production. In turn, administrators pass 
along such pressure to other lower-ranked news workers in the online newsroom. The 
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focus on the cyber police allows this research to examine and determine the source and 
nature of censorship pressure that directly affect the online news media. 
 
Studying the cyber police and mechanisms of online censorship also expands this research 
by taking account of the perspectives of insiders. It considers not only how online news 
workers self-censor and how the pressure to conform interferes with the workflow of 
online news production, but also how the government-based censorship system operates, 
and how online news workers and cyber police officers interact during the process of 
news production.  
 
1.3 The scope of the study 
As noted, this study concentrates on censorship and self-censorship in online news 
production in China, and examines the perception and experience of online news workers 
and gives an insight into the formal protocols of censorship as operationalised by the 
cyber police. The study is also unique in that it focuses on the practices of the cyber police 
and gives an examination of their perceptions and experiences of their specific role. 
Therefore, the scope of this study includes the perspective of online censors (the cyber 
police) towards the production processes of online newsrooms and activities of online 
news workers under the pressure of censorship. In these respects, therefore, this study is 
unique. 
 
The cyber police are interviewed, in order to study the perspective of online censors and 
the protocol of online news censoring, so as to address issues relating to the activities of 
Chinese cyber police in depth. For example, the clarification of institutional mechanisms 
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and the functions of the cyber police. It also distinguishes the different characteristics 
from the perspectives of the cyber police and other civil servants in China. Likewise, 
contact with cyber police officers broadens the scope of this study to the institutional 
mechanism of online censors. By doing that, this study not only looks into what 
journalistic activities take place in the online newsroom, but also the external forces that 
occur outside the newsroom and influence these activities. Moreover, newsroom 
observation and interviews with online news workers further set out the scope of this 
study of online journalistic activities, which are happening under the pressure of 
censorship and administrative interference. In these respects, therefore, this study is 
unique. 
 
The study therefore examines:  
1) The organisational and hierarchical structure of online news media in China. 
Hierarchy and rankings in the newsroom are considered as crucial in determining to 
what extent an individual news worker can decide the outcome of online news content, 
and how much autonomy he/she possesses in the newsroom. 
2) The different roles and responsibilities of online news workers as journalists, editors, 
internal censors, or pseudo commentators who pretend to be ordinary members of the 
public and post user comments on the news page in order to swing the direction of 
public opinion.  
3) The influence that internal competition and marketisation have brought to the 
protocol of online content monitoring and filtering.  
4) An in-depth analysis of different degrees of self-censorship. Definitions and 
clarifications of how the word ‘self’ functions in different contexts helps this research 
to have better understanding of the existence of different self-censoring processes in 
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online news production. It also identifies what exact kind of ‘self-censorship’ the 
participant refers to when they use the terms ‘self’ and ‘self-censorship’.  
5) The three forces: This triangular relationship between the Party, the government and 
online news media is singled out, due to its importance in explaining that the protocol 
of online news censorship is being determined not only by journalistic activities 
within the online newsroom but also heavily influenced by the power matrix between 
these three forces.  
This thesis therefore presents a holistic account of censorship of the online news 
environment in China. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis consists of: Introduction, Literature Review, Methodology, a 
detailed account of the context of online censorship in China, Analysis, Discussion and 
Conclusion. Figure 2 shows the framework of the thesis, and the sequence of how these 
chapters are presented.  
 
The Literature section contextualises this study by historically and conceptually framing 
the principles of freedom of the press and freedom of speech in China by reviewing a 
range of relevant literature and debates on the relationship between principles of freedom 
of speech, freedom of the press and Chinese history and culture. Both historically and 
philosophically, principles of freedom of speech and freedom of the press have been 
inherently linked to the Western intellectual canon. Though not considered liberal by 
modern standards, ideas that became associated with modern conceptions of citizenship, 
freedom and autonomy have their roots in the ancient Greek political and philosophical 
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tradition (see Steel, 2012). However, it was not until the English Civil War that the right 
to speak out and publish opinions gathered serious political and philosophical momentum 
(see Copeland, 2006). Within the Chinese context, we only start to see a clear reflection 
of some of these debates and ideas in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Schwartz, 
2009; Feuerwerker, Murphy & Wright, 1967). However, there is a strong Chinese 
philosophical tradition which predates even the ancient Greek body of thought, which 
Introduction
Context of online 
censorship in China
•The establishment and criticism of the Great Firewall
•Pre-installment of surveillance software in personal computers
•The environment of online free speech and free press in China
Literature review
•Confucianism and its relation to freedom of speech and freedom of the press 
in China
•Maoism, media control and propaganda before online news in China
•Theories of mechanism of censorship of news and online news in China
Method design and 
data collection 
strategy
•Theoretical approach
•Observation
•Interviews
Analysis
•Internet censorship of the cyber police
•Observation in an online newsroom
•Protocol of online news production under the censorship pressure
Discussion and 
conclusion
•Achievements
•Limitations
•Future development
Figure 2 Layout of the structure of the thesis 
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arguably contributes to our modern Chinese sensibilities and ideas about freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press. 
 
The Literature Review will begin by examining the elements of Chinese history and 
philosophy which arguably have contributed to our contemporary understanding and 
expectations of conceptions of freedom of the press and freedom of speech in China. Here 
I examine the concept of divine theory and channelisation theory, both of which emerge 
in pre-Confucian eras and which arguably have played a role in shaping Chinese 
responses to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Following a brief discussion of 
the significance of these ideas, the chapter goes on to discuss the significance of 
Confucianism as providing continuing relevance to contemporary Chinese political life. 
In particular, the moral core of Confucianism and its legacy in relation to debates about 
autonomy and freedom are examined. Continuing the historical development of these 
ideas in Chinese history and culture, the chapter then focuses on the May Fourth 
movement which provides a sharp criticism and contrast to Confucian philosophy and 
marks the beginning of the introduction of liberal ideas into Chinese politics and 
philosophy (Schwartz, 2009). This chapter then moves on to examine the debates 
concerning press freedom and freedom of speech under Mao Zedong (1893-1976) as this 
era of Chinese politics significantly shaped our contemporary experience and 
understanding of the roles of journalism and the scope of journalistic freedom in Chinese 
political life. I argue that such a conceptual framing of the parameters of speech and 
expression play an important role in understanding the specific ideological motivations 
and structural operationalisation of the protocols of censorship in China. Finally, this 
chapter explores literature concerning the construction of news and online news media in 
China and debates concerning media reform that provides a theoretical basis for my 
analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 2 Layout of the structure of the thesis 
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The Methodology chapter specifies the conceptual and methodological approach used in 
this research. It re-emphasises the purpose and scope of this study, and outlines the 
research questions accordingly. In order to provide what Geertz (1973) called ‘a thick 
description’ for fulfilling the research purpose, it draws an outline of the framework of 
research approaches and introduces the qualitative methods that have been used: 
observation and in-depth interviews. Details of data gathering, strategies, planning, pilot 
studies and limitations of both observation and interviews are introduced in this chapter.  
 
Observation is used as an exploratory method before the interviews. It aims to obtain a 
set of descriptive data of the dynamic interaction of China’s online news production. In 
practice, field notes and a field diary were used to record journalistic activities in the 
newsroom during the process of production. The scope of journalistic activities covered 
is wide, as the fieldwork observed the work of a number of online journalists, editors and 
web administrators in the newsroom. These journalistic activities include the actions, 
reactions and interactions in relation to the acquiescence to, and negotiation with, 
censorship within the newsroom, the time and locations where these activities occurred, 
and key quotations relevant to wide-ranging subjects such as censorship of online news 
production, administrative instructions, control and surveillance of user-generated 
content, news workers’ self-regulation and political sensibilities.  
 
In-depth interviews are used to collect empirical data of perspectives on and experiences 
of censorship and self-censorship within China’s online news media from the cyber police 
and online news workers. Two sets of enquiry questions were designed for these two 
groups of interviewees. Details of this semi-structured interviewing process are 
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elaborated in this chapter, including the snowball sampling strategy, the employment of 
an interview guide (see Appendix C), considerations of interviewing techniques, use of 
research instruments, and ethics. Data that were collected and recorded were transcribed 
and selectively paraphrased in Appendix E: Viewpoints of interviewees.  
 
Analysis chapters 5, 6 & 7 focus on answering and discussing the issues that are outlined 
in the ‘Objectives’ section. Chapter 5 examines the cyber police in China and their 
function and orientation to online censorship. Cyber police are considered as one 
important method of Internet censorship for the Chinese authorities in order to control 
online content produced by online news workers and Internet users. This chapter will 
identify a number of functions of cyber police including their institutional structure, 
jurisdictions and roles and responsibilities regarding how they influence the process of 
online news production by monitoring users, pressuring online news workers, and 
filtering and regulating online content. Secondly, this chapter will further explore the 
notion of ‘harmony of the Internet’, a political term and a concept which is key to the 
political agenda for the Chinese authorities (Chen, D. 2014; Winfield & Peng, 2005). The 
Chinese authorities’ attempts at maintaining a synchronised, unified, and anti-
government-free environment in online news via the use of cyber police will be examined, 
and the power flow between the cyber police and online news in the process of arguing, 
coordinating, and negotiating over online news content will be explored from the 
perspectives of these censors. Thirdly, this chapter will look at different strategies and 
tactics that cyber police use to control and manipulate users’ online activities, which 
further influence the online content that the user generates on news websites. The details 
of cyber police protocols for controlling online users, including how the users are 
censored, filtered, and sanctioned, with the cooperation of online news media, will be 
revealed. The chapter will end with discussion of a number of issues that have emerged 
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during the process of Internet censorship, including violation of user privacy and 
loopholes of the systematic firewall, which is designed to block foreign websites but is 
often breached and bypassed by users.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates the roles and responsibilities of different online news workers in 
the online newsroom in China, and provides detailed accounts of how censorship becomes 
operationalised within the newsroom by interpreting and analysing observation data. The 
analysis will open with an introduction to the background and context of the Wenzhou 
News, a local online news media organisation in China where the observation was 
conducted. This is to determine and examine the influence of the hierarchical structure 
and the structural rankings on the output of online news content. The chapter will continue 
to examine the autonomy of different online news workers in the process of online news 
production, including online journalists, editors and web administrators, and how they 
respond to censorship pressures, and what role they play, and what role they play in 
censoring online news content. Furthermore, the chapter will investigate the protocols of 
censorship in the online newsroom, and clarify how the internal briefings that are 
regularly scheduled and held in the newsroom are set up for delivering instructions of 
censorship, and ensuring the authorities control the online news media and the content 
that they and users produce on the websites. By doing this, the mechanism of online 
censorship within the newsroom is therefore established and layered between the cyber 
police and the editorial control in the process of online news production. This chapter will 
further explore the roles that online journalists and editors play in filtering and censoring 
user-generated content that appears on the webpages. Their roles as user-generated 
content monitors and pseudo commentators will be discussed, as the latter is an important 
element for the authorities to guide and synchronise the public discussion of users, and 
shape the public opinion that is favourable to the harmony of the Internet. The thesis will 
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then discuss the journalistic tactics that online news workers use, which allow them to 
avoid the minefield in reporting online news whilst adhering to journalistic 
professionalism. These tactics, which Tong (2009) called ‘guerrilla tactics’, ensure the 
mediating of safe information under censorship.  
 
Chapter 7 will begin with a discussion of the censorship protocol of critical news by 
interpreting and analysing data from interviews of online news workers, and investigating 
how online journalists and editors self-censor the online news content that they produce 
in order to comply with the pressure of censorship from the authorities. The different 
stages of censorship in the process of online news production will be distinguished, as the 
process of individual conception penetrates the process of editorial controls in the 
newsroom. There will be a discussion of the autonomy of different online news workers 
and how they understand the culture of ‘think before you write’ regarding balancing the 
news value of certain news stories with the censorship concern of keeping them politically 
correct. Secondly, the chapter will look at the manipulation of images, with examples 
from online news. By doing so, there will be a discussion of how news values can be 
downplayed in online news, while the political concerns of avoiding minefields and 
serving the propaganda purpose of the Chinese authorities are ensured. Incorporating the 
data from observation and interviews in this chapter, the triangular model of online 
censorship, which involves the power flow between online news media, the cyber police 
and the publicity departments, will be detailed. The matrix will then explore the 
coordination and restriction between these three parties whilst they influence the output 
of online news content in the process of online news production. Lastly, a number of 
issues will be discussed to complete the analysis through the insight of online news 
workers, including how they assess the news values and produce online news content that 
can comply with the pressure of censorship, identifying the elements that they consider 
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in producing news content that criticises the authorities and their policies, at the same 
time ensuring the safety of content and avoiding intervention from the authorities, and 
internal competition. Also recognising the reforms of marketisation that they experience 
can shape the mechanism of online censorship and allow the online news media to enjoy 
journalistic practices with less intervention from the authorities.  
 
By analysing and constructing these different modes of censorship in the online media, 
this study sets up a conceptual framework of the protocols of online news censorship in 
China, illustrates the processes of online news production under pressure of censorship 
from the Chinese authorities, and argues that the concept of “harmonisation” operates 
within the online newsroom where specific ideological motivations and structural 
operationalisations influence the output of online news content. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The study fits broadly in the literature on Chinese media and journalism studies, with 
particular emphasis on journalism practice, media control and censorship. The particular 
study engages with specific literature on journalistic professionalism, gatekeeping, news 
values and construction of Chinese online news media, and asserts the significant factors 
that contribute to protocols of censorship in online news environment. This chapter aims 
to explain the theoretical framework of this study in following ways. Firstly, it defines key 
concepts of censorship and self-censorship. It explores a body of literature which define 
these two concepts and integrates them into China’s context. This literature has reviewed 
and analysed journalistic practice of processing newsworthiness in general term (Harrison, 
2006; Petley, 2009; Horton, 2011; Jones, 2011; Steel, 2012). In China’s context, the 
process through which Chinese online news workers judge newsworthy in their daily 
journalistic practices involves a careful consideration of political sensibility. The 
censorship mechanisms of Chinese news differs from other Western models of journalism, 
as the particular perspective of criticising the authorities must be approached carefully, 
keeping in mind a set of formal or informal propaganda minefields (Tong, 2009: p.595; 
Petley, 2009). However, the undergoing media transformation has shifted the power-flow 
between the authorities and media organisations. With gradually autonomy, the process of 
inclusion and exclusion of sensitive news has also changed. 
 
Secondly, similar to the changing process of censorship and self-censorship, Chinese 
online news workers have also adjusted their understanding of professionalism, news 
values and journalistic norms. Whilst the authorities were not showing any signs of 
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lessening their controls over news before 2005 (Esarey, 2005, p56), journalistic 
professionalism was nevertheless developed amongst Chinese online news workers. With 
the assistance of a fast growing Internet in China, the online news shifted their loyalty 
from “ideological apparatus of the state” (McNair, 2009: p.240) to the economic demands 
of the market (Pan & Chan, 2003, Esarey, 2005; Winfield & Pang, 2005). Objectivity and 
press freedom, for instance, were “elevated” (Pan & Chan, 2003: p.653). Throughout this 
re-construction of news media, Lo et al. (2005) argue that Chinese online news still have 
to balance the intertwined flow between commercialisation and political uncertainty. 
However, there is a significant trend indicating that news workers in China are a distinct 
occupational group rather than individuals who work for a propaganda mechanism (Zhao, 
2000; Tong & Sparks, 2009).  
 
The different approaches to gatekeeping and understanding of news values are also 
significant. With the aim of promoting a positive image of a stable and harmonious society 
within news media, some general news values such as commitment to truth, frequency, 
amplitude, negativity (Harrison, 2006; Brighton & Foy, 2007) can be downplayed in 
Chinese news media. In the process of gatekeeping, this phenomena is considered 
distinctive in China’s news industry as argued by Zhao (2000) who identified the press 
orbiting the state (2000: p.3) as a significant form of press control in authoritarian China. 
However, a number of studies have indicated that China’s media landscape has been 
drastically influenced by marketisation (Xu et al. 2002; Winfield & Pang, 2005; Esarey, 
2005), and the growing online media has accelerated the process of shifting media 
organisations from being a propaganda mouthpiece for the communist authorities to 
“business entities” (Winfield & Pang, 2005: p.260). As a result, the tolerance of the 
Chinese authorities has been tested, and news about officials’ corruption and scandals, and 
criticism of government policies gets reported.  
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The media landscape transformation has also had an impact on how the media 
organisations are constructed. Before the Internet era, from the late 1980s, there was a 
developing trend of activism of political campaigns in China (Yang, 2009). These 
campaigns were extended and expanded to a broader range of political positions, including 
calls to adjust and refine the authorities’ institutions and methods of controlling the press 
(Yang, 2009: p.48). Online news media, in particular, are featuring news content that feeds 
the demands of their advertisers, the market and the public, a form of re-construction which 
Winfield and Pang (2005) have argued is ‘similar to a western capitalism system with 
advertising, subscription dependence, and capital investment’ (2005: p.260). Drawing on 
these theories, this study explores journalistic practices in online newsrooms in China, and 
the perspectives of Internet censors/cyber police and online news workers in China’s 
context.  
 
2.2 Defining censorship and self-censorship 
To answer these theoretical questions, concepts of censorship and self-censorship need to 
be defined. It is necessary to highlight clearly that censorship of news media also exists in 
democratic societies. Freedom of expression is not absolute, even in western democratic 
societies (Petley, 2009: p.1-2), and it is certainly not equally valued across all cultures 
(Horton, 2011). This study, however, focuses on how online censorship in China fits into 
existing definitions of the various forms of censorship in the modern world. In broader 
terms, the forms of censorship that Jones (2011) defines as follows: 
 
“(Censorship is) a variety of process […] formal and informal, overt and covert, conscious 
and unconscious, by which restrictions are imposed on the collection, display, 
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dissemination, and exchange of information, opinions, ideas, and imaginative expression” 
(Jones, 2011). 
 
Research by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in 2011 indicated that there was 
no evidence to confirm that journalists were murdered in China due to their reporting (Earp, 
2011). However, less dramatic forms of censorship are conducted by the Chinese 
government to oversee and filter online news content. Petley (2009) illustrates a number 
of tactics that one authority can use to effectively control and censor news, including 
preventing contentious material from being produced in the first place, licensing of the 
press to control which permits are approved, as well as listing banned work and forbidding 
people from both publishing or accessing them (Petley, 2009: p.3-4). He further extends 
these mechanisms of censorship to the Internet by arguing that cyberspace is also under 
censorship in both authoritarian and democratic countries. This study examines how these 
mechanisms are used by Chinese authorities who increasingly attempt to control the 
Internet. The hierarchy and the embedded party organisation within online news media 
allow the authorities to prevent or ban online news content which they believe may pose 
“threats to its monopoly on power” (Petley, 2009: p.101). 
 
Petley (2009) argues that in the case of online censorship in China, the Internet was built 
by the Chinese authorities to “support and maintain its fast-growing economy”, and at the 
same time allow them to control any monopoly on power (Petley, 2009: p.101). Assisted 
by sophisticated information barriers such as the Great Firewall, online content on various 
topics is blocked or filtered in China. As Petley suggests: 
 
“Analysis of blocked material shows […] that this involves subjects which the 
government believes would endanger nation security, conflict with official 
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viewpoints, enable people to contact illegal organisations or organise illegal 
gatherings” (Petley, 2009: p.105). 
 
Considering that controlling the Internet by “preventing contentious material from 
being produced in the first place” seems to be of fundamental importance to the 
authorities to maintain control over information, creating an atmosphere of vigilant 
self-censorship within the online newsroom becomes significant. In general terms, 
Horton (2011) describes self-censorship as a common phenomenon where people 
“deliberately” avoid discussing a topic because it is likely to cause offence (Horton, 
2011: p.93). In essence, self-censorship is a restriction where one tries to prevent him 
or herself from expressing particular ideas and perspectives (Horton, 2011: p.94). 
These particular ideas and perspectives are understood by Chinese news workers as 
‘minefield’ areas, or a ‘propaganda minefield’ (Tong, 2009: p.595), which formally 
or informally prohibit media from reporting and covering news freely.  
 
Historical developments have shown that marketisation has diminished the 
Communist Party’s dominance over the media since the 1980s and that the Chinese 
news workers are gaining autonomy (Tong, 2009; Chan & Qiu, 2002), but there are 
still numerous politically sensitive topics that they have to avoid. This is where the 
considerations of inclusion and exclusion of news information happen in the process 
of news conception and editing. Tong (2009) argues that the editorial process, in 
general, is also a self-censoring one, as inclusion and exclusion are understood to be 
practices of the politics of self-censorship (Tong, 2009: p.594). This study will 
examine if the outlined assessment is also applicable and reflected in editorial 
processes in online news media in China.  
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2.3 Professionalism in Chinese journalism 
This section contextualises and explores journalistic professionalism within China’s 
context in reference to existing concepts on journalistic professionalism and normative 
claims. As Drechsel (2000) argues, journalistic professionalism, throughout its historical 
development, has been understood as “essential for quality, legitimacy, credibility, and 
respect” of journalists (2000: p.181). In ‘The Handbook of Journalism Studies’, Schudson 
and Anderson (2009) examine two major strands of scholarship in the field of journalism 
studies. The first focuses on journalism being “self-evident” and not dependent on its 
status in a hierarchy of occupations, and the second focuses on the character of journalistic 
knowledge (2009: p.89-98). These strands are both problematic as Schudson and 
Anderson (2009) argue: 
 
“While the first strand suffers from its […] adoption of the “trait perspective” on the 
professions, the second strand confuses journalistic objectivity with journalistic 
professionalism per se” (Schudson & Anderson, 2009:p.88-9). 
 
Objectivity is seen as an important professional norm within journalism (Soloski, 1989). 
Practiced by journalists, objectivity requires news workers to “seek out the facts and 
report them as fairly and in as balanced a way as possible” (Soloski, 1989: p.213). 
Arguably, objectivity allows news workers to produce work that best reflects elements of 
the two strands summarised above (Schudson & Anderson, 2009: p.99). However, it 
needs to be noted that objectivity is not a definitive professional norm in many non-
American media systems where professionalism exists (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), such 
as, in the Chinese media being explored in this study.  
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Josephi (2009: p.51) argues that the ideology of objectivity can be a cover for loyalty, and 
is found in a majority of the world’s nations, including in China where the ideology of 
loyalty accommodates a form of investigative reporting. Thus, China’s political ideology 
should be considered when studying Chinese journalism. McNair (2009: p.240) argues 
that the authoritarian approach underpins the practice of political journalism in socialist 
states such as China, where journalism is “institutionally part of the ideological apparatus 
of the state”. Schudson and Anderson (2009: p.94) also indicate that the social function 
of the objectivity norm in American journalism may be different to that in Chinese 
journalism, as journalists in China work with norms other than objectivity. There is a 
political demand for journalists to support a dominant ideology “imposed by the ruling 
political faction” (McNair, 2009: p.241). Nevertheless, the Internet and online media are 
perceived to be a challenge to this dominant ideology, as Kalathil and Boas (2010) 
conclude from their research that the Internet has helped China, along with other countries 
such as Cuba and Singapore, to transform authoritarianism and pursue the “objective of 
building democracy and free media” (McNair, 2009, p.241; Kalathil & Boas, 2010). 
 
It has been argued that the relevance of journalistic professionalism in China’s context is 
ambiguous (Lee, 1994:p9) The transformation of Chinese news media is taking place 
alongside political reformation (Zhao, 2000; Huters, 2003). Before the transformation 
that started in the late 1980s, Chinese media was integrated within the structure of 
communist politics (Lin, 1970). It has been argued that the media’s transformation and 
marketisation have eroded the Party-press ideology, and “potentially elevate the canons 
of journalistic professionalism, such as objectivity and press freedom” (Pan & Chan, 
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2003:p.653). In this period, Chinese journalists who were pressed to follow both the party 
line and ‘bottom line’ (Zhao, 1998) improvised ways of practicing journalism to “stay 
afloat in the tide of commercialization and political uncertainty” (Lo, Chan & Pan, 2005: 
p.156). Journalistic professionalisation has been influenced by this transformation in 
China; although the Chinese authorities tried to maintain continued control over news 
media, the media organisations have shifted towards marketization: 
 
“The transitional nature of China has rendered journalism paradigms in a state of flux, 
with the party ideals of journalism intertwined with professionalism imported primarily 
from outside China and blatant commercialism” (Lo, Chan & Pan, 2005:p.156). 
 
Although journalistic professionalism in China is arguably fragmented and inconsistent 
(Chan, Lee & Pan, 2006), the transformation has assisted its development amongst 
Chinese news workers. Tong and Sparks (2009) indicate that Chinese journalists conceive 
of themselves as less dependent on political power and more so as a distinct occupational 
group with a distinct social function (Tong & Sparks, 2009). This can be seen as “an 
extension of a […] Chinese tradition of public intellectuals articulating society’s 
conscience” as well as a reflection of “analogies with western conceptions of journalistic 
professionalism” (Tong & Sparks, 2009: p.340). This encourages Chinese journalists to 
act as watchdogs and report corruption and scandals, otherwise considered as 
contradictory to the interests of the authorities.  
 
In the Chinese case, the marketplace is considered a driving force for news workers to 
strive for autonomy. Xu et al. (2000) highlight that market consciousness is turning 
journalism education into a testing ground for the limits of the authorities’ tolerance, as 
34 
 
China’s journalism education has been “characterized by gradual movement towards the 
market without seriously violating traditional normative of propaganda” (Xu et al., 2000: 
p.75). 
 
It is also worth noting that news organisations need not devote money and time to 
establishing training programs for new journalists. This appears to be universal, as 
Soloski (1998: p.212) indicates that professional journalistic norms of conduct are already 
established during the journalists’ professional education. With their education and on-
the-job professional training combined, news workers come to an understanding of shared 
professional norms (Soloski, 1998: p.213 cited from Johnstone, et al., 1976: p.65). 
Nevertheless, Soloski (1998: p.213) also argues that these shared professional norms do 
not guarantee a problem-free existence for news organisations, because professionalism 
provides journalists with freedom and “an independent power base that can be used to 
thwart heavy-handed interference by management in professional activities of the news 
staff.” 
 
2.4 Gatekeeping in Chinese news media 
The term of ‘gatekeeper’ was first applied to journalists in the late 1940s, and subsequent 
studies were followed in 1966. ‘Mr Gates’, who was described as ‘a decision maker’, 
picked those stories that he liked and believed his readers wanted, and discarded the rest 
(Singer, 1997; Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). Singer stated that the process of gatekeeping 
and decision-making is dependent on the personal judgement or “self-perception” on one 
person’s own terms, as she argued: 
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The gatekeepers see to it that the community shall hear as a fact only those events which 
the newsman, as the representative of his culture, believes to be true (Singer, 1997, p. 73). 
 
She further argued the role of journalists in that process in the context of “a democratic 
society”: 
 
The journalist’s self-perception as the one who decides what people need to know seems 
deeply ingrained … the journalist wants to select his own stories, to treat them as he feels 
appropriate, and in doing so, to serve the needs of a democratic society in which 
information plays a central role (Singer, 1997 p. 73). 
 
Canter (2014) also argued that the role of gatekeeper of news media is through 
development, as the traditional gatekeeper becomes a professional verifier of online news 
media (Canter, 2014). Modern journalists, as Canter redefined them, are “… able to fulfil 
their traditional roles of acting as watchdogs, quality controlling, analysers and 
storytellers, while using the tools of modern technology” (Canter, 2014 p. 112). 
 
In the context of online news media in China, these definitions and redefinitions are also 
applicable, as online journalists in China also fulfil the role of watchdogs, quality controls, 
and analysers and storytellers in the print and online working environment. However, the 
harmonisation that is forced by the Chinese authorities as a requirement of the online 
news media must be singled out, as this requirement impacts upon the self-perception of 
journalists to a great extent and is decisive in the outcome of news production. Reformed 
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through the nation’s salvation, the harmonisation that had mainly been propagandised by 
the Chinese authorities was seen as an official doctrine for “… constructing a modernised 
socialist country” (Hu, 2007). Yet some have argued that the atmosphere of harmony 
between Chinese citizens and the State was broken by the influence of Western 
civilisation since the economic reforms in the 1980s (Zhang, 1999: p. 177; He, 2004; 
Hong, 2006). 
 
This culture of harmonisation has its historical background. In the Qing dynasty, the 
ministers rested in a lounge in the morning for their daily meetings with the emperors. On 
the lounge wall an embroidered silk banner read: ‘A prevailing mood of harmony’. The 
slogan reminded the ministers in the room to argue with dignity and maintain a 
harmonious atmosphere (Hucker, 1975). The contemporary concept of harmonisation or 
of “… constructing a harmonious society” (Hu, 2007) was derived from the meaning of 
‘kind’, ‘polite’, ‘peaceful’ and ‘developed’ as being accordant and trouble-free in a 
contemporary context. It evolved as a form of reciprocal protection in political circles and 
a way of maintaining the fragile peace between the publicity departments and news media 
or among different government departments themselves. Its meaning of ‘harmonious 
mood’ was extracted and expounded by Hu Jingtao, the former Chinese president and the 
Party’s chief secretary from 2005 – 2013. His political agenda emphasised the importance 
of preserving a stable trend for economic development and maintaining the mood of social 
harmony at all times. His proposition of harmonisation stemmed from his early claim of 
avoiding self-inflicted setbacks (Goodman, 1990) and became the guideline for the 
stabilisation of government and control of news media after he came to power. The 
emphasis on harmonisation can be seen as a softer and reformed version of Deng 
Xiaoping’s political agenda, which emphasised that maintaining stability is an overriding 
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priority (Goodman, 1990). The propaganda activities which aimed to maintain harmony 
were intended to serve the purpose of developing the economy as the first priority (Hu, 
2007; Zhang, 2011). To emphasise the importance of harmony, the concept itself was 
portrayed as having a pivotal role in “… the mission of re-rise of Chinese awakening and 
revival” (Hu, 2007), which is also linked with the nationalistic salvation, discussed earlier 
in this chapter. 
 
Harmonisation is therefore associated with journalistic practice and gatekeeping in China, 
in an approach reinforcing nationalistic salvation and how Maoism was associated with 
journalism. It heavily influences the mechanism of gatekeeping in the news media 
industry and the design of filtering tools for censorship in print and online news media, 
when there is “… ambiguous criticism of party/government officials and local-level party 
and government policies, even though this type of criticism is still very limited, controlled, 
and constrained” (Hong, 2006: p. 299). However, different understandings of having a 
harmonised environment in print and the online news media by journalists and other news 
workers who are involved in the gatekeeping process leaves “… loopholes to circumvent”, 
as Lam (2000) argued, and it is later confirmed in Chapter 6:4.4 and Chapter 7:4 that 
these loopholes allow online news workers in China to resist and create leverage against 
the pressure of censorship: 
 
Internal ideological and power struggles played out through the media, […] and the 
marketplace, too, have offered journalists new and innovative loopholes to circumvent 
the central authorities (Lam, 2000, p. 42). 
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2.5 News values: the Communist Party’s interest as a news 
value 
What are ‘news values’ in journalism? And what are ‘news values’ in China’s journalism? 
To better understand how news values in China fit within or depart from other journalism 
models in the West it is crucial to define this concept in general terms at an early stage of 
this study. Galtung and Ruge (1965) introduce a brief overview of the criteria that consists 
of a set of values which can turn an event into a news item (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; 
Brighton & Foy, 2007: p.7) and includes relevance, timeliness, simplification, 
predictability, and so on.. Galtung and Ruge apply a further set of core system qualifiers 
which include frequency, amplitude, clarity, meaningfulness, among others. However, in 
adopting these for the analysis of Chinese news media, this research has to carefully 
examine their applicability in China’s context taking into consideration the specific social 
and cultural accounts of news values (Harrison, 2006: pp.18-38).  
Defined by Harrison (2006), news is that which “is judged to be newsworthy by 
journalists, who exercise their news sense within the constraints of the news organisations 
within which they operate” (Harrison, 2006: p.13). It is a process that allows journalists 
to select what they assess as ‘being newsworthy’ from a set of sources, such as press 
releases, newspapers, telegrams, tip-offs, and Internet services (Schultz, 2007). Palmer 
(2000, p. 45) notes that this process transcends individual judgment “although of course 
they are to be found embodied in every news judgment made by particular journalists”. 
Therefore, it has been argued that this process of judging newsworthiness or news value, 
and decisions about the inclusion and exclusion of material can be developed through 
ongoing engagement in and performance of journalistic practices and socialisation 
(Harrison: 2006; O’Neill & Harcup, 2009)  
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‘News values’, as Steel (2012) notes, is a general term which applies to the framework of 
principles, norms, and dispositions within which the news is constructed (2012: pp. 170–
1). They are essential tools and informal ‘ground rules’ for journalists to work with that 
enable them to select and write stories that are appropriate for their news organisation. 
These ground rules, as Harcup and O’Neil (2001) argue, “… may not be written down or 
codified by news organisations, but they exist in daily practice and in knowledge gained 
on the job, albeit mediated by subjectivity on the part of individual journalists” (Harcup 
& O’Neil, 2001: p. 261). Steel (2012) also argued that it was informal limits that set the 
criteria; journalists “… making judgement about what is and is not newsworthy” (Steel, 
2012: p. 171). These informal ground rules are based on subjectivity and individuality 
and routinely lead journalists to self-censor. Reflecting organisational cultures, routines 
and hierarchies, or “habitual conventions” (Fowler, 2013: p.25), the different 
understanding of newsworthiness among journalists shapes frameworks and affects the 
final product.  
 
However, even according to Western terms, news values are a “slippery concept” (O’Neil 
& Harcup, 2009: p.162) and challenging to grasp, as different news organisations may 
place different emphasis on different news values, according to their specific readership 
(Steel, 2012; O’Neil & Harcup, 2009). This argument, in a broader sense, may be 
universal as it does not apply only to Western news media, but to Chinese ones also. There 
are comprehensive examples of how news values differ across news organisations in 
Britain (Steel, 2012: p. 171 references Brighton & Foy, 2007; Conboy, 2010; Conboy, 
2012). In terms of readership, Chinese media also adjust news angles according to 
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different audiences (He & Zhu, 2002). Zhang (2000) indicates there is a trend in China 
that the marketization of news media emphasises its capacity to deliver information to an 
effective readership. This requires Chinese journalists to produce according to the 
interests of their majority audience. Therefore, Chinese journalists are also required to 
judge the newsworthiness of sources, assess their value to the news organisation and its 
audience, and produce news stories accordingly. These examples of how news values 
differ across news organisations in Britain can also be found among Chinese news 
organisations. For example, the news values of, say, The People’s Daily, will be very 
different to those of Apple Daily. The former tends to present hard news with features and 
comment on international and domestic political events, (Luther & Zhou, 2005: p.862) 
while the latter tends to focus on stories in keeping with its tabloid identity (Flowerdew 
& Leong, 2007), such as gossip, celebrity, and the entertainment industry. 
 
There are a number of instructions on ways in which news elements and sources can affect 
the outcome of a news product (Harrison: 2006; O’Neill & Harcup, 2009). Perhaps the 
principles outlined by Steel (2009: pp. 584–5) can provide significant guidance. These 
principles are: 1) Journalism has a commitment to truth and to inform the public; 2) News 
also provides entertainment to those who read it; 3) Journalism has an important role in 
contributing to the moral fabric of societies and helps reflect and shape […] identity; 4) 
Journalism should also be expressive of a deeper sense of humanity in playing an 
important role in breaking down barriers between different people and different cultures; 
and 5) Journalism is also about making judgement and comment (Steel, 2009: p. 584–5). 
These arguments were made in the context of the democratic environment. Journalism in 
China is somewhat different. 
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A general assumption is that China is not a democratic country. Tsai (2007) argued that 
China can be considered to be a capitalist country without democracy, whereas others 
may argue that there are strong signs of political reform proceeding, as democracy is 
somewhat accommodated and institutionalised (O’Brien & Li, 2000; Shi, 1999; 
Ferdinand, 2000). In this thesis, the researcher does not intend to explore whether this 
‘democracy’ in China is genuine or not. However, the discussion of freedom of press 
cannot be isolated from the discussion of the machinery of democratic societies. As Steel 
(2012) explains: 
 
… the legal and political structures of democratic societies have developed to encompass 
a free media as part and parcel of the machinery of democratic societies. Freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press in particular, it is argued, oil the wheels of democracy 
and enable it to function according to its central tenets (Steel, 2012:  p. 169). 
 
Despite all the acknowledgement of news values across the journalistic practice in the 
West, the news media in China are significantly different, as these news values were 
undermined or compromised under the domination of the CCP—the word domination is 
used here over the term dictatorship, as the CCP’s Soviet Union/Communist form of 
control was different from the authoritarian dictatorship of feudal China. The significance 
of the status of Chinese news media, which Zhao (2000:p.3) refers to as the press “orbiting 
the party state”, is how news values in China depart from other global models. Zhao (1998) 
argues that none of the news values, such as the commitment to truth, providing 
entertainment, or other elements that compose the idea of journalism, are as important as 
reflecting the interests of the authorities in China: 
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The central concept that underlies the Party’s domination over the media is the ‘Party 
principle’ (dangxing yuanze): … the news media must accept the Party’s guiding ideology 
as its own; they must propagate the Party’s programs, policies, and directives; and they 
must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational principle and 
press policies (Zhao, 1998, p. 19; Bing, T. & Mei, C., 1993, p. 148). 
 
Thus, in assessing the news values of a particular news story, the ‘Party principle’ has to 
be prioritised. Journalists and news workers who act as gatekeepers, a subject which will 
be revisited in the analysis in Chapter 7.3.1, were determined to sustain their gatekeeping 
role by either compromising other news values, or looking for loopholes in the censorship 
policy to circumvent. Lam (2000) pointed out that the absence of clear-cut laws has left 
many journalists frustrated and vulnerable to the whims of CCP officials, and the “… 
vague media laws and regulations encourage self-censorship” (Lam, 2000, pp. 37–46).  
 
The Chinese news media is undergoing a process of transformation (Zhao, 2000; Tong, 
2009; Winfield & Peng, 2005), alongside other rapid changes in society, politics and 
economy (Huters, 2003). This process is arguably accelerated by the growth of the 
Internet (Yang, 2003). The downside, Zhang (2011) argued, is that the rise of the Internet 
allowed the Chinese authorities to extend its dominance from print and television to 
online news media, allowing Communist propaganda to hegemonize. However, there is 
some belief that marketization and commercialisation of China’s news media have had a 
liberalising effect (Esarey, 2005; Xu, Chu, & Zhongshi, 2002). Esarey (2005: p.56) argues 
that commercialisation shifts the media's loyalty from the Party to the advertisers, “who 
through a media organisation's appeal to consumers, provide the bulk of revenue”.  
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Zhao (2000: pp.3-4) indicates that a number of paradoxical phenomena exist throughout 
this transformation. While market competition has intensified for some news media, the 
Party has shown few signs of retreat and maintains mechanisms of control over news 
media content. With regard to media ownership and financial support, Winfield and Peng 
(2005) argued as follows: 
 
“The commercialization of the press drastically influenced China’s media landscape […] 
With media com-mercialization, the Party and government organs were becoming 
business entities, similar to a western capitalist system with advertising, subscription 
dependence and capital investment.” (Winfield & Peng, 2005: p.260) 
 
The influence of this shift was that many Chinese news media organisations gradually 
gained financial autonomy, which began to have an impact on their final product and 
media functions. The relationship between the media organisations and the government 
was also influenced (Zhao, 2000; Winfield & Peng, 2005: p.260). As a result, Chinese 
news media started reporting on cases of corruption by officials and a few of them became 
whistle-blowers uncovering scandals; efforts formally considered to be contradictory to 
the interests of the Party. During transformation, some Chinese media were encouraged 
to produce market-oriented content, that is, minimise the effect of the Party interests and 
instead concentrate on other news values due to the financial interests in operation. 
Arguably, the development of market forces weakening Chinese authorities’ control over 
media content is a significant characteristic of media transformation.  
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2.6 The Organisation of news and online news media in 
China 
There are a number of studies that have described media systems in China (See details in 
Chen Huailin and Lee, 1998; de Burgh, 2003; and Lam, 2000). This institutional system 
in which the media have been situated since 1949 comprises several distinct organisations, 
themselves appertaining either to the State or the CCP (de Burgh, 2003: p. 19). Lam (2000) 
described the framework of media organisations: 
 
Most media outlets are official organs or subordinate units of the CCP and government 
organisations. All heads of key media units are appointed by the CCP Central 
Committee’s Organisation Departments, or its local equivalent, and all report to the 
various propaganda departments of the CCP (Lam, 2000, p. 41). 
 
Zhao (1998) and Chu (1994) argued that throughout history and since the establishment 
of the CCP this form of media institution could have been reclaimed, as students and 
intellectuals   “… voiced their opposition to imperialism and to Chinese warlords” (1998: 
p. 19). As he described: 
 
The Party principle and the mouthpiece theory are constantly being emphasized and 
reinforced as the Party struggles to maintain control of the media. … Mao Zedong himself 
issued many directives to high Party leaders on the importance of maintaining complete 
control of the press and overcoming tendencies toward independence among propaganda 
workers (Zhao, 1998 p. 19). 
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The Party established “… organs and non-Party publications that were nevertheless under 
its leadership” (Zhao, 1998 p. 14), which still can be considered as the dominant feature 
of Chinese journalism today, as the post-Mao leadership continues to stress the theory of 
maintaining control of the press. For instance, Hu Yaobang, the former General Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the CCP (in office from 1982 to1987), in a widely publicised 
speech in 1985 stated: “The Party’s journalism is the Party’s mouthpiece” (Hu, 1985). 
 
With reference to the conception of journalists and the audience, Lee (2005) explored the 
continuities and discontinuities of three press models that had characterised modern 
China: Confucian liberal, Maoist, and communist/capitalist journalists. The Confucian 
liberal and Maoist journalists were discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
communist/capitalist media, however, was understood as paradoxically negotiating 
between communist ideological control and capitalist market operation (Lee, 2005: pp. 
117–21). The communist/capitalist journalists, as Lee analysed, remained virtually the 
employees of the State following the reformation from the late 1980s onward, but with 
different journalistic approaches in the news media. They had dual roles of ideological 
correctness and commercial profit. Their roles in news media were more like those of 
information providers rather than the Party cadres. The conception of the audience tends 
to be more market-orientated, and their journalistic practices have been more empirical, 
fieldwork-styled, and investigative. Yet they still have had an obligation to serve. Their 
dual roles had required the purpose of propaganda and of keeping uniformity of ideology 
as part of their political correctness, which refers to having sensibilities to where the 
minefields or taboos are in political discussion and keeping away from them. Here, the 
dual roles of ideological or political correctness and commercial profit in the media 
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industry in China do not apply only to the news workers of newspapers and TV, but also 
those working in the digital and online news environment. 
 
Like other journalists in general, the roles and functions of Chinese journalists also relate 
to “… the context and environment in which they work and the economic and temporal 
pressures they are under” (Steel, 2009 p. 583). As Steel wrote: 
 
Contemporary thinking about journalism’s role and function is not clear-cut and without 
controversy. … More critical analyses of journalism, however, stress the role it plays in 
helping maintain established positions of power within societies (Steel, 2009: p. 583). 
 
For Chinese journalists, the burden of being propaganda workers had been lightened 
along with the process of political reform. On the other hand, the economic pressures 
have increased. The system of the news media institutions in China proceeded through 
reforms of media marketisation (de Burgh, 2003, pp. 26–9). The production process of 
online news media also passed through a transformation into the market-driven 
environment. To stress the importance of paradoxical implications of marketisation in 
communist/capitalistic journalism, the paradoxical phenomena of online news media 
would easily find its theoretical ground. For instance, the construction of the online 
newsroom was formed under both the pressure of commercial profit and the hallmarks of 
the Party’s control, which the later analysis Chapters of 7: 7.4.4 will examine. 
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There are also arguments about the purported potential of the Internet to provide a space 
in which free speech may flourish (McNair, 2006 pp. 57–60). The significant growth of 
the Internet since the mid-1990s has placed debate about the potential consequences of 
this new media in the political process, as van de Donk et al. (2004) argued that most 
observers of the digital democracy were quite “subtle” about the impact of this evolution, 
and did not believe that it would  “… radically transform democracy in either a positive 
or a negative way” (van de Donk et al., 2004: p. 97; Loader, 2005). The sense of urgency 
with which the Chinese authorities have sought to control the Internet in China reflects 
the perception that the Internet does indeed provide a valuable space for free speech, as 
Castells (1991: pp. 168–9) argued that the innovations of information technology 
provided a powerful tool for organisational restructuring. 
 
In a broader sense, Nunziato (2009: p. 5) argued that studies that considered incidents of 
censorship and other forms of  discrimination by broadband providers found them 
difficult to establish or document with precision. Firstly, the average users might be 
unaware that the broadband provider was blocking some content that they should have 
access to. Secondly, providers might simply deny that they blocked undesirable content 
and refused to provide the information necessary for users to confirm or deny such 
restrictions. 
 
Yang (2009) linked the development of activism in China from the late 1980s before the 
era of the Internet, to a boom in online protests and campaigns in the first decade of the 
21st century (2009: pp. 29–31). Yang further categorised the evolution of China’s 
Internet-controlling regime in three phases, as the government responded to the challenge 
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of online activism by “… adjusting and refining its institutions and methods of control” 
(2009: p. 48). From 1994 to 2009, the evolution moved from the stages of network 
security regulation, Internet service provision, and institutional restructuring, to the stage 
of expanding and refining Internet control over Internet content-providers (ICPs) and 
individual consumers. Under the command of Hu Jingtao, the fourth generation of the 
Party leaders in China, the guidelines for strengthening Internet control were then set out. 
The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Regarding the 
Strengthening of the Party’s Ability to Govern in 2004 ensured the dominant control of 
the Party over the Internet, as its terms read: 
 
Attach great importance to the influence of the Internet and other new media on public 
opinion, step up the establishment of a management institution that integrates legal 
binding, administrative monitoring and management, occupational self-discipline, and 
technical guarantees, strengthen the building of an Internet propaganda team, and forge 
the influence of positive opinion on the Internet (Wang, 2004) 
 
It is therefore the new framework of Internet control encompassing institutional structure, 
legal instruments, self-discipline, and professionalism (Knight & Horrocks, 2010) for 
news workers, technological insurance, and proactive propaganda and public opinion 
channelisation/orientation (Yang, 2009). Castells (1991) argued that in the contemporary 
era of new technologies in information, centralisation in organisational decision-making 
was no longer dominant. It is arguable that a limited style of criticism of officials and the 
government’s policies in China’s news media is indeed a reflection of this perception 
(Cheng & White, 1991), which indicates that the exposure of societal problems is no 
longer a taboo. These criticisms and exposures of course are limited, controlled and 
filtered by the authorities (Hong, 2006: pp. 299–300). For optimists, the Party’s relaxation 
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of ideological control over news media is seen as a sign of democratisation in China 
(Hong, 2006). However, Tong (2011) described a different landscape of the Chinese 
media in which investigative journalism flourished in the 1990s, peaked around 2003, but 
has become harsher during the 21st century. The illustrated landscape demonstrated a 
decline in investigative news reports in both their quality and quantity under the pressure 
of government intervention and re-constraining of ideology control in the news media 
(Tong, 2011). 
 
Tong (2011) summarised a number of tactics that the central and local government had 
adopted to interfere with the news media which had posed a great threat to local 
authorities via investigative reporting: issuing official regulations to forbid investigative 
reports, issuing reporting instructions and bans to newsrooms, and blocking journalists’ 
access to information and news sources (Tong, 2011: pp. 54–6). These methods of 
interference resulted in resistance from the news workers. Tong (2009, 2011) also listed 
a number of factors that preserve Chinese investigative journalism. Many of them are 
relevant and will be expanded on, referred to, and revisited in the later analysis (Chapter 
6: 4.4, & Chapter 7: 5.2). These relevant factors are: 
 
1) Central government’s paradoxical attitude to investigative journalism seems to swing 
between a loosening and a tightening of media controls. 
2) Media organisations are concerned about maintaining their popularity and credibility 
with the readers, which would consequently relate to their commercial profit. 
3) Journalistic professionalism contributes to the survival of ‘watchdog’ journalism in 
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China, and the institutionalisation within the media organisation makes practising 
investigative journalism not part of the journalists’ individual activities, but part of 
the media’s organisational activity. 
4) A number of counterstrategies, which Tong (2009) called “guerrilla tactics” and the 
author names “journalistic tricks” (see Chapter 6: 4.4), ensure information can be 
mediated safely under censorship. 
5) The Internet also contributes to the survival of investigative journalism, as it provides 
online resources and exaggerates the influences of reports, which the central and local 
authorities cannot repress (Tong, 2011). 
 
Although Tong’s analysis of investigative journalism in China was mainly concerned 
with offline activities, it may also be applied to online news activities. The analysis of the 
tortuous development and strategies and counterstrategies of Chinese investigative 
journalism can also be extended to the level of the online news media, as both of them 
can be considered as practising the role of watchdog journalism in China. Also, the online 
news media were constrained by the authorities in a similar way to how investigative 
journalism in newspapers and TV was constrained. The media reform in China that de 
Burgh (2003) recognised was thus reversing its position from authoritarian to libertarian 
to some extent, although the Party’s control over the media was not loosened enough, to 
conclude anything other than that the press in China is now still considered to be an 
instrument of government. 
 
51 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted literature that this study aims to locate. It identifies key fields, 
including news values, gatekeeping, construction of online/offline news media in China 
and journalistic professionalism. The chapter firstly looks at existing definitions of the key 
concepts of this study: censorship and self-censorship. Although many theories have 
defined these concepts in general terms (Petley, 2009; Jones, 2011; Horton, 2011), the 
struggle for autonomy within the online newsroom in China is still problematic (Tong, 
2009). This leads to questions about journalistic professionalism in the context of China’s 
online news media. How important is objectivity in China’s online news media? And under 
what circumstances would it be undermined? Schudson and Anderson (2009) argue that 
Chinese journalists may operate according to journalistic normative other than objectivity, 
and Josephi (2009) also indicates that in China, the ideology of objectivity can be a cover 
for loyalty towards the authority.  
 
Therefore, an understanding of news values in China may have departed from the Western 
schools of journalism, according to which journalists judge what is newsworthy (Harrison, 
2006; Conboy, 2010 & 2012; Steel, 2012). As McNair (2009) argues, there is political 
demand for journalists to support a dominant ideology “imposed by the ruling political 
faction” (2009: p.241). Chinese news workers, online or offline, are required to serve the 
propaganda and sustain uniformity of ideology as a way to exercise political correctness 
(Zhao, 1998; Lee, 2005). This situation, however, is arguably experiencing a 
transformation, as marketisation (de Burgh, 2003), technology (McNair 2006), and 
journalism education (Kalathil & Boas, 2010) push the boundaries of online news 
reporting and test the tolerance of Chinese authorities. 
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The next chapter will begin exploring how the concepts of freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press were historically introduced, developed, and associated with Chinese 
philosophical schools as they relate to autonomy and the concept of individual freedom. It 
will further introduce the historical and social background of online censorship in China, 
in order to contribute to the construction of the previously identified inverted censorship 
pyramid. 
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Chapter 3 Literature review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores, in the context of Chinese journalism, how the concepts of freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press were historically introduced, developed, and 
associated with Chinese philosophical schools as they relate to autonomy and the concept 
of individual freedom. In connecting the theory of freedom of speech with the notion of 
freedom of the press, Steel (2012) presented a thorough description for the development 
of how, in British, US and French traditions, journalism and freedom of the press were 
associated with liberalism and democracy (Steel, 2012: pp. 24–40; Schauer, 1982; Kelly, 
2005; Levine, 2002). The democratic tradition can be traced back to its origin in ancient 
Greece. Democracy did not develop during the enlightenment, rather certain relationships 
between individuals and the state, the role of reason in politics and the principles of public 
sovereignty started to be forged. There were a few signs of what we would identify as 
‘liberty’ today (Gray, 1984; Grey, 1986; Barendt, 2005; Brenkert, 1991). Arguably, the 
ancient world had a conception of liberty that was somewhat different from that held in 
modern times. However, the modern liberal viewpoint, as Gray (1984: pp.7-8) argued, 
“… feels immediately at home in Greece”, since the content of Greek freedom “… 
involved a number of rights and privileges”. Rawls is ultimately concerned that people 
act freely but in ways that do not undermine the liberty of others (Steel, 2012: p11; Rawls, 
1972). Followed by his discussion of the rise of censorship and control, Steel then 
explores a historical review of Milton’s intellectual contribution to conceptions of press 
freedom, and formed the discussion of how the narrow conception of press freedom had 
emerged and developed in Britain (Steel, 2012; Eccleshall, 1986; Marchall, 1992). Unlike 
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its historical development in Britain (Danziger & Gliksman, 2004; Nagel, 2007), US and 
France, the conceptions of journalism and freedom of the press in China did not emerge 
by themselves, but were introduced externally. Although similar ideas can be traced back 
to ancient times in China, i.e. pre-Confucius times (before around 551–479 BC), it was 
not until the late 19th century that these Western concepts were introduced from the West 
into China as part of colonialism. 
 
Confucianism is arguably a vital philosophical school that has influenced contemporary 
understandings of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in contemporary China. In 
order to examine these understandings from the perspective of online news workers and 
cyber police, it is necessary to provide an overview of the specific elements of Chinese 
history and culture that explicitly relate to how censorship practices are operationalised 
and experienced. In other words, the contemporary experience of censorship as identified 
in this thesis can only be adequately understood via a broader appreciation of the 
historically and culturally significant legacy of Confucianism. The assertions of historical 
and philosophical association between freedom of speech and freedom of the press, along 
with the mechanisms of controlling and suppression (Steel, 2012: p. 169) are also an 
assessment that this chapter aims to explore in the context of the Chinese news media, 
although the concept of freedom of speech and freedom of the press were imported and 
have had a considerably shorter life than in the West. 
 
This chapter further outlines a turbulent development of how freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press were understood, respected, suppressed, or digested in China after it 
was introduced by early Chinese liberalists. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) had an enormous 
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influence over the construction of the news media in China, as his perspective of and 
attitude towards the roles of journalism shifted from a liberal viewpoint in his early times 
to one similar to that of the “Soviet Communist” model (Siebert et al., 1956) after China’s 
Communist Party came to power around 1949.  
 
Lastly, the historical and social context of online censorship is reviewed. The aim of 
analysing the background of online censorship is to provide this study with a political and 
historical context of China’s construction and modes of censorship. The discussion on the 
environment of free speech in China has become increasingly critical in recent years 
(Yang, 2003; Mackinnon, 2008). At the same time it has attracted public attention in 
China and instigated debates around the possibility of democratic reform (Hughes, 2003; 
Huters, 2003). Such a discussion involves the nature and scope of free speech in China, 
the nature and scope of freedom amongst Chinese online news workers, how censorship 
manifests, and how the Chinese authorities censor people’s speech online. 
 
This section also outlines examples of online censorship and online news media. In doing 
so it contextualises the blocking of foreign websites, the conflicts between Chinese 
authorities and foreign Internet firms, the rise of microblog as a form of news, and various 
historical and economic reasons for the existence of censorship, particularly within the 
liberal tradition of southern China’s media. In summary, the scope of this chapter is 
limited to China’s online news censorship, although it looks at the broader landscape of 
how the mechanisms of online news censorship are constructed. It also cites major 
incidents that have occurred since the authorities have sought to manage the control of 
the Internet.  
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3.2 Confucianism and its relationship to freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press in China 
3.2.1 The divine theory and channelisation theory in Pre-Confucian 
times 
Though no definitive conception of freedom of speech or expression emerges in Chinese 
political thought until the latter part of the nineteenth century from the First Opium War 
in 1839 (Hucker, 1975; Feuerwerker, Murphey & Wright, 1967; Hsü, 1971), Chinese 
ancient history does shed some important light on the significance of the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled and the appropriate behaviour of both rulers and the ruled 
in respect to speech and expression. Both of these theories can be seen in terms of a debate 
concerning the subject’s right to speak against the authority of the ruling elite without 
punitive sanction. In other words, both of these ideas signal attempts to reign in ruling 
power and ensure that dissent was managed effectively.  
 
The notion of divine theory relates to the legitimacy and authority of the ruler over their 
subjects to control and discipline critics. Often those who spoke out against tyranny or 
unjust rule were harshly punished and sanctioned. For example, King Zhόu (? – c. 1046 
BC) of the Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1046 BC), portrayed as a heinous and debauched 
tyrant, sentenced to death those who dared to criticise his lavish and corrupt lifestyle. The 
principle of divine theory was an attempt by intellectuals to reign in the ultimate power 
of rulers by suggesting that punishing dissenters was an act of blasphemy and an insult to 
the gods (Sima, 1969). Crushing dissent or criticism was an insubordination of the 
principle of kind-heartedness and justice; and rulers who committed such acts might be 
condemned and punished by the gods which might also potentially result in their earthly 
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downfall. Ancient Chinese intellectuals therefore used this principle of divinity to 
constrain the absolute authority of the ruler and encourage kind-heartedness and justice. 
In contrast, the sagacious ruler knows how to take criticism and listen to advice from his 
people (Sima, 1969; Hsu, 1971) 
 
The divine theory used the rulers’ fear of their own downfall to prevent their suppression 
of the right to speak. However, it had two downsides. Firstly, the process of constraining 
the power of rulers was extremely time-consuming (Lu, 1933: p. 13). Secondly, the divine 
theory might only be effective if the ruler was either sagacious, ambitious, or at least 
sensible (Sima, 1969). A sagacious ruler would know the importance of taking advice and 
listening to criticism. An ambitious and sensible ruler might have a perspective of the 
overall situation and restrain himself for the sake of his own dominance. Principally, the 
practice of this theory was highly reliant on the personal judgement of imperial rulers to 
be effective. The hereditary feudal system could not guarantee that every king in a dynasty 
possessed the precious characteristics, such as sagaciousness, ambition, or sensibility (Lu, 
1933: pp. 13, 14). 
 
The channelling theory was another significant school of thought that intellectuals used 
to constrain the authority of the ruling class. The term of ‘channellisation’ was firstly used 
by Zhao-Hu (dates of birth and death unknown; c. 841 BC), a minister of the Zhou 
Dynasty (1046–771 BC) at the time of the Citizens’ Riot in 841 BC, as he compared the 
right to speak with a form of natural phenomenon, by stating that banning people’s speech 
was as dangerous as blocking the water of a flood (Lu., 1993), and he proclaimed that 
channelling people’s resentment of the ruling class was a preferable solution for solving 
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political crisis, i.e. that rulers should grant people the right to criticise them, in order to 
assuage people’s negative emotions, such as hatred and resentment, and to prevent the 
downfall of imperial governance. 
 
Channelisation theory also seeks to emphasise certain limits to executive power. However, 
instead of attempting to set up a divine sanction for rulers who did not allow subjects a 
voice, this theory states that rather than prohibiting people from speaking out against 
unjust rule, people should be encouraged to ‘channel’ their energies in ways that can be 
managed by the authorities. In this way social stability, an important element of Chinese 
political culture could remain intact.  
 
The channelling theory regarded the power of dictatorship as being superior to the right 
to speak, which could be limited by the will of a ruler. It granted that the ruler had the 
power to either allow or disallow people to criticise or give advice. The sole purpose of 
allowing the existence of criticism and the right to speak for people was to maintain the 
dominant status of the ruling class. Without questioning the irrationality of brutal 
censorship, it was therefore people’s right to speak, regarded as the product of a ruler’s 
benefaction (Schafer, 1951: pp. 133–8). Yet the channellisation theory failed to provide 
explicit guidelines, to demonstrate to the ruler how and where exactly these negative 
emotions could be channelled. 
 
Traces of this sentiment can be seen in how gatekeepers and censors rationalise their 
activities. Arguably, this principle, also known as the mechanism of guiding public 
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opinion (Pan & Chan, 2005) or “… to eliminate instabilities” in order to maintain social 
stability (ibid., 2005; de Burgh, 2003), represents the core principle guiding censorship 
in online news media in China. The news is presented in a way by which the public 
opinion can be efficiently guided and channelled, favourable to the Chinese authorities. 
Lam even argued that this may be seen as a form of “heavy-handed manipulation of media” 
(2000: p. 37). The legacy of channellisation, which is also commonly seen in the 
production process of online news media, will be analysed in Chapter 5: 5.3 and Chapter 
6: 4.2. 
 
3.2.2 Morality as the centre of Confucianism 
Before Confucianism was authorised by King Wu of Han (157–87 BC) as the only official 
philosophical thinking in 138 BC (Dubs, 1938: p. 435), historians had played a significant 
role in exercising channellisation theory. The historians were appointed directly by the 
imperial court. Their job was to record political activities and historical events and to 
present the emperor with the records of public criticisms of policies from the public (Sima, 
1969). From the perspective of contemporary Chinese study and historical analysis, 
records produced by the historians became extremely important and critical, since the 
material was then edited and amended for the official historical record by the historians 
of the next dynasty. Historians were required to be extremely honest and professional as 
they were obliged to record truthfully and objectively (Sima, 1969). These characteristics 
of pre-Confucian figures have also had an influence on contemporary China, as Tong 
(2011) argued that contemporary journalists in China have inherited honesty and integrity 
from historical figures such as Bao Zheng (AD 999–1062) and Hai Rui (1514–1587) 
(Tong, 2011: pp. 18, 19). There is little evidence to suggest that these historians had an 
awareness of the concept of free speech, but as a group of intellectuals their obligation 
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was to record independently without interference from the authorities. The culture of 
historians required them to write the “objective truth” without fear or favour (Sima, 1969). 
A similar characteristic of professionalism is also pursued by contemporary Chinese 
journalists as they too praise the attempts of being honest and objective without 
interference by the authorities in reporting news stories (Tong, 2011), principles of most 
models of journalism worldwide. 
 
The historians were also praised by Confucius (551–479 BC) because of their sense of 
morality, which was conceived by Confucius as reinforcing his theory of the right to speak. 
It was one of the crucial concepts that he advocated, a central point of Confucianism 
(Ivanhoe et al., 2001). Confucius did not support constraining the power of feudal rulers 
by using their fear of downfall. Instead he focused on the solution of how rulers could be 
advised to restrain their power. He developed the notion of kind-heartedness and justice 
from the divine principle to suggest that a State should be ruled by a moral dominator 
who could be kind and just (De Bary, 1991). The moral dominator, as Confucius 
presumed, would know the importance of taking advice from others; his sense of morality 
would refrain him from punishing people who criticised him (Zhang & Schwartz, 1997: 
pp. 193–4). Confucius thus introduced his theoretical framework of morality, which 
consisted of his proposition of the right to speak, known as the ‘morality’ of Confucianism. 
In Analects of Confucius (2008), which was written by his pupils to record his statements 
and actions, Confucius interpreted his definition of morality as referring to knowing good 
and then being good; whereas immorality was either knowing good but being bad, or 
knowing bad, then being bad (Confucius, 2008). 
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Fairbank (1979) understood that in Confucian discourses, individuals are “… subservient 
to the State, personal duty is more important than individual rights” (Lee, 2005: p. 109). 
Confucius enrolled his pupils to spread his philosophy and political propositions. 
Confucianism—the Confucian doctrine—was defined as follows: 
 
Confucianism was but one philosophy among many, including Menciusm, Taoism and 
Legalism. To strengthen his power, Han Wudi (140–87 BC), emperor of the West Han 
Dynasty, followed the advice of the renowned scholar, Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BC), by 
rejecting all philosophies except Confucianism. Since then all feudal rulers have followed 
Confucianism and enforced it as a secular religion (Zhang & Schwartz, 1997: p. 193). 
 
As Confucius defined it, being good could be interpreted differently according to its 
subject. For a dominator, being good meant being kind to his people in the State. A moral 
dominator was capable of accepting reasonable criticisms (Confucius, 2008; Kim, 2003). 
This was the ideal “benevolent governance” (Zhang, 1999) to which Confucius referred. 
As he commented in The Book of Songs (Waley, 1937), a collection of folk poetry that he 
edited: 
… do not blame the speaker, take note of his warning; an exhortation to speak one’s mind 
without fear of reprisals, and with the expectation of being taken seriously (Waley, 1937). 
 
On the other hand, for citizens, being good meant to be self-disciplined and not to criticise  
the ruling class. He commented, “When the way prevails in the realm, the common people 
do not debate politics among themselves” (Analects of Confucius, 2008: 16.2, Li Shi). 
The right to speak, from the perspective of Confucian morality, should not overrule the 
interests of the State or the power of the ruler. Critics of the rulers had to be self-
disciplined to be moral, which meant that the interests of the State were the crucial criteria 
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to determine whether the critics were being moral or proper. If propositions of critics were 
consistent with the interests of the State, they were proper. However, if the propositions 
of critics were contradictory to the interests of the State, they were improper and critics 
should be silent. Hence, Confucius argued that ‘being good’ for citizens meant to “… not 
watch what is improper; do not listen to what is improper; do not speak improperly and 
do not act improperly” (Analects of Confucius, 2008: 12.2, Yan Yuan). Like the 
channellisation theory, Confucius also viewed the right to speak as a product of a ruler’s 
benefaction. Moral citizens were to know when to stop their participation in political 
discussions properly, as their permission to speak was granted by the authorities. This 
was what Confucius regarded as—I theorise—the limited freedom of the right to speak. 
In this manner, Confucius’ contributions were to define the notion of morality as a 
guideline of being good for both the rulers and the citizens, and brought forward his 
theory of limited freedom. 
 
3.2.3 The Legacy of Confucius 
In essence, the core of Confucian ethics was being kind-hearted. Confucius incorporated 
kind-heartedness into the concept of morality and attempted to lecture rulers to respect 
human nature, and thus to forbid the right to speak would contradict his philosophy of 
morality (De Bary, 1991; Ivanhoe et al., 2001; Crossley, 1992). His pursuit of kind-
heartedness was discussed and reinterpreted by Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Although a 
rationalist and a Neo-Confucian, he nevertheless generated criticism of the right to 
individual freedom based on notions of man’s natural morality. It has been argued 
(Gardner, 2003; Ivanhoe, et al., 2001; Dallmayr, 2002) that Zhu Xi believed human nature 
was derived from spirit and mind. Human nature could only be understood when it was 
rooted in the grounds of rational principles. In his memorial to the throne, he indicated 
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that the rational principle was the origin of man’s nature. Being just therefore means the 
obeying of certain rational principles (Gardner, 2003). Human desires, for Zhu Xi, were 
unjust because having these desires disobeyed the rational principle. Therefore, he 
proclaimed that individual freedom should be restrained and controlled by the ruling class, 
and the freedom of the right to speak should be undermined. 
 
Zhu Xi defined the meaning of ‘rational principles’ in many ways. He referred to the 
relationship between rational principles and human nature as the relationship between 
disciplinary virtue and greed (De Bary, 1991). Zhu Xi considered slander, spreading of 
rumour, and irrational verbal attacks as irresponsible speech (De Bary, 1991, Makeham, 
2003). He suggested that the rulers of the State had to exercise their political power to 
censor and discipline the irresponsible speech before it brought harm to the interests of 
the State. Furthermore, Zhu unduly praised this notion to a virtual level and suggested 
that the imperial rulers restricted the public from participating in political and social 
discussions because he believed the common people knew little regarding what would 
benefit the interests of the State (Gardner, 2003) and their autonomy was unreliable. As 
a result, his morality was interpreted as a theory of a more limited freedom of the right to 
speak and individual freedom, which theoretically underpinned the literary inquisition, a 
form of accusation for people who were condemned for their speech crimes in feudal 
China. 
 
Zhu Xi’s proposition of censorship thus offered the feudal rulers the ideological support 
for literary inquisition and centralisation, which were mainly used to persecute scholars 
whose criticisms offended the highest imperial ruler before his time. For example, Yang 
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Yun (?–54 BC), a general of the Han Dynasty (202 BC–AD 220), was executed because 
he had mocked an agricultural policy in his essay, a letter to Sun Huizong. The musician 
and poet Xi Kang (223–263) was executed because he had questioned the validity of the 
dictatorship of Emperor Wen (211–265) in public, and Su Shi (1037–1101), a statesman 
and a poet of the Song Dynasty (960–1279), was banished twice as he repeatedly 
criticised the reformation of the highest ruler. After Zhu Xi, the scope of literary 
inquisition was expanded, especially in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The Qing rulers 
were notorious for their use of literary inquisitions, as not only scholars or critics suffered 
but the more common people were also victims. For instance, in a single “case of the 
history of the Ming Dynasty” between 1661 and 1662, “no less than a thousand” people 
were killed or exiled, based on unwarranted charges of being offensive to the imperial 
court (Wong, 2000). 
 
The reason for reviewing the historical and conceptual development of Confucius and his 
successors is that the only authorised philosophical thinking in feudal China—
Confucianism and its manifest of limited freedom—still heavily influence the way in 
which censorship is understood and experienced in the news media in China today. It has 
been argued that Confucianism had an enormous impact on the early Chinese press from 
1919 to 1949, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (Levenson, 1962; Lee, 
2005; Passin, 1963). The early Chinese press was “… strongly modernizing, opposing 
the forces and ideologies based on Confucianism and tradition” (Passin, 1963). And yet, 
anti-traditional reformists of the media operated “… within the framework of 
Confucianism and rebelled against it” (Lee, 2005, p. 109). Although Confucianism began 
to lose its position, unchallenged since the decay of the Qing dynasty in the 19th century 
and had to compete with other social doctrines of Western thought, it still influenced the 
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formation of Chinese philosophical thinking and Chinese news media to a great extent. 
For example, Fairbank (1979) called ‘Maoism’ “… Confucianism in Leninist garb”, as 
both Maoism and Leninism “… stress the pivotal role of ideology” and “… share the 
elitist and statist orientations”, while the former was developed and rooted in a Confucian 
tradition in China (Lee, 2005, p. 110). Based on the strongly retained ideology of 
Confucian legacies, Mao declared, “Politics takes command of the press” and the press 
and communist journalists were democratically centralised, i.e. the media was to be 
commanded by the Chinese authorities to “… create social impact closely related to the 
grand ideology and political lines” (Lee, 2005, p. 110). 
 
Hence, the contemporary administrative structure of the news media in China found their 
theoretic basis in the limited freedom and morality of Confucianism. For instance, during 
the Cultural Revolution (1967–77) which de Burgh (2003) called the “destruction of 
journalism”, Chinese journalism was understood as a tool for the purpose of maintaining 
uniformity in public opinion and propagandising the image of the communist leaders. 
News stories that were unfavourable to the Chinese authorities, such as criticism of the 
government or its policies, were strictly prohibited. Arguably, this form of administrative 
intervention was gradually changed, and the emergence of massive critical reports on 
social problems and government policies from the news media were approved (Tong, 
2012: pp. 35–48). But the philosophical thinking of the freedom of people/citizens is that 
the benefaction of the authorities can be given and taken, and remains intact. The limited 
freedom is, therefore, suitable for underpinning media censorship which the later analysis 
Chapter 7:3.1 & 3.2 will explore. 
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3.3 Maoism, media control and propaganda before online 
news in China 
3.3.1 The May 4th Movement: introducing free speech and freedom 
of the press to China 
With the reinforcement of the imperial rulers, people’s right to speak was restricted, 
although Confucianism proposed limited freedom within it. The concept of the right to 
speak in ancient China was derived from morality. Chinese scholar-bureaucrats did not 
extend the scope of the right to speak into law. Up to the point when literary inquisition 
caused social instability in the Qing dynasty, the utopianism that restrained the feudal 
powers from violating the right to speak was considered a failure (Hucker, 1975). Before 
a comprehensive concept of freedom of speech and freedom of the press was introduced 
to China after the First Opium War in 1839, freedom of speech had never been considered 
at a legislative level in China. 
 
After the First Opium War, the works of Western philosophers were translated into 
Chinese, and with them the concepts of free speech and freedom of press. Translators 
who specialised in translating Western books into Chinese emerged during the period 
when knowledge of foreign languages was extremely low. Translators therefore became 
crucial to the introduction of the concepts of free speech and freedom of the press to China. 
For example, Yan Fu (1854–1921) translated J. S. Mill’s On Liberty and Thomas 
Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (Yan, 2004), the latter considered to have made an 
enormous contribution to civil education and enlightenment in the modern history of 
China (Schwartz, 2009). Yan Fu interpreted J. S. Mill based on his own understanding 
and developed his theory of human nature. Human nature, for Yan Fu, consisted of 
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freedom of speech and of choice, where concepts of public and private become evident; 
a man should not be punished if he only spoke in private, despite the fact that his speech 
might be offensive to the governors. Based on this theory, he directly criticised the literary 
inquisition, as the inquisition and the philosophy that stood against the freedoms of speech 
and of choice (Schwartz, 2009). 
 
Radical criticism of Confucianism began from the May Fourth Movement in 1919 
(Schwartz, 1986). The movement was seen as a volcanic eruption in China, as many 
Western schools of thought were rapidly introduced. It was seen as China’s own 
enlightenment movement (Feuerwerker, Murphy & Wright, 1967; Schwartz, 1986). Lu 
Xun (1881–1936) analogised censorship of the press to the chains of cultured persecution, 
and proposed that people should be free to participate in political discussions in a public 
area without fear of being punished or persecuted (Lu, 1933). Confucian limited freedom 
of the right to speak was sharply criticised as “fake freedom”, as Lu argued that the limited 
freedom theory and Confucian morality gave people “fake hope”, and deluded them into 
thinking that they could have freedom of speech that could never be redeemed (1933: p. 
36). 
 
Lu (1933) believed that the Chinese people’s freedom of speech should not be a product 
of the ruler’s benefaction, and defined it as a just and fair freedom for every human being, 
regardless of class. Freedom of speech should not be given or be permitted by anyone. 
On the contrary, this freedom was within the notion of human nature, i.e. people were 
born to have freedom of speech and the limits of freedom should not be limited by the 
will of the government (Lu, 1933: pp. 37–8). 
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As a result of the May Fourth Movement and other subsequent social movements, 
freedom of speech was recognised as a fundamental right and eventually was written into 
law for the first time in the history of China. The Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) promulgated in 1947, (Chapter II, Article 11) states: “The people shall 
have freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication.” Similarly, Article 35 of the 
Constitution of the PRC (promulgated in 1949) also states: “Citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession and of demonstration.” However, despite the fact that freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press were legitimated in China, the full realisation of both has been 
limited in practice. 
 
3.3.2 The Communist Party’s criticism and self-criticism in journalism 
The understanding of free speech and freedom of the press in China were treated 
differently in the periods of Mao and post-Mao, and the understandings and practices of 
freedom of the press resulted in different social impacts. These developments and shifts 
were socially driven and reflected the development of the news industry in China. This is 
not to classify Mao as a simple individual who had enormous influence in contemporary 
China. Rather, he was seen as a representative figure of communism in China who came 
to signify the era which witnessed the development of the Chinese news industry (Dirlik, 
1978). The waves of Maoism and his interpretations of communism also influenced the 
structure and mechanisms of Chinese news media and, later, the online news media.  
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It is worth noting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has traditions of what Mao 
advocated as “criticism and self-criticism” (Mao, 1964). It was interpreted as an 
embracing gesture for media supervision, of controlling and disciplining Party cadres 
(Tong, 2011: p. 23). There was a period of time during which criticism and self-criticism 
were both welcomed. Journalists were encouraged to report, criticise, and investigate 
social crises, injustice, and unfairness on behalf of the underprivileged class. Thus, 
criticism and self-criticism were tools used by the Communist Party for purification, 
which was defined by Mao (1964) as a political reformatory process of educating the 
Party members’ mindset and creating strong believers in communism. 
 
After becoming one of the main leaders of the CCP, Mao regarded freedom of speech as 
a powerful weapon for communistic revolution. In The United Government (1951), he 
quoted the ancient philosopher Su Xun (1009–1066) who had spoken of “… saying all 
that you know and saying it without any reserve” (Mao, 1951, p. 1096) to stress his 
political view. He believed that in political discussions it was always a better scenario to 
have an open and free public sphere rather than a closed and censored one, as he claimed 
that only the people’s participation in political discussion without fear could assist the 
prospect of democracy and liberalism in China. He also criticised Confucianism thought 
by referring to its doctrine as only looking at the self-regulation and self-governance in 
terms of morality. Confucianism, as Mao objected, was concerned with the morality of 
being good for the governors and ruling class, but underrated the power of autonomy and 
freedom. If a governor believed in Confucius and ignored the autonomy and freedom that 
people should have, he was being neither moral nor politically just. Therefore, Mao 
recommended criticism and self-criticism, which he later specified as “media supervision 
of the governance” and contributed to investigative journalism (Tong, 2011: pp. 23–4). 
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This is principally a reflection of what Steel (2009) regarded as “prioritizing the interests” 
in respect of the capitalist market: 
 
Journalism can be seen as reflecting particular values that prioritize the interests of those 
who have the most to gain from the market of news production and dissemination (Steel, 
2009: p. 583). 
 
It was at that time that the press in China functioned in a “top down” manner (Siebert et 
al., 1956, p. 2), typically constructed in a way that Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) 
understood within their authoritarian category of the press. A few men who possessed 
power were to be the centre of decision-making in the media, and the products of mass 
communication were to serve the rulers. Hence, it was not surprising that Mao’s original 
political propositions were shifted after the Communist Party obtained political power, as 
the dominant status of the Party became the interest that needed to be prioritised. 
Although Mao was a supporter of establishing a liberal society in China in his early years, 
he changed his views on freedom of speech and freedom of the press after he became the 
leader of the PRC. The process of this shift of political propositions might even have 
occurred earlier than that. In his conference report, Opposing Liberalism in 1937, he 
criticised the over-emphasised concept of individual freedom which had negative effects 
on China’s Communist Party. Some comrades appeared to disobey the Party and its orders 
(Mao, 1951). He described liberal thought as a corrosive agent that could corrupt the 
solidarity of communist comradeship. If his comrades were to care more about the pursuit 
of personal values than achieving communist values, it would harm the Party’s collective 
will and its organisation. 
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Mao was later described as a dictator rather than a liberal, as he censored and disciplined 
people who criticised communism and government policies (Patten, 2005). In 1966, he 
launched the Cultural Revolution, a ten-year social movement that was full of literary 
inquisitions and abuses of liberty (Bridgham, 1967; Deng & Treiman, 1997). During the 
time of the Cultural Revolution, journalists were obliged to serve the interests of the CCP 
as part of its propaganda mechanism, rather than journalistic practices. The purpose of 
propaganda served to emphasise that the class struggle and proletarian revolution were 
the most important tasks for the whole country, from journalists, politicians, workers, 
even to school pupils. Press freedom was overlooked or devalued, and as de Burgh (2003, 
p19) notes, the Cultural Revolution brought about the destruction of journalism as we 
understand it. 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, often the authorities could charge an individual by 
assuming that his thinking or behaviour might be harmful to others or to the “highest 
ideality of communism” (Han, 2006), which principally would equal the interests of the 
authorities. In order to uphold the best interests of the majority, any individual who might 
have been “… corrupted by the capitalism and imperialism” (Mao, 1964: Chaps. 11 & 13) 
had committed crime in thought. These judgements of crime were often made by a group 
of frenetic people who had little knowledge of human rights (Angle, 2002; Kent, 1993), 
law, and free speech, and not by a court in a country with an adequate legal system. They 
were, in this sense, another form of literary inquisition under the name of the highest 
ideals of communism (Deng & Treiman, 1997; Tsou, 1969). The suspects who were 
considered as anti-revolutionists would suffer public humiliation in the street and physical 
abuse. The Cultural Revolution encouraged self-censorship and cross-surveillance, and 
created a consciousness of class struggle among civilians. It destroyed trust between 
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friends, family members, and colleagues. Freedom of the press was then strictly limited 
and the news media barely engaged in political discussions (Deng & Treiman, 1997; de 
Burgh, 2003). 
 
The fear of saying anything but ‘Long live the leader!’ and singing praise for the doctrine 
of communism is basically mirrored by today’s North Korea, where the professional 
journalists have little room to practise journalism, and the voice of the press is isolated 
and stereotyped. The study of this typical communist form of propaganda can be traced 
back to the 1930s, when the Soviet Union used it to remove the profit motive from 
publishing and broadcasting, and integrated mass communication “… into the total 
communication system and into the total government” (Siebert et al., 1956: pp. 140–1). 
 
However, this study does not intend to pursue too much detail about how Stalinists 
operated the propaganda machine. The purpose of bringing the propaganda studies of the 
Soviet Union into the picture is to provide a reference point for the form or manifestation 
of the communist propaganda that the Chinese journalists—more precisely, Chinese 
propagandists—used for similar goals of serving the ideals of communism as the interests 
of the authorities. 
 
China had imitated the constitution of its communist neighbour, the USSR, before the 
Soviet Union broke apart in 1989. This included a large scale of institutional forms of 
government departments. The institutional influence of the Soviet Union also expanded 
to cultural and media levels, as some may argue this influence is still strong today 
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(Lindtner & Szablewicz, 2010; Chang, 2001). The Party’s infiltration of the online news 
media is arguably a significant legacy of journalism in the class-struggle period before 
1977, when the Party members who represented the proletariat had to rule the mouthpiece. 
This infiltration resulted in “a sterile uniformity of Mao worship and political formulae” 
as de Burgh (2003, p. 60) described it. 
 
Chinese society experienced a dramatic transformation after 1977, when Mao’s death led 
to a dramatic change in journalism in China. Along with the reform of the economy, the 
press was reformed in a way in which saw previously taboo subjects, such as “natural 
disasters, riots or resistance to Chinese rule by the Turks or Tibetans” (de Burgh, 2003: 
p. 66) be reported. In 1989, plans to separate the Party from the civil service were initiated 
(de Burgh, 2003: p. 66). In Chapter 8: 8.2.1 and 8.4, I argued that exfoliation of the Party 
and the government in China leads to loopholes in censorship regulation, which online 
news workers can use to negotiate and leverage with the authorities over online content.  
 
3.3.3 Propaganda in Communist China: nationalism and salvation in 
journalism 
It is worth noting that neither in journalistic nor political terms has ‘propaganda’ had 
negative connotations among communists (Jowett & o’Donnell, 2014). Because, 
“Communism is said to provide an objective and scientific understanding of the world, 
little distinction is made between propaganda and education” (Clark, 1997: p. 73; Hardt, 
1979). Evidently, nationalistic salvation has been adopted by China’s Communist Party 
as one of the key concepts in its strategy of propaganda since the beginning of its 
establishment in the early 1920s. Mao extracted the proposition of proletarian revolution, 
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and then integrated it with nationalism and salvation (Chang, 2001; Han, 2006). 
Throughout the history of the Sino-Japan wars (1931-1945), and the Third Domestic War 
(1946–49), and following the official establishment of the PRC in 1949, China’s 
Communist Party consistently portrayed itself as the representative of the proletariat and 
as the saviour of the Chinese as a whole nation (Chang, 2001). 
 
From a historical perspective, declaring the Communist Party or the nation’s saviour was 
a timely strategy that did indeed earn the support of the masses in the 1920s in China, as 
nationalistic awareness was on the rise (Feuerwerker, Murphy, & Wright, 1967). China 
experienced political instability and turbulent times when the central government became 
weak, while the military power of warlords in different regions was growing stronger 
(Grieder, 1981). China’s working class and middle class intellectuals, who harboured 
resentment of the central government, found sympathy with the CCP, which declared 
itself as being the liberator and vindicator of the nation (Chang, 2001). This propaganda 
of the idealised identity had been the core of the strategy of the Communist Party 
throughout its history and it further influenced the Party’s censorship mechanism of 
journalism and the news media. For example, slogans such as “Communist Party is the 
great savior of Chinese people” (Wu, 2010) and “No Communist Party, no new China” 
were broadcast widely via radio, newspapers, and booklets in the early 20th century (Chen, 
2014). These slogans, which were embedded in lyrics to assist their popularity among the 
working class and peasants, represent a symbolic statement that nationalism and national 
salvation were associated with the identity of the CCP. Before Mao died in 1976, 
propaganda also linked the idea of loyalty to the nation with a personality cult of Mao 
(Chen, 2014). As Lam (2000) argued, this strategy was formed during the war time and 
was established by Mao himself: 
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‘Power grows out of the barrel of a gun,’ said Chairman Mao Zedong on the success of 
the Communist Revolution. Yet it is equally accurate to say that power grows out of, and 
is sustained by, the nib of a pen. Propaganda, through the heavy-handed manipulation of 
the media, has been just as essential as the army and police in upholding the mandate of 
heaven of the CCP (Lam, 2000, p. 37). 
 
The role and function of Chinese journalism, under these circumstances, were required to 
maintain the uniformity of Chinese society (Lam, 2000, p. 37), rather than promoting 
other values. The doctrines of the Communist Party as the Chinese saviour and the 
personality cult of Mao have been weakened in today’s news media in China, but a similar 
philosophical thinking remains. The worship of Mao and the ‘saviour’ identity of the 
Chinese nation have been transferred to the concept of harmonisation for political and 
social stability, which is also considered as the higher purpose of constructing the society 
and maintaining political stability. 
 
Perhaps the theory that best describes journalism and freedom of the press in China during 
this period has to go back to the Soviet communism about which Siebert, Peterson and 
Schramm (1956) theorised. Both were derived from Marxism, and Chinese journalism 
shares compelling similarities with its communist neighbour, e.g. 1) led by the power of 
organisation of the proletariat; 2) the mass submitted to the dictatorship of the parties; 3) 
mass communication was used instrumentally and integrated with other instruments of 
State power (with publicity departments of the Communist Party in China’s case); 4) 
freedom of speech and the press were constitutionalised and written into law, but the 
freedom to act against the State cannot be permitted (Siebert et al., 1956). 
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3.4 Social background of online censorship in China 
3.4.1 The Great Firewall and online Censorship 
This research seeks to establish a blueprint of online censorship in China. It includes five 
different levels of online censorship, from top to bottom, they are: technological means 
of Internet surveillance, government-based public security monitoring, administrative 
gatekeeping in the online news media, editorial self-censorship and self-censorship of 
journalistic practice. The lowest three levels refer to the activities that happen in the online 
newsroom, whereas the top two levels emanate directly from the practices and structures 
of the Chinese authorities. This section focuses on reviewing the establishment and 
development of the first level of this revised-pyramid, and criticisms of them (see figure 
1 in Chapter 1: 2.5). 
 
The top two levels of the inverted pyramid of online censorship are operationalised 
automatically or manually, or a combination of both, via the use of specific technologies. 
The technologies used in this process will be discussed in this chapter. More specifically 
this chapter will detail the automated mechanisms of censorship, also known as the Great 
Firewall and Green Dam. The Great Firewall effectively filters content via scripts and 
code algorithms, while Green Dam blocks content and provides surveillance through the 
pre-installation of software on personal computers (Bristow, 2009). 
 
77 
 
3.4.1.1 The Great Firewall 
As figure 1 (Chapter 1: 2.5) demonstrates, the Great Firewall is the first level of online 
censorship which is essentially technological. Although the use of the technology of the 
firewall may seem to be remote from online news workers’ journalistic practice, their 
daily routines are heavily influenced by their knowledge of the existence of these 
nationwide monitoring and filtering technologies. A significant inconvenience that the 
Great Firewall causes is that it disables Chinese online news workers’ access to foreign 
websites, such as BBC and Twitter. The blocking of foreign news websites and 
microblogs therefore limits the news feeds in China (Zhang, 2006; Smith, 2002). Chinese 
online news workers normally cannot access these news feeds for reporting international 
news stories, unless they use proxy virtual private network (VPN) to bypass the firewall. 
The act of bypassing the Great Firewall is known as “climbing over the wall” (Fan Qiang, 
in Mandarin.) In this sense, to study the censorship of online news, it is impossible to 
overlook the Great Firewall, as the filtering project has impeded the process of online 
news production in China. 
 
The Great Firewall is operated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of China. It was 
first launched in 1998, also known as China’s national firewall (Global Times, 2011; Xiao, 
2010). The firewall project was adopted by the Chinese government for the purpose of 
controlling online content, and monitoring the Internet browsing of ordinary Internet 
users in China (Zittrain & Edelman p.70-71; Clayton, Murdoch, & Watson, 2006). The 
Great Firewall was developed to block domestic users’ access to foreign websites that 
contained ‘sensitive’ information, such as anti-communist or obscene content (Zittrain, 
& Edelman, 2003:70). It also filters domestic website content and has the technical 
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capacity to switch off servers if they are found to be hosting “sensitive” political or 
obscene content (Zittrain, & Edelman, 2003: 70-1). 
 
The Great Firewall’s ﬁltering mechanism is understood by Crandall (2007) as not only a 
ﬁrewall, but also “a Panopticon” where the presence of censorship promotes self-
censorship (Crandall, et al., 2007; Jansen, 1991). The Panopticon was firstly designed by 
Bentham late 18th century as a form of institutional prison that allows surveillance of 
inmates. Bentham argued that it was an effective design for a constant controlling of 
inmates’ behaviour, as inmates know they may be watched but are never sure of when 
(Bentham, 2011). Later, Foucault (1995) invoked the design of the Panopticon and 
developed it as a metaphor for modern disciplinary societies and “social quarantine” 
(Foucault, 1995, p.216). Foucault argued that not only prisons but hierarchical structures 
of society had evolved to resemble Bentham’s Panopticon, thus creating a consciousness 
of visibility as a form of power for surveillance and domination (Allmer, 2012). Building 
on Bentham’s Panopticon and Foucault's Panopticism, scholars applied the theory to the 
technological context. Zuboff (1988) provides portrayals of the use of computer 
technology that created an information Panopticon in surveillance, and Brignall (2002) 
has argued that the Internet allowed for a panoptic form of observation for social control. 
In this sense, the Great Firewall is a significant example of an information Panopticon 
where computer technology is used for the purpose of online content control.  
 
In recent years, the name of the Great Firewall appeared in a number of news items which 
involved the conflicts between the Chinese government and foreign Internet companies. 
In 2009, the Chinese government accused Google.cn of not filtering sensitive information 
properly, as a number of obscene pictures and texts could be searched via its search engine 
(Chen, 2009a; Chen, 2009b). The searching function via Google.cn search sites was 
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subsequently closed down in 2010 (Helft & Barboza, 2010; Independent, 2010). Other 
examples include foreign news media. The Chinese versions of BBC News and Voice of 
America were banned in China in 2008 (BBC, 2008b). Both of them were accused of 
asserting the concept of ‘two Chinas’, which referred to mainland China and Taiwan as 
two independent regions (BBC, 2008b). Foreign websites such as YouTube, Facebook 
and Twitter were also restricted or banned, as they allowed users to edit and update text, 
audio and video content which were out of reach of Chinese government interference 
(Branigan, 2009). Users in China found the links to YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were 
directed to a ‘server error’ page. 
 
3.4.1.2 The Green Dam pre-installment filtering software 
Green Dam Youth Escort, shortened to Green Dam, is a content-control software 
developed by Zhengzhou Jinhui Computer System Engineering Ltd. with input from 
Beijing Dazheng Human Language Technology Academy Ltd (Zhang, 2009). A directive 
from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China (MIIT) in 2009 
originally took effect on 1st July, after which every new computer in China would have 
the software pre-installed. It was reported (Zhang, 2009; Bristow, 2009) that the newest 
version of the software had to be pre-installed on new Chinese-made computers, and 
imported computers must contain the software before they were sold. According to 
Foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang, the software filters out obscene or violent 
materials to promote the healthy development of the Internet (Bristow, 2009; Watt, 2009a; 
Watt, 2009b). 
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However, at the end of June 2009, the requirement of mandatory pre-installation was 
delayed when some computer producers postponed the plan (Fang, 2009; Mcdonald, 
2009). In August, Li Yizhong, the minister of MIIT, announced that it was no longer 
obligatory for computer manufacturers and retailers to install the software on new 
computers for home or business use, because a number of personal computer 
manufacturers refused to comply with this regulation and pre-install the software on the 
computers sold on the Chinese market (BBC Chinese, 2009a; Li, C. 2009). Eventually, 
state owned media announced that the Green Dam would instead be an optional package 
(Watt, 2009). 
 
The software has received strong criticism since it was developed. The criticism focused 
on three aspects: the legality of coercive installation, query of the project’s cost (417 
million RMB) and, most importantly, query of its functional defects and security 
vulnerabilities. The design of Green Dam was criticised on a number of levels, for 
instance, the software is only capable of recognising pictures of nudity featuring “yellow-
skinned” characters (Hu & Guo 2009). Reports also criticised that pictures and words can 
be misrecognised (Southern Metropolis Weekly, 2009), and word editing applications 
may be forced to close without notifying the user and therefore cause data loss, if so-
called “inappropriate content” is identified (Hu & Guo 2009). The software runs only on 
Microsoft Windows x86 and is compatible only with Internet Explorer and Google 
Chrome browsers (Fildes, 2009), and tests showed potential faults in the software could 
lead to a large-scale disaster as it has “a series of software flaws” (Fildes, 2009). Other 
issues included that the software was easy to be hacked (Netease, 2009) and its 
executables loaded on the start-up part cannot be removed by its own uninstaller. This 
means personal computer users have no administrator access to uninstall the software. 
Furthermore, in spite of the main aim that MIIT declared, namely filtering out 
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pornographic or violent material, tests have shown that the software filter contains about 
85% political keywords, and only 15% pornography-related keywords (Southern 
Metropolis Weekly, 2009). These figures indicate that the purpose of implanting this pre-
installed software might be politically motivated rather than to protect young people, as 
the MIIT claimed. 
 
Before it was abandoned, free speech campaigners were concerned that the software could 
be used to spy on users’ profiles and Internet habits on behalf of the government. 
Professor Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society is worried that the government-mandated software installed on each machine 
could significantly damage the free speech environment (Fildes, 2009). Isaac Mao, a 
blogger and social entrepreneur in China, also a research fellow at Harvard's Berkman 
Center, believed that there was a new guideline from the country's central propaganda 
department “to comb all media and online forums to block critics and discussion over the 
issue” (Fildes, 2009). 
 
Chinese users mocked Green Dam as an IT joke. The polls conducted on leading websites, 
such as Sina, Netease, Tencent, and Sohu, showed that over 80% of people refused the 
installation (Gao, 2009). Li Fangping, a lawyer, indicated that the software was a 
“concealed attempt by the government to expand censorship” (Jacobs, 2009a). People’s 
attitude to the Green Dam was sarcastic. Moreover, users created a cartoon version of the 
so-called “Green Dam Girl”. The figure is often depicted as a young girl in green web 
police dress (BBC, 2009; Koman, 2009; Goldkorn, J. 2009). 
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Although the Green Dam project was a failure with flaws and loopholes in its design, the 
proposal to launch it by the MIIT signalled that the government was attempting to expand 
the range of information control and content filtering from the Internet to private devices. 
We already know that Internet users who search ‘sensitive’ words in news websites and 
search engines may find their access limited due to the filtering of the Great Firewall. But 
the limitation can only apply when the users connect their devices online. Offline 
activities on a computer or a smart phone cannot be monitored by the Great Firewall. The 
conception of Green Dam intends to plant the filtering and blocking into private devices, 
as both news workers and ordinary Internet users are under surveillance as long as they 
use these electronic devices (Qin, 2014; Bristow, 2009). In this sense, it is a more 
aggressive method of censorship and invasion of privacy than the Great Firewall and the 
cyber police that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
This study does not discuss further details of the design flaws in the Green Dam, nor does 
it argue the issues of abuse of public resources and corruption of the government. As such, 
the mindset of having administrative interference over the online content is identical with 
what was observed in online news production (See details in Chapter 5:4 and Chapter 
6:4.1 & 4.3). The technological means used by Green Dam, such as key word filtering 
and sensitive word censoring, are also broadly used by the cyber police (Chapter 5:5.1) 
and they comment as monitors of online news and delete user-generated content as routine 
(Chapter 6:4.2). As such the criteria of control remain but have been implemented by 
humans instead of technologies. 
 
3.4.2 The Internet in China in 2008 
The year 2008 was significant for Internet censorship in China, as it was the year that the 
Chinese authorities’ attitude toward the censorship of news changed and they 
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demonstrated a friendly gesture to foreign websites which used to be banned. During the 
Beijing Olympic Games, foreign news websites such as BBC became accessible, but soon 
after the Olympics finished, these websites were again blocked (BBC, 2008b). Beijing 
had promised to improve the environment of freedom of speech and the free press during 
the bidding process for the Olympics in 2001 as Wang Wei, the secretary general of the 
Beijing Olympic Bid Committee stated:  
 
“We will give the (foreign) media complete freedom to report when they come to China 
[...] We are confident that the Games coming to China not only promotes our economy 
but also enhances all social conditions, including education, health and human rights” 
(Amnesty International, 2008). 
 
The lifting of the ban on foreign websites benefited both foreign and domestic news 
workers. The Chinese news workers in the Olympic Media Center also gained free access 
to foreign websites without the assistance of proxy VPNs (Spencer, 2008; Branigan, 
2008). 
 
This section takes a look back on Internet censorship issues in 2008 in three parts. The 
first part mainly introduces a brief background of China’s pledge to allow open media 
access, and lift the controversial bans on foreign websites before and during the Games. 
The second part, reviews criticisms of censorship on the Internet from both the domestic 
and foreign media. The government’s response to these criticisms and the lifting of bans 
on foreign websites are also reviewed. Lastly, it reviews the period after the Games, when 
the limited freedom of Internet access was fading away as unblocked websites were re-
banned again. The discussions on this and following sections about Google China’s 
dispute with the Chinese government and Weibo and high profile scandals together set 
out the precursors to the current environment on the Internet. 
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3.4.2.1 Website bans 
In 2002, China was criticised for expanding its secret team of informers and hackers who 
spied on users on the Internet (BBC Chinese, 2002). Statistics show that the population 
of Internet users in China was about 33 million in 2002 (BBC Chinese, 2002). The number 
sharply increased to 100 million in 2006 (BBC Chinese, 2005). However, the population 
growth of Internet users did not also bring openness on the Internet. Criticisms of the 
Chinese government censoring the Internet increased. In 2006, Internet giants, such as 
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google, were criticised by the British Parliament and U.S. 
Congress for the compromises they made to the Chinese government (BBC Chinese, 
2006a). These corporations were accused of censoring their own search engines in order 
to enter the Chinese market. The consequence of such censorship was that Chinese 
Internet users could not search and access certain information that the Chinese 
government considered sensitive (BBC Chinese, 2006b; BBC Chinese, 2006a). 
 
3.4.2.2 Debates on portal restriction 
The crucial standpoint that justifies Internet censorship for the Chinese government is that 
the Communist Party believes some content on the Internet can pose a threat to the 
stability of Chinese society. Such content, the Party objects, contains information about 
anti-Communism, hostility to Communism and China, incitement to overthrowing the 
regime, pornography, violence, Tiananmen Square protests, discussion of democratic 
systems, parades, and the independence of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong, which 
may harm the solidarity and harmony of society. Therefore, as the government persists, 
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the Internet needs to be censored, and websites with sensitive information need to be 
banned. 
 
On the 14th of February, 2006, Liu Zhengrong, Deputy Director of Information Office of 
the State Council, explained the prohibition on foreign websites. The reason that foreign 
websites were banned was they were judged to violate certain law articles of PRC. 
According to his clarification, some foreign websites contain elements which may be 
considered as “pornographic, obscene, or horrific”. As such it was “necessary and 
understandable” that censorship was imposed (Zhu, 2006). Furthermore, he added, the 
censoring procedures were transparent and the communication between Chinese users 
and the rest of the world was fluent. He indicated that the Chinese government had no 
intension to make enemies with foreign political parties or websites (Zhu, 2006). 
 
On the 25th of October, 2006, Cai Wu, Director of Ministry of Culture, former Director 
of Information Office, said Chinese websites offer “probably the freest forum for opinion 
in the world” (Radio Free Asia, 2006). 
 
On the 23rd of March, 2009, Qing Gang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, refused to 
confirm that YouTube had been re-blocked. He commented that the “Chinese government 
does not feel afraid of the Internet” (Government of PRC, 2009; RFI, 2009; BBC Chinese, 
2008c; BBC Chinese, 2009b). After the conference, YouTube appeared to be accessible 
for a few days, but was blocked again on the 29th of March. 
 
On the 2nd of July, 2009, in answering questions about the ban on Free Asia Radio, Qing 
Gang said that “the radio station that had been mentioned is consistently interfering in 
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China’s internal affairs” (Ji, 2009). According to the report by Radio Taiwan International, 
a BBC journalist asked whether the ban on BBC was for the same reason, and Qing 
indicated that he had no knowledge of this situation. However, he implied that situations 
could be different, “otherwise, it could be serious” (Ji, 2009). 
 
On the 6th of August, 2009, a commentary on China Daily from the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army wrote that Twitter, Flickr, Facebook, and YouTube could be used by 
“Western hostile forces” (Chi, 2009) as propaganda tools. Moreover, it called for 
progressing the technique of network isolation, shielding, locking and countering online 
attacks (Chi, 2009; Sina News, 2009). 
 
The ban on certain websites along with the censorship of the Internet was criticised widely. 
Reporters Without Borders ranked China 167 out of 173 in its Press Freedom Index in 
2008 (RWB, 2008). Furthermore, due to the lack of public commitment to press freedom 
by the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOGBC), Reporters Without 
Borders and other NGOs called for a boycott of the Olympics (Engdahl, 2010; Swiss Info., 
2008). 
 
In 2001, Wang Wei, Secretary General of the BOGBC, had confirmed that China would 
offer “complete freedom” (Hai, 2008) to the media. According to a report, it was 
intending to relax control of the Internet during the Olympics. The Committee planned to 
tear down the Great Firewall and allow access to banned websites such as the BBC (AFP, 
2008). 
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The lifting of bans started on the 1st of April 2008. The BBC’s English web page was the 
first to be unblocked (BBC, 2008b). At the beginning of July, one after the other, Yahoo 
Hong Kong, Sing Tao Daily, Ming Bao, Central News Agency, The Hong Kong Jockey 
Club, Taiwan Television Broadcasts Satellite, Eastern Broadcasting, the Chinese web 
page of America Online, China Times, World Journal, Asia Times Online, Google 
Blogger and Flickr were unblocked. However, international journalists from the Beijing 
Olympic press centre complained about the transparency of unblocking. Web pages that 
contained information about Free Tibet, Tiananmen Square protests, and Falun Gong 
were still banned (BBC Chinese, 2008b; Central News Agency, 2008). 
 
On the 31st of July, Kevan Gosper, the press commission head of the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), admitted that he had broken the promise of uncensored 
Internet access which he had made in early April, and he suspected that the IOC leadership 
probably knew that certain websites were blocked (MSN News Services, 2008; Batty, 
2008).  In the afternoon, more websites were unblocked, including the Chinese web page 
of Wikipedia, Apple Daily of Hong Kong, Taiwan Liberty Times, the Chinese page of 
BBC, Deutsche Welle, Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders (Bristow, 2008). 
 
The Government’s act of lifting the ban on websites was embraced by foreign media. 
Xiao Yang, a commentator on Deutsche Welle, wrote that it would be a big step forward 
for the Chinese government over censorship (Xiao, 2008). Sealing Internet access could 
not block people from knowing about the outside world forever (Xiao, 2008). Xiao Yang 
advised that the liberalisation of the Internet should continue after the Games. 
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However, the liberalisation did not last. A few months after the Games, the government 
started banning websites again. By December 2012, Deutsche Welle, BBC, VOA, 
Reporters Without Borders, Ming Bao, Asia Weekly, Radio France Internationale, ABC 
Radio Australia, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation were re-blocked (Chen, 
2008). Liu Jianchao, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicated that 
overall, China’s Internet policy was open, however, that the websites which had been 
banned must have violated Chinese law (BBC Chinese, 2008a). Chen Su, a VOA 
journalist, believed that re-blocking was conducted for economic reasons. The 
commentator suspected that the Chinese government used its authority of censorship to 
control the Internet media again in order to relieve its financial stress in a period of 
economic crisis (Chen, 2008). 
 
To sum up, due to the promise that had been made, the Chinese authorities temporarily 
stopped the blocking of foreign websites and loosened its control of the Internet. But soon 
after the Olympics finished and the foreign news workers left, the Internet control was 
tightened and a number of foreign websites were re-banned.  
 
The reason for reviewing the narrative of change and temporary freedom in 2008 is 
because, firstly, the renewed blow to press freedom essentially confirms that the 
Confucianism philosophy of limited freedom is still influential. That is, in the current 
social context in China, freedom for the people is a benefaction of the rulers/authorities, 
and this freedom can be compromised for the welfare of the state, the government, or the 
Communist Party. Throughout the whole year of 2008, the Chinese authorities had made 
a gesture of decontrolling the Internet to some extent, but this decontrolling was only a 
benefaction of the authorities as this ‘limited freedom’ was reversible. 
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Secondly, the act of re-banning demonstrates the control of the Chinese government over 
the Internet. Re-tightening Internet control, re-blocking foreign websites, and re-
disallowing news workers’ access to foreign websites did not cause significant resistance 
in China itself. Online news workers, who in principle should be one of the most affected 
groups of Internet users, remained quiet and submissive about the loss of their ‘limited 
freedom’, as few criticisms against this process were made within online news 
organisations.  
 
3.4.3 Google China’s dispute with the Chinese government 
The aim of reviewing the dispute between Google and the Chinese government is firstly, 
to provide a background of why and how Google was restricted in China despite the fact 
it is the one of the largest search engines in the world. For online news workers, the 
consequence of losing access to Google’s search engine deprives them of a useful 
database and access to international news feeds and proxy VPNs for the purpose of 
bypassing the Great Firewall. Secondly, this section aims to compare the efficiency and 
results of administrative interference from the authorities in the online news media. For 
domestic websites, the Chinese authorities can give instructions and directives to interfere 
with the protocol of online news production, as the domestic websites are principally 
managed by the authorities. The web administrators can be pressed by the government to 
comply, and the staffing and structure of websites are infiltrated by the Party (See details 
in Chapter 6:4.3). But for foreign websites, such approaches are ineffective. The dispute 
between Google and the Chinese government is an extreme case where the Internet firm 
refused to comply with the censorship and this resulted in its abandoning of China’s 
market.  
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The dispute between Google and the Chinese government was not an isolated case. Many 
global Internet firms have a conflictive history with the local authorities when setting up 
business in China. For instance, Microsoft admitted in 2005 that its blogs automatically 
blocked key words like ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, and Yahoo was accused by a US 
congressional hearing that they sacrificed their cooperative principles to profit, by helping 
the Chinese government filter e-mails and messages (Petley, 2009: p.107-8). 
 
Google developed a Chinese-language interface in 2005. Its China-based search page 
google.cn was launched in 2006. After the establishment of Google China, google.com 
was inaccessible on mainland China’s Internet (McLaughlin, 2006). Google’s official 
blog admitted that it compromised in launching a Google domain that restricted 
information and filtered search results (McLaughlin, 2006; Thompson, 2006). If users 
searched for prohibited Chinese keywords, the result would be filtered. Users were 
notified when they tried to access certain search terms that had been restricted. In this 
case, Google.cn displayed the notification at the bottom of the page: “In accordance with 
local laws, regulations and policies, part of the search result is not shown” (Text translated 
from Chinese). 
 
Google China had been the focus of controversy over its capitulation to the Great Firewall 
since it announced its intention to comply with Internet censorship laws and regulations 
in China (Bridis, 2006). Google was criticised as a multinational Internet company that 
assisted government censorship in China (HRW, 2006), and Google China as a flagrant 
violation of the Google motto “Don't be evil” (Cohn, 2007, p.30). In responding to these 
criticisms, Google argued that, despite the compromises involved, it could play a more 
useful role in China “by participating than by boycotting it” (BBC, 2006). 
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Google’s official blog released a blog named “A new approach to China” on 12 January 
2010. It responded to a Chinese-originated hacking attack on it when Gmail accounts of 
Chinese human rights activists were hacked (Worthen, 2010). The blog indicated that 
Google.cn would not continue censoring search results and might stop the searching 
service operation in China as follows: 
 
We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, 
and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the 
basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We 
recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our 
offices in China (Drummond, D., 2010a). 
 
According to the announcement released by David Drummond, SVP, Google’s Corporate 
Development and Chief Legal Officer on 22 March 2010, Google stopped censoring the 
search services on Google.cn, including Google Search, Google News, and Google 
Images. Meanwhile, China’s mainland users, who visited Google.cn, would be redirected 
to Google.com.hk, Google’s Hong Kong service which offered uncensored searches in 
Chinese. However, Drummond stated that, throughout the negotiation, the Chinese 
government had been “crystal clear” that self-censorship is “a non-negotiable legal 
requirement”, and presumably that Google’s decision might cause access to the search 
engine to be blocked in China (Drummond, D. 2010b). 
 
Although Google argued that offering uncensored searches “is entirely legal and will 
meaningfully increase access to information for people in China” (Drummond, D., 2010b), 
it was criticised by Chinese media, which stated that the search result violated China’s 
law and regulations. From 19th June, state owned media CCTV and People’s Daily 
published a series of commentaries to condemn and denounce the fact that pornographic 
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information was found on Google’s search results (Qing, R. 2009; Zi, 2009; Cui, 2009b; 
Chen, 2009). It was reported that Google search engine might direct users to links with 
obscene content even though users did not intentionally look for it. For example, 
searching the keyword “son” would result in links that contained fornication (Chen, 2009). 
 
Google China’s uncensored search was accused of demoralisation and causing people 
antipathy (Zi, 2009). Beijing recruited an Internet monitoring team which consisted of 
over 10,000 volunteers in June 2009. The team members would supervise the contents of 
websites and report to the Bureau of Culture Enforcement and Public Security if 
“pornographic or dirty information” was detected (Cui, 2009a). 
 
A distinct difference between the Chinese government and Google on this debate was the 
parties’ different focus on censorship. Google claimed the decision was not merely made 
on a financial basis, but that Google.cn would not willingly self-censor its results (Jacobs, 
2009b). These uncensored results might contain links to adult content and some of the 
political content which the Chinese government originally required Google to filter.  
However, the state owned media in China appeared to only address the issue of adult 
content and delivered its strong disapproval to them. From the reports and commentaries, 
criticism of Google defying the government focused on searchable adult contents over 
Google.cn. However, the crucial issue of searchable, politically sensitive content was 
somehow neglected. In other words, these reports and commentaries did not mention, 
quote or comment on the censorship issue that was addressed in Google’s announcement. 
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3.4.3.1 Criticism 
When Google initially announced its intention to leave China, many young people placed 
wreaths at the company headquarters in Beijing as a sign of mourning (Helft & Barboza, 
2010; joe200362, 2010). However, the donated flowers were promptly removed by 
security guards. Google’s supporters were told that they needed to apply for permits to 
prevent them from facing accusations of contributing to the “illegal flower tribute” 
(Osnos, 2010). 
 
It was reported in January that some students and professionals felt disappointed by 
Google’s decision to pull out because they lost access to the company’s vast resources 
(Helft & Barboza, 2010), and others used the real-time service to express their gratitude 
to Google (Independent, 2010). A large number of tweets with the term #GoogleCN were 
being created and the stream of tweets increased rapidly (Independent, 2010). 
 
In responding to Google’s pull-out in March 2010, Han, a critic, said “farewell Google” 
in an interview with Tudou.com. (veryeasy, 2010) He commented that Google 
abandoning China might cause other foreign websites to change their business strategies 
in China and back out, eventually making China’s Internet “the largest local area network 
(LAN) in the world” (veryeasy, 2010). The video of this interview spread over the Internet, 
but was later deleted along with his other blog articles which commented on the incident.  
 
It was viewed as a historic moment for Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet project 
at the University of California, Berkeley. He valued the Internet as a catalyst for China 
being more integrated into the world. But Google’s departure indicated that “China’s path 
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as a rising power is going in a direction different from what the world expected and what 
many Chinese were hoping for” (Helft & Barboza, 2010). 
 
3.4.4 Weibo and high profile scandals 
This section reviews a number of incidents that occurred in microblogging from 2010 
when Sina, a large Chinese Internet firm launched its microblog called ‘Weibo’ or ‘Sina 
Weibo’, in order to provide a broader picture of the current environment of microblog 
usage and issues around it. The rise of Weibo corresponded to the blocking of 
international social network websites in China, such as Facebook and Twitter. The Weibo 
site successfully filled the void of online social networks among these international 
websites, and became popular in China. As such, the Sina Weibo was so popular, that the 
word ‘Weibo’ gradually became a substitution term for ‘microblog’ in Mandarin. For a 
number of Chinese celebrities, it was fashionable to have a Weibo account and post online 
content. Along with the celebration of public figures, politicians and government officials 
also joined in Weibo and registered their personal account. Zhang and Negro (2013) argue 
that Weibo established its status as a new source for news stories in a short period of time, 
due to its advantage in fast online content generation, collective news data, and a 
relatively freer environment from censorship (Zhang & Negro, 2013). The phenomenon 
of the rise of Weibo and its linkage to online news feeds is similar to Twitter, as it has 
been argued that Twitter can be considered as an increasingly important online news 
media resource due to its power as a new mode of information sharing (Kwak et al., 2010). 
 
The relatively freer environment contrasted sharply with the censorship of other forms of 
offline news media, such as newspapers, TV and radio, where news workers were 
effectively pressed by the Chinese authorities. In this regard, news that might be censored 
in the offline news media had a chance to be posted in Weibo as a new form of a news 
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channel. By introducing these elements, this section provides a context to how this online 
news was shaped during the rise of Weibo, and how Weibo was later censored by the 
authorities. 
 
3.4.4.1 Twitter and Facebook 
International social network giants such as Twitter and Facebook did not benefit too much 
in China’s market. Despite Facebook’s well-designed Mandarin version, its development 
in the world’s largest Internet market was never easy, as its portal was blocked in China 
(Oran, O. 2011; Ford, 2012; The Daily Beast, 2011). Only a few Chinese users access 
Facebook abroad or via a proxy server. The rest are somewhat loyal users of Sina Weibo 
and Renren (Sina News, 2012b; Yang, 2012; Kejixun, 2012). The epidemic of local 
microblogs and other forms of social networks in China were dependent on this huge 
population base: 30 million for Weibo (Yang, 2012) and 20 million for Renren (Kejixun, 
2012). However, it is hardly deniable that the ban on foreign social network sites also 
contributed to the rise of these local companies. In its fourth quarter report of 2011, Sina 
Weibo had over 300 million users (Yang, 2012). It is considered as the most influential 
microblog website in China. On the other hand, a report shows that the number of Renren 
users reached over 200 million in 2012 (Kejixun, 2012). 
 
Along with increasing user numbers and the growing influence on Chinese social 
networks, both Sina Weibo and the Renren are now eyeing the international market.  
 
When considering questions of copyright, criticisms of these influential websites suggest 
that they are similar to Twitter and Facebook. Weibo was criticised for stealing Twitter’s 
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ideas, and Renren was accused of copying Facebook’s layout. (Han, 2008) Arguably, the 
rapid expansion of local social network sites benefited from China’s problematic 
intellectual property protection laws.  
 
However, the rise of Sina Weibo and Renren sites occupy microblogging and Internet 
social networking in China. The role that they play on the Internet is functionally similar, 
that is, they have established an online speech platform. Chinese users quickly sensed the 
existence of this new type of platform. On this platform, government censorship and self-
censorship of the site are no longer the same as they are in the traditional media. People 
gain more free space to talk and share. Even if the site assumes a fast and rigorous self-
censorship, new comments and messages can spread rapidly before being filtered. In this 
regard, with the rise of microblogging and Internet social networks, Chinese users 
arguably entered an era of relative free speech. This new online speech platform has 
become a window for people to vent dissatisfaction and expose scandals. 
 
3.4.4.2 Scandals and microblogs 
In 2008, the Paris leg of the Olympic torch relay was disrupted by anti-Chinese protests 
along the route. According to several reports, the torch was extinguished three times 
(Sandford, 2008; BBC, 2008c; Ward, 2008). The repeated attacks on the procession, and 
escalating international protests, forced cancellation of the relay (Ward, 2008). This news 
was quickly spread on Renren. The indignation of the Chinese people was aroused. There 
was a sense of hostility towards France in the public, and a boycott of China-France trade 
ensued (Shi, 2008; Sandford, 2008). Meanwhile, nationalist Chinese users called for a 
boycott of Carrefour and other French brands. The proposal soon spread on Renren. More 
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resentful users were eager to join (Zhang, 2008; Tan, 2008; BBC, 2008a). In Wuhan, 
110,000 people attended the gathering for the boycott (Global Voices, 2008). It was also 
reported that several robberies occurred in Carrefour (Shi, 2008). Even worse, French 
cars parked on the road were randomly damaged by protestors. This demonstrated to the 
Chinese that the network can easily incite the masses, and advocacy of an article or 
exposure of a scandal can rapidly spread among a specific population through the sharing 
and dissemination of such information online. 
 
The layout and interface design of Sina Weibo is more conducive to such dissemination. 
Sina brought in the “@” function from Twitter and Facebook. If user A inputs an @ 
followed by user B’s usernames, the system will inform the user B in a pop-up window. 
This mode of transmission enables a message to travel and spread in the form of a spider 
web. The “@” function was adopted by Renren later on.  
 
The early Renren encouraged users to sign up using their real name. It requested new 
users to fill registration forms and only allowed verified users to blog and comment. 
Unlike Renren, Sina Weibo’s registration process was simpler. It did not demand of users 
to tweet using their real name, until Beijing put pressure on Sina. This advantage suddenly 
turned microblogging into a natural platform for publishing scandals. It often appears that 
people learn of a scandal from the Internet before mainstream media expose it.  
 
Often the scandals that are exposed on the Internet appear as complaints or grievances. 
Here, a typical characteristic is that one party hopes that the pressure of public opinion 
can undo a purported injustice. For example, the plagiarism scandal of Professor Ma 
Jiming of Tsinghua University in 2011, (China Education and Research Network, 2011) 
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and murder case of Yao Jiaxin (BBC, 2011; Xinhua Net, 2011) both demonstrated such 
a characteristic. The victims were considered the weaker parties. They exposed the 
incident and presented evidence on the Internet to show that they had been treated unfairly. 
Microblogs became a cheap and effective platform to call for justice for the weaker party, 
who are not influential enough to attract the attention of mainstream media, or who cannot 
financially afford the cost of exposure on mainstream media.  
 
In the case of Professor Ma’s plagiarism scandal, Pan Xiaochun, a 41-year-old senior 
engineer, found that Ma and his Master student Meng Changbo had plagiarised his 
structure, core formulas, analytical data, conclusion and even some personal expressions 
from his paper published in 2007. Pan indicated that he was not satisfied with Ma’s 
protracted response even after he tried to report plagiarism to the university several times. 
Ma denied his act of plagiarism, and the university did not respond to the evidence that 
Pan provided. Pan felt he did not have a chance to confront the university, merely relying 
on his individual power. Taking advice from his colleagues, he signed up to Sina Weibo 
and presented his evidence on the Internet (Sina News, 2011). Soon, the story spread on 
the Internet and caused a public outcry, which eventually resulted in Tsinghua University 
admitting that “according to a preliminary judgement”, Professor Ma’s behaviour was 
“academic misconduct” (Sina News, 2011).  
 
The murder case of Yao was another example of Internet’s role in exposing scandals. The 
murder victim’s family was not satisfied with the slow progress of the investigation half 
a year after the murder occurred. Wang Hui, the victim Zhao Miao’s husband, and his 
lawyer Zhang Xian, believed Yao had committed a crime of intentional homicide, but the 
case was not investigated properly allegedly due to the military background of Yao’s 
family and relative low status of the victim. They were afraid the law would not do justice 
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in this case and the criminal would not be punished in the way he should be (CNTV, 
2011). Zhang Xian indicated that he had decided to expose the case on the Internet in 
order to get the public’s attention. He concluded that, for the victim’s family, exposure 
on the Internet is more practical than via mainstream media (Lanzhilei, 2011). When Yao 
was sentenced with the death penalty on 20th May 2012, some people set off fireworks 
in front of the court gate to celebrate, as they believed “the criminal gets what he deserves” 
(Jiang, 2011). 
 
However, some critics are afraid that exposure on the Internet can bring negative effects. 
Also, Xiao (2011) indicates that the public sphere on the Internet is impossible to control 
in extreme cases like the murder case of Yao. The masses have shown their interest in 
scandals, especially when they were persuaded by the victim’s side that the military 
background of Yao’s family may have manipulated the judgment of the court (Xiao, 
2011a; Xiao, 2011b). Xiao expresses (2011a; 2011b) her concern about the “possibility 
of tyrannical behaviour as a result of Internet exposure” or “…possibility of tyrannical 
behaviour by the public as a result of their exposure to the Internet.” In the murder case 
of Yao, the death penalty was critical. The court made the sentencing quickly after the 
story had been exposed. Here, Nanfang (2011) argued that the wave of public 
dissatisfaction may somehow have interfered with the independence of the judiciary 
(Nanfang, 2011). 
 
The spread of information prompting scandals via the Internet can be seen as a 
consequence of the microblogging era. One typical characteristic of such scandals is that 
exposure is initiated on the Internet by one of the parties while they are blogging or 
tweeting. For example, in June 2011, Xie Zhiqiang, director of Liyang City’s Public 
Health Bureau, flirted with his mistress on Sina Weibo (Du, 2011). They discussed details 
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of how they were having an affair by tweeting. It is reported that, after the exposure, the 
local disciplinary inspection department began to investigate. Xie Zhiqiang admitted that 
he was “a newbie to microblogging”. He used microblogging as chatting software, and 
thought his tweets were private (Liang, X. 2011; Du, 2011). Another example is Zhou 
Lei, a fashion model who posted pictures of herself with a government official in March 
2012. She showed off her luxury party pictures and implied an immoral relationship with 
the married official by calling him “dear daddy” (Lu, 2012; Wei, 2012). 
 
Social networking technologies enable end users to become editors of their own news 
stories. Users blog their personal life on the Internet and share it with friends. The 
exposure of scandals, therefore, occurs when people are blogging and sharing. Out of all 
the scandals on the Internet, the incident of Guo Meimei and China Red Cross is 
instructive.  
 
Guo Meimei, a 20-year-old girl, flaunted her wealth on Sina Weibo on 21st June 2011. 
The pictures that she posted suggested she lived in a large villa, owned expensive sports 
cars, and had about a dozen designer handbags (Fauna, 2011; Chunshan, 2011). As Sina 
Weibo verified, she was the “general manager of the Red Cross Society of China”, but 
argued that “she needs to ride horses every weekend, for example, to cultivate the habits 
of the rich” (Chunshan, 2011). Users discovered Guo’s life was ordinary in 2008. Her 
photo album showed that she rented an apartment, used a cheap mobile and tried to sell a 
second hand car on the Internet. But she suddenly became rich within two years. Her 
wealth enabled her to upgrade to super cars and a villa. Before she was verified by Sina 
Weibo as “general manager of the Red Cross Society of China”, her identity on Sina 
indicated she was an actress (Fauna, 2011). Therefore, the incident was escalated into a 
controversy over how Guo had switched her profession from an actress to a China Red 
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Cross’s manager, and how her wealth may have emerged from corruption. Although 
China Red Cross denied on 29th June 2012 that Guo Meimei was employed with the 
organisation, or that “Red Cross Society of China” was even in existence (Yu, 2011), the 
accusation of its corruption was still a crucial focus. 
 
Li Chengpeng, writer and social critic, sarcastically claimed that Guo deserved to win 
“Person of the Year” for China (Li, 2011b). Li compared Guo to Monica Lewinsky 
because they both played the role of the key that opens the box of scandal and corruption. 
He argues that, it is magnificent to see how powerful that one tweet could be on the 
Internet. It forced China Red Cross to hold two press conferences just to respond to it. 
“China Red Cross’s dirty deeds have been exposed by a 20-year-old girl” (Li, 2011b). 
Furthermore, he argues that, the IT evolution gives ordinary people power that the 
government did not anticipate: “the government officers do gangdom’s job; mistresses do 
anti-corruption bureau’s job” (Li, 2011b).  
 
Unlike the waves stirred up by the incident on the Internet, mainstream media reacted 
slowly and was relatively quiet. Li regards this reaction as “disgraceful” (Li, 2011a). The 
TV and newspapers, Li argues, tended to avoid reporting the incident in detail. The 
attitude of ignoring the obvious was a disgrace to any journalist’s conscience; if the Red 
Cross squandered and embezzled people’s donations, it would be serious enough to make 
the story a headline. The public should have zero tolerance for a charity organisation’s 
corruption and dereliction of its duty. Ironically, the incident became the most popular 
controversy on the Internet, whereas TV and newspapers silenced themselves on the 
grounds that they considered that controversy had nothing to do with the public (Li, 
2011a). 
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Some critics believe an important reason that TV and newspaper ignored such a story is 
that China Red Cross is a governmental organisation. Mainstream media are censored by 
the top-down administrative method, in which the directives come from the authorities 
are non-negotiable for its receivers. Professor Larry H. P. Lang of the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong (hereinafter CUHK) criticised China Red Cross as a monopoly (Lang, 
2011). Before Guo Meimei, China Red Cross consistently received criticism of corruption 
and embezzlement, but the problem did not arouse public attention. People had no 
knowledge about the nature of China Red Cross as a governmental organisation hidden 
within several shell companies. And China Red Cross did not seem eager to clarify this 
information to the people. On the contrary, China Red Cross enjoyed appearing in public 
when people believed it was a charity and an NGO. This information gap was not known 
to the public until Guo Meimei exposed it (Chunshan, 2011; Fauna, 2011). Furthermore, 
Lang describes the complicated relationship between China Red Cross and other local 
charities as “intolerable”. Here, the aim of doing charitable work seems to be not about 
helping, but earning money. It was common for schools, hospitals, and even private 
companies to force students and employees to donate (Wang, Y. H. 2011; An, 2011, 
Chang, 2011; Cui, 2011). Complaints about this so-called “donation” raised people’s 
attention, but were not as influential as the coverage of Guo. In addition, the fact that the 
Red Cross and other charities received donations without clarification of their deployment 
was also questionable. Complaints and accusations of charity corruption, however, were 
hardly reported by TV or newspapers due to the Red Cross’s governmental background.  
 
It was argued by some social activists that mainstream media’s slow reaction to the 
incident was intentional. For example, Han (2011), writer and blogger, believes that 
China Red Cross and other charities are calm and arrogant because they are embedded 
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with the government. Even when the accusations from the public escalated, they still had 
faith in censorship and eradication of free speech. The role that mainstream media played 
in the incident was not as important as the public had hoped. TV and newspapers did not 
have much influence in reporting the incident (Han, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, some critics also criticised the role that social network sites played in 
the affair. Although websites, such as Sina and Renren, might not generally receive the 
same degree of monitoring and surveillance pressure from officials, some filtering of 
sensitive information still occurred. After the exposure, Sina Weibo suspended its built-
in searching for “China Red Cross” and “Guo Meimei” for a short period of time. Thus, 
users who searched these key words in Sina Weibo would not find anything (Han, 2011). 
Therefore, we see that the will of the government had already infiltrated corporate 
websites (Long, 2012). The influential social networking sites in China, including Sina 
Weibo, are not truly independent. It is also speculated that the information that these 
websites filtered may have been on the instruction of the government, or even worse, that 
government technicians may be actively involved in the censorship (Zhang, 2010). 
 
This method of censoring and filtering has been conducted more than once. For example, 
in 2012, Sina Weibo adopted a similar suspension on a search function within its site 
when Wang Lijun, Chongqing city’s top police chief, was branded as a traitor after he 
visited the U.S. consulates, (Bristow, 2012; Widdall, 2012) and Bo Xilai, a member of 
the Politburo of the Communist Party of China was dismissed from his party post 
(LaFraniere, 2012; BBC, 2012). Before April Fools’ Day in 2012, Sina Weibo and 
Tencent Weibo suspended the comment function on microblogs, and deleted users’ 
protest posts (Want China Times, 2012; Cao, 2012; Alia, 2012). The incident of April 
Fools’ Day will be detailed in the next section. 
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3.4.4.3 A silent April Fools’ Day 
From 8 a.m. on the 31st of March, 2012, users found they could not comment on posts on 
Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo, the two largest microblogs in China. The comment 
function on these websites was suspended. Sina’s announcement explained that the 
suspension was temporary. The purpose of the suspension was to create a better 
interactive environment on the Internet. To achieve this “beneficial interactive 
environment” (Dan, 2012), Sina stated that there was a need for rumour “clean up” (Dan, 
2012):  
 
“Recently there has been an increase in the amount of rumours and other illegal and 
harmful information appearing in microblog comments. In order to carry out a 
concentrated clean up of these comments, from 8am 31st March until 8am 3rd April we 
will be temporarily suspending the comment function on microblogs. Following this 
tidying up, we will restore the comment function. Carrying out this necessary clearing of 
information is in order to ensure a more beneficial interactive environment for everyone. 
We hope to have your understanding. Thank you to everyone for your support” (Dan, 
2012). 
 
Although Sina and Tencent censored the content which might have contained sensitive 
information, a large-scale suspension without public announcement did not occur. The 
31st of March announcement was seen as evidence of the government’s administrational 
interference, since two competitive Internet giants in China chose to filter their contents 
at the same time. 
 
Sina’s short announcement did not mention crucial details that interested the public, for 
example, Sina did not clarify which “rumours” and “illegal and harmful information” had 
increased, and how this illegal and harmful information was identified. Furthermore, 
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along with its real-name registration, people were concerned about whether Sina and other 
social network sites would monitor these users who posted or shared illegal information, 
and whether users’ privacy could be protected (Zhang, 2010). 
 
The definition of illegal and harmful information was later clarified by Information Times. 
On 31st March 2012, the Information Times headline read: “Involved in spreading 
rumours of Beijing coup; 16 websites suspended; Sina and Tencent Weibo penalised" 
(Information Times, 2012; Branigan, 2012; Britow & Patience 2012). The report directly 
indicated that the suspension was caused by the downfall of Bo Xilai (Britow & Patience 
2012), former CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary and former Minister of Commerce 
of the PRC. Bo Xilai’s removal from his position and suspension from the Politburo 
aroused stories that spread over the Internet. Although the news of Bo’s pending 
investigation for serious disciplinary violations was announced officially by the state’s 
own media on 10th April, (China News, 2012; Buckley, 2012) microbloggers kept one 
step ahead of state media by pre-empting the event before the official admission 
(Branigan, 2012). 
 
A direct effect of the suspension of the comment function was that microbloggers could 
not interact and communicate. The blogging appeared to be bulletin posts rather than 
vivid interactions between users. It was suspected that the reason the suspension took 
effect one day before April Fools’ Day was because the government worried that more 
rumours would be spread on 1st April (Yip, 2012; Gao, 2012). As a consequence, 1st 
April 2012 became a silent day on the Internet in China.  
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3.4.4.4 Debates concerning real-name registration 
As noted, Xiaonei.com, the former portal of Renren, controversially replicated the layout 
of Facebook. It was also argued that it did not just replicate Facebook’s appearance but 
also its essence, including source codes and some central ideas (Rand, 2009). For example, 
Facebook required identity authentication for new registrations (Ellison, Steinfield, & 
Lampe, 2007). Similarly, Xiaonei’s new users needed to provide personal details to sign 
up. As it originally targeted post- and under-graduates, these details included a new user’s 
name, gender, name of college or university, department, and details of accommodation. 
However, the difference between Xiaonei’s identity authentication and the real-name 
registration that was later required by Sina and Tencent Weibo was that, the 
authentication simply encouraged users to register on a real name basis. If users submitted 
applications with fake names, they could still register.  
 
Yet, real name registration is not insisted upon in microblogs. Instead, Sina uses so-called 
“micro-identity” to encourage people to register on a real name basis. Users who request 
micro-identity in the form of a digital “honorable medal” need to submit applications with 
their real names and ID card numbers. Sina also designed a series of virtual rewards for 
micro-identity bloggers. For instance, micro-identity bloggers can be ranked in the charts 
of most welcomed bloggers, (Sina News, 2012) which shows how welcome the bloggers 
are among their friends. Here, users who want to know their popularity need to be real-
name verified.  
 
The side effect that microblogs brings here is controversial. Real-name registration 
objectors believe that the platform of debate on the Internet provides every participant 
with opportunities to reason and clarify (Yu, 2012; Han, 2011). On the other hand, 
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supporters argue that the boundaries of free speech in microblogs are obscure. It 
sometimes appears that users curse and attack each other in microblogs. Feng Xiaogang, 
a film director, criticised some users’ Internet behaviour as he believed they spoke like 
“uneducated people” and attacked others without morality (Liang, 2012). He tweeted on 
his personal page that whoever did not speak with morality on the Internet was what he 
called “an animal being” (Liang, 2012). A bolder criticism was from Zhou Libo, a 
comedian. Zhou compared the public discussion space on the Internet with the public 
toilet, as he believed that people left their “obscene content” if they were displeased (Wen, 
2010). 
 
Objectors to real-name registration express their fears in relation to four aspects. Firstly, 
objectors suspect that users’ personal information may be leaked to other parties, and 
microblogs are not able to guarantee the protection of users’ privacy (Liang, 2012). This 
leads to the second concern which is that some objectors are afraid that they can become 
vulnerable targets if they reveal their real-name on the Internet. The concern is especially 
addressed by Han (2011), who believes the government can have access to users’ personal 
information if it requests it. In this case, real-name registration enables government 
restrictions on free speech (Han, 2011). Thirdly, sceptics doubt that real-name registration 
can be applied nationwide, due to the differences of regions, and technical power that 
websites possess (Han, 2011). Lastly, compulsory real-name registration is criticised as 
being contrary to the anonymity of the Internet (Liang, 2012). Some users enjoy playing 
different characters in the virtual world, and the real-name registration would ruin their 
fictitious personalities (Liang, 2012). 
 
Some critics worried that real-name registration would eventually become compulsory if 
technical difficulties were resolved. For example, Han (2011) believed that the 
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philosophy of censoring and monitoring the Internet was inherited by the Chinese 
government from its censorship on TV and newspapers. The methods might have changed 
accordingly, but the management of content control was nearly the same regardless of the 
differences between traditional media and the Internet (Han, 2011). If real-name 
registration became compulsory, freedom of speech on the Internet would be heavily 
interfered with by the government. Han alleged that most users who objected to the real-
name registration were not averse to the registration in itself, but rather they were 
concerned about whether the government would continuously restrict the Internet, and 
use real-name registration as a tool to shackle freedom of speech (Han, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, Han (2011) argues that the uncompromising interference in April Fools’ 
Day in 2012 proved that the current image of a happy and free public sphere on the 
Internet was inaccurate. It was not the environment of freedom of speech that the public 
expected and desired. Government power over the Internet was still authoritarian. The 
government’s attitude in this incident was clearly non-negotiable. Therefore, he predicted 
that an implementation of real-name registration would de-liberalise the environment of 
the Internet. 
 
Furthermore, adopting the concept of China’s economic reform, he proposed the solution 
of marketisation. He suggested that, the development of free speech needs to be 
marketised with little interference by the government. The Chinese government started 
economic reform roughly from 1978, and for the last three decades, taking advantage of 
market principles, China’s economy grew remarkably fast. Yet progress in marketisation 
may be controversial as the nature of China’s economic model no longer embraces the 
planned economy. In comparison with the rapid growth of the economy, marketisation in 
other areas, including in the field of censorship, is relatively slow.  
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To sum up, by reviewing the incidents and scandals in microblogging from 2008, this 
section has set up the background to the development of censorship in microblogging, 
and provides the context for understanding the mechanism of censorship in three aspects: 
 
1) The spread of scandals via microblogs was considered as a sign of transition where the 
old protocol of censorship of news media was overturned and the new one was 
formulating. That is, the microblog provides an online news channel for news stories that 
might expose the government and its officials in a negative light, and which would not be 
seen in offline news media.  
 
2) Microblogs were once a freer channel for news stories before the Chinese authorities 
stepped in and intervened. The freer environment of online censorship had led to a relative 
increase in the discussion of scandals. It corresponds to the channelisation theory 
(Chapter 2:2.1) which indicates that public resentment can be destructive if it is 
suppressed by pressure from the censor. 
 
3) The silent April Fools’ Day was a significant turning point as the authorities started 
tightening the restrictions on microblogs, as specific topics were forbidden on Weibo, and 
key word searching was filtered. This indicates that the Chinese authorities adapted the 
protocol of censorship of offline news media and applied it to the online news. 
 
3.4.5 The southern media 
The aim of reviewing the southern media is to determine the following aspects of this 
study. Firstly, led by the Southern Weekly, southern media differ from microblogs, where 
the update of online news content is largely dependent on the uploading from its 
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registered users. The southern media employ professional journalists and editors to work 
on the production of news, and provide them with strong support against administrative 
interference. Secondly, the review provides a historical context for a later stage of analysis 
which explains why the southern media are seen as ‘rebellious’ and ‘radical’ to the 
authorities. It also provides an argument that explains the historical and economic reasons 
for their liberal tradition. Reviewing the context of the southern media is central to 
analysing the news media’s influence on public opinion which is also mentioned by 
respondents in the interviews.  
 
The southern media is a group of liberal and uncompromised media organisations which 
is often opposed to the authorities’ interference over the news media in China. Most of 
these media organisations are located in the south. To look into the historical and 
economic background of the southern media provides the political context of China’s 
activist journalists and their attempts to resist the administrative interference from the 
Communist Party and the government. 
 
If there was a book on China’s modern history, Guangzhou would be an important chapter 
because a number of revolutions and incidents were initiated in and exploded out of this 
province. In 1839, shortly before the First Opium War, Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu 
ordered the confiscation and destruction of opium in Humen, Dongguan of Guangzhou. 
The destruction of opium was seen as the casus belli of the First Anglo-Chinese War. 
Dissent and a regional uprising organised by the Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen, a 
revolutionary and first president of the Republic of China, were launched in Guangzhou 
and nearby provinces from 1895, including the famous and tragic Second Guangzhou 
Uprising, also known as the Yellow Flower Mound Uprising. These anti-Qin Dynasty 
movements preceded the Xinhai Revolution (1911–1912), which overthrew China’s last 
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imperial dynasty and established the Republic of China. In 1924, the Republic of China 
Military Academy (ROCMA) was founded in Huangpu in Guangzhou. It was the first 
modern military academy in China. It educated and generated army officers who 
contributed their military talents to the Kuomintang (KMT) army force and later fought 
in wars such as the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and the Second Sino-Japanese War 
(1937–1945). Both KMT and the Communist Party established their bases in Guangzhou 
of Guangdong: KMT’s central Party headquarters were relocated in Guangzhou in 1925, 
and Mao Zedong founded Political Weekly in the same city in 1927. 
 
In economic terms, Guangdong has been one of the most developed areas in China for a 
century. It possesses a number of natural ports and well-equipped railway stations, and is 
geographically a neighbour of Hong Kong, a free-trade port and colony of the UK until 
1997. All of these advantages make Guangzhou economically strong in trading, light 
industry and orientation. Currently, there are six special economic zones (SEZ) in China, 
and half of them (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou) are in Guangdong. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Based on the literature reviewed, the theories of Confucian limited freedom of the right 
to speak, and the work on CCP’s propaganda, gatekeeping, judgement of news values, 
and construction of online news media, this chapter has provided an overview of the 
specific elements of Chinese history and philosophy that relate to the operation of 
censorship practices in China. The articulation of Confucian thought and its legacy 
provides historical and cultural perspectives for individual freedom in China. The reviews 
on the CCP’s earlier political proposition of media supervision, before the establishment 
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of PRC and its propaganda strategy of presenting itself as the saviour of the Chinese 
nation, demonstrate how Maoism was associated with freedom of the press in China. 
Lastly, the third part of this chapter has explored the mechanism of media censorship in 
China, from aspects of gatekeeping, news-value judgement of news workers, and 
construction of Chinese print and online news media. All of these establish the basis for 
the methodological frameworks that will be outlined in the next chapter, and will be 
analysed in the later chapters of 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Speech crime was common in the 1960s and 1970s and a great number of people who 
criticised the authorities were convicted of it, but nowadays a single prosecution of a news 
worker or a critic may cause an enormous social response. An infamous instance is the 
case of Liu Xiaobo. Liu Xiaobo was portrayed as a rebel and sentenced to imprisonment 
for the crime of inciting subversion of state power, (Chen, 2010; BBC, 2010) whereas the 
Noble Prize committee awarded him the Peace Prize in 2010 for ‘his long and non-violent 
struggle for fundamental human rights in China’. While Liu Xiaobo was serving his time 
in prison, criticism and speculation damaged the Chinese government’s reputation. 
Foreign and domestic media became concerned about China’s lack of free speech and 
questioned the Chinese government’s determination and efforts to improve the situation. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter looks at the establishment and development of technological 
means that have been applied by the Chinese authorities to censor online content in China. 
It is seen as the first level of the revised-pyramid model of online censorship construction. 
By reviewing public reactions to and criticisms of these filtering and monitoring projects, 
this chapter provides a historical and political context to these technological means, to be 
referred to in the analysis of the whole picture behind the construction of online 
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censorship, in later chapters. The next chapter will outline the theoretical approaches and 
research methods that have been used in this study, which aims to gather empirical data 
for the analysis of the other levels of online censorship: the censorship of the cyber police 
and the online news workers. 
 
This last section starts with an introduction to the construction of online censorship in 
China, as an essential part of the research focus, namely, one of the five elements of the 
earlier identified, censorship inverted pyramid. It illustrates an inverted-pyramid with 
different levels of censorship mechanisms. This section therefore aims to explore the top 
level of the technological mechanism of Internet censorship, whereas the lower levels, 
including public security monitoring and the censorship and self-censorship protocol in 
the online newsroom, will be analysed in the following chapters.  
 
The next chapter will detail the conceptual and methodological approaches used in this 
study. It will discuss the aims and methods of the investigation as providing thick 
description (Geertz, 1973) to the context of online news censorship in China. In addition, 
it will explore the rationale and strategy for field observation in the online newsroom and 
interviews of online news workers, in order to thematically analyse the protocols of online 
censorship in the processes of news production. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The research methodology for this thesis will be detailed in this chapter in order to specify 
the conceptual and methodological approach used throughout. It is divided into two 
sections. The first explains the aims of the investigation: to provide a coherent description 
and analysis of how China’s online news media are being censored by the Chinese 
authorities, and how these media self-censor within their particular contexts in China. It 
also explains the scope of this research, and outlines the guiding research questions and 
the approach used. By answering these questions, it provides a thick description (Geertz, 
1973) for censorship and self-censorship in the context of the environment, which is the 
primary intention of this study. The second section explores the research methods that 
have been used. It contains the rationale and strategy for each method respectively. This 
completes the design of the methodology. 
 
4.2 Aims and scope 
The main aim of this research is to provide a coherent description and analysis of the 
environment of censorship and self-censorship of the online news media in China. The 
research is focused on three areas. Firstly, the research examined the formal and informal 
mechanisms of control which impact upon how the Chinese online news media 
experience censorship. Pressure from the Chinese authorities, which is outlined in the 
interviews, is seen as a key aspect of Chinese news media’s censorship and self-
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censorship policy. The second aspect looks at how Chinese online news media formulate 
and practice their own editorial policy in order to comply with the demands of the 
authorities. Lastly, attention is paid to how editors and journalists who work in the 
Chinese online media experience, adapt and respond to China’s approach to media 
censorship and control. 
 
The first and second aspects center on policy: the formal policy of the Chinese authorities 
and the policy and policymaking process of a particular online news media organisation 
in China. The latter involved an ethnographic study of editorial meetings, and conferences 
of governmental publicity divisions. Therefore, an approach of field observation was used. 
Also, interviews were conducted to explore the third aspect, because the self-censorship 
of editors and journalists involves individual experiences and practices which can be 
revealed by face-to-face conversation.  
 
The research questions are as follows: 
1. How and why do the Chinese authorities censor the Chinese online news media? 
(focus: motivation for censorship policy of online news media) 
2. How do the Chinese online news media formulate a policy of censorship and self-
censorship to comply with the censorship of the government? (focus: policymaking 
process) 
3. How do the Chinese online news media practise the policy of self-censorship on their 
website to comply with the censorship of the government? (focus: self-censorship of 
online news media) 
4. How do the editors and journalists who work for the online news media self-censor 
to comply with the policy? (focus: self-censorship of editors and journalist) 
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4.3 Theoretical Approach 
The term ‘qualitative research’ is difficult to define, as it covers a wide range of 
techniques and philosophies (Flick, 2002; Yin, 1998). However, in the field of social 
science, it can be understood as an approach that allows researchers of social science to 
examine people’s experience in detail, by using a set of research methods (Hennink, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.8-9; Blaikie, 2010: p.7-9; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000: p.2-4). In 
this project, the overall aim of applying a qualitative research approach is to provide a 
coherent yet rich description and analysis in an environment characterized by censorship 
and self-censorship. In order to achieve this, a blueprint that connects researchers to 
research philosophies, strategies and methods for collecting and analysing empirical data 
is required (Stone, 2010: Vol. 2 p.13; Berg, 2009).  
 
In-depth interviews and observation are used to build up what Geertz (1973) initially 
called a thick description, which identifies the roles and experiences of the participants in 
the context of their lives. In this research, a thick description is sketched for the 
environment of China’s free speech on the Internet. These interpretive approaches place 
emphasis on different aspects. Observation enables the researcher to study people in their 
natural settings; “to identify how their experiences […] are shaped by the context of their 
lives” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011; p.170-1), and in-depth interviews allow 
participants to tell their own story of their experiences of censorship and self-censorship. 
The aims of conducting these methods, along with their applications, are recalled 
respectively in the section on data collection in this chapter. 
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4.3.1 Research philosophy 
As Bryman (2004: p.4) highlights, the practices of social research do not exist in a vacuum: 
“they are linked with the ways in which social scientists envision the connection between 
different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should be examined” 
(Bryman, 2004: p.4).  
 
The perspective of interpretivism (Schwandt, 2000) fundamentally underpins this 
research, as the research questions revealed that an interpretivistic analysis of empirical 
data of censorship and self-censorship in the online news media in China is regarded, in 
Blaikie’s (2010: p.99) words, as “the product of its inhabitants in social reality”. It focuses 
on understanding people’s subjective meaningful experience from the perspective of 
people themselves and understanding “the meaning of social actions within the context 
in which people live” (Snape & Spencer, 2008: p.7; Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2011: 
p.14-5). Therefore, in this research, the emphasis is put on the personal reflections of 
participants on censorship and self-censorship, and the environment of online news media 
that is socially constructed.  
 
4.3.2 Framework 
Figure 3, below, visualises four fundamental stages of this study: exploratory, 
interviewing, data collecting, and analysis and discussion.  
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In the exploratory stage, I explain how the observation is designed in three phases: 
observation questions, participating level, and pilot study. Here, empirical data such as 
field notes and a diary are collected to provide a contextual basis for the next stage, the 
Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 3 Framework of research approaches 
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structured 
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Figure 3 Framework of research approaches 
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interviewing stage. This consists of four phases: main interview questions, setting and 
sampling strategies, interview guide, and the pilot study. 
 
The fieldwork stage comes after the completion of the first two; after the research design 
and pilot study. After the empirical data are collected, at the fourth stage, we end with the 
analysis and writing-up. In his Hong Kong school fieldwork of the study of education for 
citizenship, Lai (2005: p.74-5) analysed his field diary while observing and recording 
daily, in order to make a decision “based on analysis and requested the school to help and 
cooperate likewise”. Hence, it is worth noting that for this study, observing, interviewing, 
and recording in the fieldwork realistically demands in-time analysis.  
 
4.4 Observation 
4.4.1 Aims and objectives 
Observation is often used within an ethnographic approach. Spradley (1980: p.3) and 
Barbour (2008: p.92) evaluate that an ethnographic approach requires carrying out 
ethnographic fieldwork and is in essence the work of describing the culture. But it should 
also be stressed that the scope of the usage of ethnographic fieldwork has expanded. It 
has been used in social studies for a long time (Delamont, 2004: p.217-9; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Since the study of individuals and their socio-cultural communities, 
defined by Casey and Edgerton (2005), there has been a growing application of 
ethnographic approaches in the field of social research. For example, Fetterman and 
Pitman (1986) argued that federally funded evaluations in education in the United States 
had involved ethnographic components.  
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Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) sketched the historical expansion of the ethnographical 
approach and its diversification in political studies in a social context. For this study, the 
concepts of censorship and self-censorship in China are “socially constructed phenomena 
that mean different things to different people” (Mertens, 1998: p.11). 
 
There are two aims for using observation in this research. The first aim is to obtain a 
detailed description of the dynamic interaction of China’s online news production, 
including observation of action, reaction, and interaction in relation to the acquiescence 
to and negotiation with censorship within the newsroom. Attention was paid to three 
different professional roles: Online journalists, editors, and web administrators. The range 
of the description covered their individual actions (e.g. what they do and what they do not 
do), their reactions (e.g. handling the censorship and self-censorship pressure), and the 
interactions that involve pressure of censorship from their superiors. Observation is 
capable of achieving the goal of this research, as it is defined as a method that “enables 
researchers to systematically observe and record people’s behaviour, actions and 
interactions” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2010: p.170). Hence, observational methods for 
this study involve “the systematic, detailed observation of behaviour”, watching and 
recording how online journalists, editors, and web administrations act and interact and 
negotiate censorship (Mays and Pope, 1995: p.182). 
 
The second aim is to provide exploratory support for interviewing from the records of 
field notes and diary. Bivens (2008) conducts his research by using observation to cast 
widely in an effort to collect as much information as possible within the scope of the 
research. In the chapter on historical development (Chapter 4), the narratives and 
mechanics of China’s Internet censorship have been explored. The chapter provides a 
sketch of Internet censorship in China. But for the purpose of a deeper understanding of 
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different roles and the interactions among them, research is required for first-hand 
observation and recording. Records produced in fieldwork, such as field notes, can 
achieve this purpose. Further, a field diary is used as a complementary tool to record the 
researcher’s thoughts on the research to enrich the data. Noonan (2008: p.48) uses a field 
diary to allow himself to talk and record those involved “in this area informally about the 
research and get valuable feedback”. 
 
The method of observation falls under the interpretive paradigm, as stated earlier. To 
provide complementary data and understand issues from different perspectives (Hennink, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.170), it is combined with in-depth interviews.  
 
4.4.2 Questions and focus 
To make actions and interactions such as censoring and self-censoring observable, the 
questions in observations are listed as follows: 
In China’s online news media 
1. What do journalists do? 
2. What don’t journalists do? 
3. What do editors do? 
4. What don’t editors do? 
5. What do web administrators do? 
6. What don’t web administrators do? 
7. How do journalists react to the pressure of censorship? 
8. How don’t editors react to the pressure of censorship? 
9. How don’t web administrators react to the pressure of censorship? 
10. How do journalists, editors, and web administrators interact to the pressure of 
censorship?  
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11. Where does the pressure of censorship come from? Explicit or implicit pressure? 
From the government? The administrators? Self? 
12. What is a production team meeting like? Who gives the instructions? 
13. What is a briefing or a press conference like? Who gives the instructions? 
 
These questions can be divided into three aspects, and each aspect has its own focus. The 
first six questions focus on individual acts of three fundamental roles in a normal Chinese 
online news media production team: online journalists, editors and web administrators. I 
observed what online journalists, editors, and web administrators do, in order to record 
how they work as individuals, and what their newsroom duties entail. Furthermore, the 
record can be used to distinguish what different roles they play, and don’t play in the 
newsroom. This leads to the second focus on how online journalists, editors and web 
administrators react under the pressure of censorship. In the second aspects, from 
questions 7 to 9, I observed how these different roles responded to the pressure in the 
newsroom. In other words, I observed and recorded what they did in dealing with the 
pressure of censorship as individual actors and as a team. The last focus is on the 
interaction among these three roles. From questions 10 to 13, I observed how they 
interacted on the censorship instructions on different occasions. For example, how did 
they react in newsroom meetings and private coffee time? What is the difference? 
Furthermore, I differentiated and distinguished the origin of the pressure by observing the 
newsroom meeting, and the press briefing and press conference held by the government.  
 
Several aspects of observation can be focused on fieldwork. For example, people’s 
behaviour, actions and interactions, their language and body language, and the social 
setting where the actions and interactions occur (Mays and Pope, 1995: p.182). However, 
as suggested, focusing more on one aspect than others may provide a deeper insight into 
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the norms and values surrounding behaviour and the social setting (Hennink, Hutter & 
Bailey; 2011: p.173). Depending on the observation of the production and operation of 
online news media under the pressure of censorship, the focus is on actions and 
interactions, and the observation on language and social setting. Therefore the design is 
complementary, because observing and recording the actions and interactions can 
integrate the picture with rich data on the situation and the interplay of power or social 
control (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey; 2011: p.174-6). This is similar to Graham’s study 
(1997), as he observed actions and interactions between audiences who sit in the context 
of computer-based virtual artwork and examined the theory of its relationship to the 
audience. He also set the audience conversation as complementary to enrich his data 
(Graham, 1997). 
 
Questions about how generally or particularly censorship is/was operated are asked in the 
interviews, but observation is still needed as it enables the researcher to gain perspectives 
from other angles. Compared with the interviews, the benefit of observation, the risk of 
post hoc rationalisation, is avoided. This is interpreted as follows:  
 
“This approach (note: interviews) can yield one type of data, but there is also the risk of 
post hoc rationalization of certain behaviours, whereby participants then adjust how they 
describe their behaviour as a form of justification or rationalization. With observation 
you are able to view what people actually do, so you learn about how people really behave 
and also how certain behaviours are influenced by the situation or context in which they 
are conducted” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey; 2011: p.173). 
 
Thus, observation on actions and interactions of news workers who work in the online 
media industry may give the research access to more nuanced information especially 
when people’s language contradicts their actions (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey; 2011: p.173-
4).  
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4.4.3 Approach to observation 
The types of observation, referring to the level of researcher participation, can be viewed 
as a “continuum” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.178) between two extremes: the 
range of the researcher’s role in observation derives one end of complete participation to 
another end of complete invisibility (Robson, 1995). In this project, observation is going 
to be adopted, in some way, very close to invisibility. I focused on observing the activities 
of Internet content censoring by not participating in them. However, it is worth noting 
that as Robson (1995) indicates, complete invisibility is theoretically impossible to 
achieve in reality, as the researcher is always present in the social setting. This has also 
been acknowledged in the pilot study and addressed as a natural limitation of this method.  
 
The mode of observation was non-participant. It has been argued by several scholars that 
non-participant observation allows the researcher to observe people’s actions and 
interactions from a distance (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.185). From the pilot 
study, I realised that non-participant observation was more suitable because of the need 
to minimise the researcher’s personal influence on the online newsroom’s workflow and 
activities. Socialisation and interaction with the news workers, especially the journalists, 
could heavily influence the research, and the researcher’s personal involvement and 
participation would certainly have had some impact on the newsroom dynamic.  
 
The non-participant observation allows the researcher to observe people’s actions and 
interactions from a distance. Observing, listening and recording can be done more freely 
in the process. The key to conducting a non-participant observation is to blend into the 
background and try not to influence the activities (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.185). 
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However, because of the theoretical impossibility of complete invisibility, as stated above, 
rapport building and other negotiations with participants are still required for overcoming 
this methodological flaw. 
 
4.4.4 Choice of place 
The news organisation was chosen based on whether  its online news workers had 
experience in reporting some key incidents of this research, such as the Wenzhou train 
collision and Bo Xilai’s downfall. I chose the local news media organisation Wenzhou 
News (WN) for observation. WN is an online news media organisation that has  
considerable coverage in local community in Wenzhou, and is the online media for the 
Wenzhou News Group. Its employees have experience in covering the breaking of an 
explosive news story, and handling the procedure of censoring and self-censoring is a 
daily routine. The length of the fieldwork was four weeks. The length of time spent in the 
newsroom is based on observation in the pilot study. Web administrators were scheduled 
to hold a meeting at the beginning of every month, and in these meetings, web 
administrators would brief online journalists and other editors on tasks in the following 
month. Therefore, four weeks is a reasonable length of time to observe and study the 
process of online news production. The observation was from 6th May to 3rd June in 2011.  
 
According to its official announcement retrieved from February 2012, Wenzhou News, 
domain name 66wz.com, was established in December 2000. It is owned by the Wenzhou 
News Group and in 2008 it became the most popular local news website in China. It meets 
the criterion of the research project that its employees, namely journalists and editors, 
have experience in handling the procedure of censoring and self-censoring, and already 
have a daily routine, for example, dealing with the situation of reporting an incident, such 
as the Wenzhou train collision.  
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It is the researcher’s background as a former journalist at Wenzhou News which affords 
a further advantage to conducting observation. As it has been suggested, beginning 
rapport development in the early stages of fieldwork is crucial (Swanson & Holton III, 
2005), as this process of rapport building determines “the level of trust that the community 
or the group under study” has in the researchers (Hennink, Hutter& Bailey, 2011: p.192).  
 
Background of the Wenzhou News and its host media organisation 
The local online news media organisation Wenzhou News was chosen for observation for 
several reasons, detailed in Chapter 3: 4.4. In short, WN was one of the most visited local 
news websites in Wenzhou, and its online news workers had first-hand experience in 
reporting the Wenzhou train collision in 2011. The website describes itself as an 
“objective and affectionate” (WN, 2013a) online news media with the largest news 
coverage in the Wenzhou community. Its news service manages the local newsgathering 
network, and its official language is Mandarin. The website has an online news section 
along with blogs/microblogs and forums. As the main concern of this research is to study 
censorship of online news, the observation was made in its online news section, which is 
responsible for reporting, broadcasting and re-posting local news.  
 
Its online news service is an integral component of the multiplatform Wenzhou News 
Media Group (WNMG). WN Online is a multiplatform subsidiary to the traditional news 
services of the main WNMG company. This form of integration can also be found in 
western media such as the BBC and its online news supplements (Way, 2013). WN is a 
popular website in its local region, with 1.1 million weekly users (WN, 2013b). Its 
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popularity is significantly localised, as about 90 percent of the hits on its web-pages are 
from IP addresses in the Wenzhou region (WN, 2013b).  
 
4.4.5 Planning 
Observation was conducted over a period of one month. An observation guide was 
brought to this study. So far, this is an original idea, i.e. a supplement to the data collecting. 
The idea of employing an observation guide was inspired by the pattern of using an 
interview guide. An interview guide is usually sketched as a list of questions which 
reminds the interviewer of the focus of the research. The observation guide does the same.  
 
4.4.4.1 Instruments 
Field notes were taken as the method of recording when the observation was conducted. 
The notes became important data for analysis. It is advisable that field notes also include 
those things that may not seem important at the time, because their importance may 
become clear later during analysis (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.194). 
 
It is worth emphasising that the field notes should be understood in a way that shows the 
focus is on descriptions of elements and actions, rather than interpretations of them. 
Furthermore, recording objective field notes pays attention to the detailed documentation 
in chronological order. In addition, a field diary is adopted in order to gain a set of rich 
data for analysis, as stated above. 
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4.4.6 Pilot study 
The pilot study was conducted in the offices of journalists and editors of Wenzhou News 
to pre-test the design for several reasons. Firstly, it helped the researcher to verify the 
efficiency of observing (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.193). Secondly, the 
researcher’s observation skills can be pre-tested and enhanced in a pilot study. Thirdly, 
the continuation of rapport-building with the team of journalists and editors at Wenzhou 
News aids the researcher’s invisibility by blending into the news group (Hennink, Hutter 
& Bailey, 2011: p.193). 
 
The pilot study also contributed to this research in four aspects: firstly, at the stage of the 
pilot study, skills of observing and recording were enhanced from practice. Secondly, 
initial knowledge of conducting observation in fieldwork was gained and was therefore 
advantageous in designing the method for this project. Thirdly, the rapport-building with 
online journalists, editors, web administrators, and cyber police could help me to blend 
more easily into the environment while the observation formally started. Lastly, the close 
relationship that I consistently built eased the difficulties of accessing interviewees for 
sensitive topics.  
 
4.4.5.1 Initial observations of the pilot study 
The roles of editors and web administrators have overlapped in some areas. Both of these 
roles have the responsibility of monitoring online news content on their websites. 
Meanwhile, online journalists are rarely found to be obliged to censor the news content. 
In fact, online journalists worked at the bottom of the news production chain in the field. 
What these journalists publish depends not only on what they actually produce, but more 
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on what web administrators orientate and what remains after it has been censored by the 
editors.  
 
One of the main differences between editors and web administrators is that the latter are 
heavily engaged in corresponding with the publicity department of the government on a 
daily basis, while the focus of editors is on content monitoring. Moreover, web 
administrators prefer to give top-down instructions, and editors censor what journalists 
produce and coordinate the relationship between online journalists and the administrative 
board. It also appears that, on most occasions, web administrators have higher authority 
for decision-making in the online news media, due to their position at the higher 
administrative level. 
 
4.4.7 Limitations 
In practice, it is difficult to be an absolutely invisible observer. An observer who carries 
recording materials, such as a notebook and pen, or electronic devices, would to a certain 
degree influence the behaviour of the participants as they interact. It was foreseen and 
acknowledged in a pilot study that the members of the newsroom often notice the observer 
as an outsider. For the purpose of collecting data in these circumstances, in which the 
participants work spontaneously, the process of observation requires careful preparation 
and rapport-building beforehand. Thus, the observer can minimise his interfering with the 
participants’ behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, observation has its weakness in generalising a theory. The local online news 
media organisation that was chosen cannot represent the entire picture of this industry in 
China and not every detail of the mechanisms of its news production can be fully 
130 
 
interpreted. Hence, it is important to conduct in-depth interviews in the next stage, due to 
their exploratory function. 
 
4.5 In-depth interviews 
4.5.1 Aim and objectives 
The in-depth interview has been chosen as one of the essential approaches for the 
methodology of the project. Li (2008; p.80) argues that the interview is a method suitable 
for examining the impact of the media on decision-making. In his case study of EU-China 
relations in the post-Cold War era, he specifies that the semi-structured interview is the 
key to exploring the interaction between news media and external policy thorough 
preparation and flexibility. In this study, the aim of using in-depth interviews is to collect 
empirical data of perspectives on and experiences of censorship and self-censorship 
within China’s online news media from two groups of participants: the Chinese publicity 
authorities and members from the newsroom of China’s online news media.   
 
In-depth interviews are widely used as a data collection strategy in social science research. 
For his case study of Dissent’s media practices on meditation and political contention 
McCurdy (2009) selects the semi-structured qualitative interviews for their emphasis on 
structure while accommodating “spontaneous, reflexive interaction” (McCurdy, 2009: 
136) between two parties – the interviewer and interviewee. For this study, all interviews 
are semi-structured. This type of interview can provide a breadth of data by asking open-
ended questions with purpose, and its nature allows the researcher to adjust questions 
accordingly while the interviews are being conducted (Fontana & Frey, 2000: pp.652-3; 
Adams & Hicks, 2001). 
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The aim of using in-depth interviews in this research is to collect empirical data from 
online journalists, editors, web administrators, and cyber police. Questions were asked of 
these four roles, in order to capture their perceptions and experiences of censorship within 
the Chinese online news media.  There are eight core questions: 
 
4.5.1.1 Aspects of news production: 
1. How do online editors operationalise censorship instructions and regulations in the 
newsroom? 
2. How do online journalists respond and react to censorship instructions and 
regulations in the newsroom? 
3. How do web administrators coordinate with censorship instructions and regulations 
in the newsroom? 
4. How do web administrators operationalise censorship instructions in the newsroom? 
 
4.5.1.2 Aspects of evaluation: 
5. How do online editors evaluate censorship instructions and regulations? 
6. How do online journalists evaluate censorship instructions and regulations? 
7. How do web administrators evaluate censorship instructions and regulations? 
8. How do cyber police evaluate censorship instructions and regulations? 
 
4.5.2 Design  
All interviews in this study were semi-structured for the reasons stated above. 
Furthermore, the in-depth interviews are designed as a one-to-one method of data 
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collection (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.109). In an interview, one interviewer and 
one interviewee were involved in having an in-depth conversation on specific topics, such 
as the personal experiences of working under the pressure of censorship and the 
perspectives of the authorities.  
 
These semi-structured interviews were conducted as face-to-face conversations. As Shuy 
(2003, p.181) argues, face-to-face conversations elicit “more thoughtful” and “more 
accurate” responses than other forms of conversation interviews. However, the 
geographical dispersal of interviewees required other means for conducting the interviews, 
such as phone or online-conversation. McCurdy (2009; p.139-141) used phone and email 
interviewing after consistent rapport-building with his interviewees since the different 
interviewees were from different geographical areas. In this research, every effort was 
made to ensure each interview was conducted face-to-face.  
 
4.5.3 Participants and sampling 
4.5.3.1 Rationale of selection 
Two groups of participants were included in the interviews. They are the cyber police 
and online news workers. The participant codes, gender, age, education background, 
administrative status and the unit (office/news organisation) they worked for are listed 
in Table 1, below: 
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Table 1 Details of interviewees 
 
Code Gender Age Education background Administrative status Unit 
P00 F 24 Bachelor of Media 
Studies 
Journalist Wenzhou 
Evening Paper 
P01 M 33 Bachelor of Publishing 
and Editing 
Journalist Wenzhou News 
P02 F 30 Bachelor of Economics 
and Finance 
Editor Wenzhou News 
P03 M 54 Diploma of Chinese 
Literature 
Web administrator, editor Qianjiang 
Evening Paper 
P04 M 33 Diploma of Publishing 
and Editing 
Editor Wuhai Online 
P05 M 51 MBA Cyber police officer Director of 
Department of 
NIS, Bureau of 
Public Security 
P06 M 39 Bachelor of Politics Web administrator,  Qianjiang 
Evening Paper 
P07 M 36 Bachelor of Security and 
Law Enforcement 
Cyber police officer Cyber policeman 
of Bureau of 
Public Security 
 
Cyber police officers 
There are three reasons to interview Chinese cyber police who are subordinated to the 
public security system in China. Firstly, cyber police are seen as censors for the 
construction of mechanisms (see Chapter 1:2.5). They are an important element in the 
structure of the mechanisms of online news censorship, as they represent how the Chinese 
government oversee and monitor online news media. Secondly, interviewing cyber police 
officers reveals the protocols of censorship of online news media, as they deliver the 
pressures of censorship and demands of the authorities to individual online news workers. 
It also examines how these pressures and demands influence, obstruct or interfere with 
the processes of online news production in the way in which the online journalists and 
editors have to take precautions at different stages of news production, and how they 
conceive and report news stories that fit into the requirement of being “harmonious”. 
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Lastly, in-depth interviews allow this research to acquire data for analysing a number of 
aspects of the cyber police from the perspective of these censors, including their roles and 
responsibilities in the processes of online news production, and how they perceive their 
job as censors of online content.  
 
Online journalists, editors and web administrators 
Online journalists, online editors and web administrators are seen as a group of people 
who together are heavily engaged in the processes of online news production in the 
newsroom. Selection of these participants required the following criteria. Firstly, they had 
experience of working in online news media organisations in China. They were either 
registered as journalists, editors or web administrators in legitimate media organisations, 
and were familiar with the production process in the newsroom including handling the 
pressure of censorship instructions. Hence, they were capable of answering interview 
questions by referring to their engagement and particular examples of news production. 
Hence, participants could give their perspectives based on actual cases from their 
professional work experience rather than providing abstract concepts and generalities.  
 
4.5.3.2 Sampling 
Although the observation was conducted in Wenzhou News, some interview participants 
were not selected from this media organisation. There is a significant reason of 
broadening the range of the interviewee selection. The aim of this study is to explore and 
discuss issues of censorship and self-censorship in the context of China’s online news 
industry (See Chapter 1: 1.1 Objectives and research questions). This thesis aims to 
demonstrate the protocol of online censorship in China through a review of a range of 
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theories and literature, and an analysis of the perspectives of censors and online news 
workers. The scope of the interviews is not limited to one news organisation. In addition, 
there are a number of nationwide news incidents such as Bo Xilai’s downfall and southern 
media’s struggle with censorship that was discussed in chapter 7: 7.4.2 and 7.5 Therefore, 
the scope of the research interest is set to be broader than only one city in China.  
 
I chose “snowball sampling” (Roseneil, 1995: p.9) for the purpose of recruiting 
interviewees. In selecting interviewees, efforts were made to ensure that participants were 
varied and distinguishable. Five elements were listed as follows: gender, age, educational 
status, administrative status, and active work experience. This framework is inspired and 
developed by Roseneil (1995, p.9) who sampled with a set of four “important variables” 
in her study of the Greenham Common protest site.  
 
Gender) Female participants were included in the sampling, but disproportionate 
involvement of gender is acceptable, because the majority of individuals within the 
institutions are male.  
Age) The design required the researcher to ask the exact age of all participants, and place 
them into different age ranges from under 30, 31-40, 41-50, and above 50.  
Educational status) According to different educational background, participants who 
hold diplomas or undergraduate/postgraduate degrees were selected. Effort was made to 
ensure the samples included one or more of these three.  
Administrative status) Participants with or without administrative authority at work 
were differentiated. Most online journalists have no administrative authority. On the 
contrary, web administrators and cyber police operate at an administrative level. The 
status of editors, however, can be both administrative and journalistic and were further 
explicated in the detail of the pilot study. 
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4.5.4 Interview guide 
The purpose of having an interview guide was to set a memory aide during the interview 
(Hennink, Hutter& Bailey, 2011: p.109-112). In short, it is a list of questions that focuses 
on specific topics and guides the interview. The structure of an interview guide contains 
four parts: the introduction, opening questions, key questions, and closing questions. In 
order to give an example, an interview guide from the pilot study is attached (See 
appendix C). 
 
An introduction is basically a reminder for the interviewer. It tells the interviewer to raise 
the introductory points to the participant at the beginning of the interview (Hennink, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.112). Here, this part includes a short self-introduction, the topic 
and the aim of the research, the envisioned outcome of the research, the outline of the 
interview, the prospective length of time of the interview, and some additional ethical 
issues, such as the endorsement of the participant and consent sheet. The sheet establishes 
permission to audio record the interview, treat statements with confidentiality, ensure the 
anonymity of the data and highlights additional procedures for data protection (See 
Appendix B). For the purpose of establishing context about the participant and building 
rapport, after the introductory stage, the guide includes some easy-going questions for the 
participant. These questions are about age, occupation, educational level, and general 
questions about the background of the respondent, so the interviewee feels comfortable 
in the interview setting (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.113).  
 
Following the introduction, some opening questions were asked to build more rapport 
with the interviewee. Questions here are broadly related to the nature of the interviewee’s 
137 
 
occupation in general. Opening questions continually helped the interviewee to feel 
comfortable. This part bridged the introduction to key questions where the most serious 
and most important topics were discussed.  
 
Key questions are designed to collect core information (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: 
p.113). A rapport needs to be established at this stage between the two parties in the 
interview. Depending on different sets of interviewees, these questions are related to their 
personal experiences and perspectives on and experience of censorship in China on 
particular online news incidents. Additionally, some other aspects were covered including 
the development of the instruments of Internet censorship, and expanding discussions on 
how they saw prospects for changes in the online free speech environment.  
 
However, the prior setting does not mean that the sequence of the interview questions 
cannot be changed or revised in the process of interviewing. As Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 
(2011: 116-7) suggested, the order setting should be convenient to the interviewee rather 
than the researcher. Moreover, the quality of the data may be jeopardised if questions are 
inappropriately structured and are not logically presented to the interviewees.  
 
The closing questions are designed for the purpose of reducing the rapport and 
disconnecting the two parties. They address the importance of this ‘fade out’ process 
being ethical and not leaving the interviewee in “an emotionally vulnerable state or with 
painful memories” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.113-4), especially when dealing 
with sensitive issues, such as the experience of being censored, banned, or forbidden, as 
is the matter of this project. The questions are broader and more general, related to the 
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topic of the research. And if it is necessary, this part may even include some 
considerations on the prospective development of censorship on the Internet. 
 
The questions in the in-depth interviews are short, clear and open (Hennink, Hutter & 
Bailey, 2011: p.118-9). A short and clear question minimizes the possibility of confusion 
about the key points for the interviewee. And an open question enables the interviewee to 
expand upon their personal experiences of or perspectives on Internet censorship, and not 
simply by responding with yes or no. Furthermore, a series of topical probes, which are 
noted with each question, can remind the interviewer to ask certain issues of interest if 
the interviewee does not raise them (See Appendix C). 
 
4.5.5 Strategies and considerations in conducting interviews 
A successful interview demands careful attention to its strategies and different stages of 
the process. The first of these stages is preparing for the interview beforehand. Attentive 
preparation involves two considerations: the preparation of the interviewer, which has 
been expounded in the interview guide, and the preparation of the interviewees. It is 
essential to ensure that the empirical data can be collected thoroughly in a way that no 
important details are missing, and at the same time that the interview is able to be 
conducted in a way in which both parties feel comfortable with a thorough consideration 
of interviewing techniques as well as ensuring reliable methods of recording and 
transcribing. 
 
Preparation of the interviewees is equally important in the design of the interview guide. 
The preparation of the interviewees requires attention to two phases. Firstly, a formal 
letter of invitation is required to be sent to each interviewee before the interview. The 
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content of the letter is similar to the introduction in the interview guide. It includes a brief 
introduction to the research and the aim of the interview, the use of the data, the methods 
of recording, the duration of the session, responses to concerns about confidentiality and 
ethical issues, and enclosed names of the interviewer and supervisor (see Appendix A). 
The difference between the invitation and the interview guide is that the letter is a 
clarification for the respondents rather than a reminder for the interviewer.  
 
Secondly, an interviewee should be contacted initially a few days before the meeting. 
After sending the letters, a few days preparation are required for the interviewees. This 
period allows them to recall the details of events that happened in the past such as the 
establishment of the Golden Firewall which takes the interviewee back more than ten 
years. A preliminary discussion may be required for the purpose of reassuring the 
interviewee that his/her perspective and experience of Internet censorship are valuable. 
During this phase, a necessary reassertion of confidentiality and research ethics may take 
place if the interviewee expresses concern about commenting on sensitive topics.  
 
4.5.5.1 Interviewing techniques 
Attention to a number of interviewing techniques is vital for the process of the interview. 
To obtain the qualitative data in a way that the respondent feels comfortable with, the 
interviewer will be keen to manage the process with well-established rapport. Ensuring 
rapport with the interviewee should be partly achieved beforehand, as elaborated above, 
and it is an ongoing task during the process of the interview.  
 
Furthermore, the use of interviewing skills is highly important in the process, and it can 
reflect on the quality of data and influence the outcome of the research. Skilful control of 
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time is demanded. It is suggested that a successful interview is one in which the 
statements of the interviewee heavily outweigh those of the interviewer (Bogdan & 
Biklen, 2006). Further attention must be paid to the strategy of asking questions, for the 
sake of the interviewer. Questions should be asked in a non-directive way. Dealing with 
sensitive topics such as censorship and freedom of speech, it is always worth probing the 
motivations of the interviewee carefully at certain points. Rannikko (2010, pp.288-97) 
planned a full set of questions, opening, emphasis and closing points, in his study of 
online participatory journalism as a mode of civic engagement to ensure that every aspect 
and risk could be considered in preparation. 
 
4.5.5.2 Instruments 
With prior permission from the interviewees (See Appendix B), the conversations were 
recorded with an audio recorder. The reasons for using electronic recording are that, 
firstly, it ensures the empirical data is properly recorded and in a way allows both parties 
to retrieve. The second reason is that, audio recording can make both parties relax in the 
process of interviewing and focus on the flow of the conversation by freeing the 
interviewer from mere note-taking. However, brief note taking is still required during the 
course of the conversation. It helped the interviewer either to emphasise and clarify for 
the later process of transcribing, or to develop further questions according to the answers 
given by the respondents.  
 
After the interview, audio recording needs to be transcribed and translated as soon as 
possible as the interviewer’s memory of the interview may be distorted as time passes. 
Transcription and translation were carried out by the interviewer, who was familiar with 
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the data. During the processes of transcribing and translating, this familiarity was 
increased.  
 
 
4.5.6 Pilot study 
To further enhance the quality of interviewing, a pilot interview was conducted with a 
suitable candidate. With the help of a critical assistant, the pilot study aims to rehearse 
and familiarise oneself with the procedure, and to foreshadow any difficulties (Hennink, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011: p.120).  
 
In the arrangement of location and seating, the situations are diverse. For most journalists 
and editors, and a few web administrators, the interviews are preferably conducted in 
casual places, such as coffee bars or restaurants. Seating in a private or semi-private room 
in a casual place with a few thoughtful light refreshments will help the interviewer create 
a relaxed and comfortable atmosphere. However, for most politicians and some web 
administrators, due to their professional background and work environment, the 
interviews may necessarily take place in their offices. Predictably, a table or a desk may 
be set between both parties in order to have distance between them. Here, creating a 
slightly formal atmosphere can enhance the credibility of both parties. After all, it is 
preferable to have the interviewees choose the interview location. It can eventually help 
the interviewees to establish the right mood and to share their thoughts in a place where 
they feel both safe and comfortable. 
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4.5.7 Limitations 
Kvale (1996, p.284- 291) summarises several critiques of qualitative interviews targeted 
against qualitative research. Some of them need to be highlighted as they are highly 
relevant to this study, e.g. unreliable, biased, not generalisable, and individualistic. He 
and others also argue that these limitations are unavoidable, as an interview is the product 
of an active, “contextually grounded process between interviewer and subject governed 
by power dynamics between researcher and researched” (Kvale, 1996, p.126; Wengraf, 
2001: p.2-15).  
 
However, Yin (2009) suggests the use of multiple sources of evidence, in his term, 
triangulation, to minimise the affect of bias data. In order to validate the data collected, 
Chen (2011) applied triangulation at two levels: 
 
“[…]one of which has to do with factual data, where the researcher is capable of 
verifying the data, while the other concerns situations where the researcher can compare 
data with other sources without being able to truly triangulate it” (Chen, 2011:p.66). 
 
One of the difficulties in conducting comparisons of online censorship is that, for a 
researcher, the chance of accessing uncut or uncensored news content is low. On most 
occasions, it is impractical to access the uncut or uncensored version of a news draft. On 
other occasions, such as blogging and microblogging, if the web administrators or 
bloggers decided to delete the news content, it would require massive effort to recover it. 
The sampling process for comparison, in this sense, would be slow and ineffective. And 
for this reason, I abandoned the original discourse analysis plan of comparing different 
versions of news drafts with the final public version. 
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4.6 Ethics 
To ensure the interviewees’ personal safety and to avoid other unexpected problems, all 
interviewees appeared anonymously. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, interviewees 
had to be guaranteed personal safety in participating in this project. Therefore, keeping 
interviewees anonymous allows the researcher to “actively protect the identity of research 
participants” (King & Horrocks, 2010: p.117; Byrne, 2004) even though it can limit the 
credibility of the data collected (Ong, 2003: p.94). In a similar situation, in Chen’s study 
on the politics of democratisation and independent communications regulator in 
transitional Taiwan (Chen, 2011: p.71-72), respondents remained anonymous as it was 
believed that to reveal the identity might affect the interviewees. Therefore, all transcripts 
are marked with reference numbers and sorted in chronological order.  
 
All participants in this study, including the eight interviewees and observation 
participants were treated equally and anonymously. Participants were asked to sign the 
consent form (an example of the consent form is given in Appendix B) and agreed on the 
terms and conditions of participating in this study before the beginning of every 
investigation. Participants had performed professionally throughout the process of 
investigation. Furthermore, in the processes of data gathering and analysing, the 
researcher strictly adhered to the ethical requirements of the University of Sheffield, the 
organisation to which this research is being submitted. 
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4.7 Analysis 
As stated in 4.4.1, the aims of observing an online newsroom are to obtain data on the 
dynamics of online news production and to provide exploratory support for interviews. 
Thus, observation is important because without it, interviews with online news workers 
would be merely individual, and would face limitations such as being unreliable, biased, 
and individualistic (Kvale, 1996: pp.284-91). The aim of using in-depth interviews, as 
stated in 4.5.1, is to gather data from online news workers and cyber police officers on 
their experiences of and perspectives on online news censorship. Here, the effect of bias 
data was minimised by relying on multiple sources of evidence, establishing, what Yin 
(2009) calls triangulation. In this research design, neither of these two methods can be 
isolated. Observation was used to provide an exploratory stage for interviews and to better 
understand the workflow within the online newsroom. Hence, it is important to employ 
combined methods to increase reliability (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000: pp.336-350).  
 
The key findings from the results of the study are fundamental in understanding and 
providing a description and analysis of the environment of censorship and self-censorship 
of the online news media in China. They also provide empirical evidence of censorship 
from the Chinese publicity authorities, and censorship policies and self-censorship among 
the newsroom in online news media. 
 
Thematic analysis is used as the conceptual tool in this research to utilize the data. This 
qualitative approach was informed by Schutz’s theory of social phenomenology (1970) 
as both a philosophical framework and a methodology. (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 2008; 
Schutz 1970; Schäffner, 2004) Social phenomenology is interpreted by Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane (2008: pp.81-2) as a descriptive and interpretive theory of social action 
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that “explores subjective experience within the taken-for-granted, ‘commonsense’ world 
of the daily life of individuals”. Thematic analysis is chosen for this research because 
themes of censorship of online news media that emerged during the process of data 
collecting and analysing, including the hierarchies of online news and cyber police, 
protocols of online censorship and different levels of mechanisms of online news 
censorship, are identified through what Rice and Ezzy (1999) described as “careful 
reading and re-reading of the data” (1999: p.258). The data that describes the activities of 
operationalisation of online censorship within the processes of online news production 
are interpreted through a form of pattern recognition where these emerging themes above 
become the categories for analysis. This fits the definition of thematic analysis by Daly, 
Kellehear and Gliksman (1997) as being important to the description of the phenomenon 
for aspects of individual experience and social relationships. 
 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) indicate that the process of interpretive analysis involves 
both inductive and deductive approaches. Thus, Stone (2011) processes his analytical 
activities to “move from description to explanation, as well as from explanation to 
description” (2011: p. 37). Likewise, for this study, the interpretive analysis is projected 
to be a similar process.  
 
The analytical activities were taken to interact between research design and data 
collection (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Bearing in mind that analysis was not separated 
from other features of the study, I did prompt analysis while collecting data during the 
fieldwork. In addition, analysing and writing-up are also inseparable, as writing-up social 
research is a “way of knowing” as well as a method of discovery (Richardson, 1994; 
Coffey & Atkinson, 1996: p.109). Therefore, this study was punctuated with consistent 
analytical activities.  
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At the stage of the empirical research, which comprises non-participant observations and 
interviews, I employed the strategy of thematic analysis to aid the “comprehension of 
interpretive processes involved within the qualitative context” (Stone, 2011 p.38).  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research questions and the design of observation and interviews have 
been detailed. Also the aim of this research, to provide a coherent description and analysis 
of the environment of censorship and self-censorship of the online news media in China, 
was clarified across three focal areas. They are, examining the mechanisms of control 
which impact upon how the Chinese online news media experience censorship, describing 
and analysing how Chinese online news media formulate and practise their own editorial 
policy in order to comply with the demands of the authorities, and how editors and 
journalists who work in the Chinese online media experience, adapt and respond to 
China’s approach to media censorship and control.  
 
By reviewing and referencing the previous analogous studies, the research philosophy is 
introduced. Fundamentally, the perspective of interpretivism underpins this research, as 
the research questions revealed an interpretivistic analysis of empirical data of censorship 
and self-censorship in the online news media in China. Key principles of grounded theory 
are adopted, and the data from the exploratory fieldwork and interviews were 
systematically gathered and analysed through an explicitly defined research process 
(Bryman, 2004: p.4). 
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Furthermore, this chapter illustrates a framework with explicit details for the different 
stages of exploratory fieldwork, interviewing, data collecting, and analysis and discussion. 
This part contains the rationale and strategy for observation and interviews respectively. 
 
The next chapter will introduce the context of online censorship in China from a number 
of aspects. This will include the first level of construction of online news censorship, the 
use of the Great Firewall and pre-instalment of software, dispute between the Chinese 
government and Google, drastic social turbulence in 2008 when China started to lift the 
bans on foreign websites, social engagement and debates on online news content via 
Weibo, and historical and economic reviews of southern media which were considered as 
frontier liberalists in the journalistic field against administrative interference from the 
Chinese authorities. By doing so, the discussion of the environment of free speech and 
free press in China provides the background to online censorship within a political and 
historical context, and draws attention to significant parts of the construction of protocols 
of this online news censorship. 
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Chapter 5 Data & Analysis 1: Chinese Cyber 
Police 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the issues of the Chinese cyber police force in the following 
respects. Firstly, it looks at the cyber police’s functions and their institutional role in 
censorship of the Internet in China. It discusses the jurisdiction, recruitment processes, 
and anonymity of the Chinese cyber police. It also defines the notion of ‘harmony of the 
Internet’, a phrase that was used repeatedly throughout the process of observation and 
interviews. The concept of keeping the “harmony of Internet” sustains the control of cyber 
police. Secondly, it discusses the systematic protocols of censorship for the online news 
media. The analysis continues to identify how the cyber police force imposes surveillance 
of the Internet and the online news media, using Internet control methods, such as 
collaborations with the publicity departments and filtering online news content to fulfil 
its administrative responsibilities. Lastly, the chapter concludes by discussing how the 
online news users are monitored and sanctioned, and the strategies that the cyber police 
use in filtering and censoring the online news content that appears to users. Overall, by 
discussing the role of cyber police and their influence on the process of online news 
production, this chapter argues that the existence of cyber police in the background adds 
to the sense that Chinese online news workers are required to conform to appropriate 
norms of behaviour.  
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This chapter intends to answer the following questions by decoding and analysing 
interviews with the cyber police officers: 
 1) What are the cyber police’s functions, jurisdictions and administrative responsibilities? 
 2) What role do the Chinese cyber police play in the mechanism of Internet censorship 
in China? 
 3) How do the cyber police filter, monitor and censor the content that is produced by the 
online news media in China?  
 4) How are Chinese Internet users monitored, and what are the potential risks of being 
sanctioned? 
 
By interviewing two Chinese cyber police officers, this chapter contributes to the study 
of Internet censorship in China from a censor/insider’s perspective. It looks at how 
Internet censorship is conceptualised by those who censor, what the censors say they do, 
and why they do it. It is, therefore, important to define the notion of ‘harmony of the 
Internet’ which is seen by the Chinese authorities as the most significant motivation for 
Internet censorship.  
 
5.2. Framework 
The interview transcripts are being used for two purposes in this chapter: firstly, to 
describe the roles and responsibilities of the cyber police and secondly, to describe and 
understand their perceptions and experiences of their role. This is a crucial distinction as 
the former can be presented without the subjects’ input while the latter is what is crucially 
valuable for this analysis. As such, this chapter attempts to separate two types of material: 
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that which can be gleaned from other sources and the perspectives of the interviewees 
themselves.  
 
The perceptions and experience of the interviewees, which reflect what the cyber police 
officers think and experience, will be quoted and marked directly or indirectly from the 
transcripts. The other material, such as the actual facts about their roles and 
responsibilities, will be supported with evidence and references.  
 
5.2.1 Interviewees 
The analysis and quotations in this chapter are based on interviews with two cyber police 
officers. The interviews were conducted in February and March 2013 after agreeing on 
anonymity for the participants’ benefit. The outline of the interview transcripts can be 
found in Appendix E. The two participants are labelled P05 and P07 according to the 
sequential time when the interviews were conducted. In the text, they are also 
distinguished by their ranks and the names of their positions in the public security division. 
P05 was one of the Directors of the Department of Network and Information Security 
(NIS), Bureau of Public Security of Zhejiang. He is also known as the director in the text. 
P07 was a lower-ranked cyber police officer in the Bureau of Public Security of Jinhua. 
He is known as the officer.  
 
Both interviewees gave their full consent to the disclosure of information in this chapter. 
The coded names and their positions are used in the text for ethical reasons. In Chapter 
3: Methodology, I highlighted that one of the most important reasons to use coded names 
for interviews was to protect the identities of interviewees. (See details of anonymity and 
ethical considerations in Chapter 3: 5.5.3 Ethics.) However, some basic introductory 
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context to interviewees, such as their occupation, ranks and duties, is necessary, as this 
context contributes to the credibility and reliability of the data. 
 
 
5.2.2 Thematic outline 
It is crucial to this study to have a clear picture of the mechanisms of censorship in China. 
The cyber police are subordinate to the public security system (Chen, 2015; Southern 
Weekend, 2015). They are defined as a force which is in charge of fighting against 
Internet crimes, monitoring online user generated content, and operating the firewalls 
(Zhang, 2014; Southern Weekend 2015). As such, the cyber police are the second filter 
for the content that the online news media and Internet users produce, and they have the 
power to amend the online news, and sanction users who do not conform to the prescribed 
protocols. Its institutional mechanism and systematic censorship protocol can, therefore, 
be expected to have enormous influence on the behaviour of the online news media and 
users. 
 
The news content produced by the Chinese online news journalists is intended forat three 
types of “audiences”, and these “audiences” may access the news content sequentially: 
news supervisors, online editors and web administrators, the government and the 
Communist Party, and the public. Within the newsroom, the news supervisors amend and 
alter the news content together with the online journalists, in order to produce the news 
that ensure the safe mediating of information in the context of censorship (Tong, 2009). 
A number of tactics (Tong, 2009) may be used at this stage of the process (see details and 
examples of the use of “guerrilla tactics” in online news media in Chapter 6: 4.4). The 
firewall of the cyber police, according to the interviewees’ descriptions, can detect and 
flag suspicious online news content which the system estimates as “may-cause-trouble”. 
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This highlighted content will be manually considered for censorship by the cyber police, 
who may decide whether to delete or ban this content based on their judgement. 
 
This chapter consists of three main themes, after a preliminary layout of the mechanism 
of censorship in China. It first explores the functions of the cyber police. By reviewing 
and mapping their institutional structure, jurisdiction, and recruitment requirements, the 
roles and responsibilities of the cyber police are demonstrated. The recruitment criteria 
are also reviewed with an extracted list of requirements (see Appendix: F). The list 
demonstrates that the cyber police officers are required to be physically fit for their job, 
and mentally able to understand their institutional role and the need for obedience. They 
are also required to be politically sensitive and cautious about disclosure, as they distance 
themselves from personal use of smart phones and social networks to avoid exposure of 
their own personal information. 
 
The second theme of this chapter is to further explore the cyber police’s roles and 
responsibilities in overseeing and censoring online news media in China. It discusses the 
notion of “harmony of the Internet” in the context of the current political climate in China, 
as the concept of harmony is key to the political agenda of the Chinese government and 
the Party (Chen, 2014; Winfield & Peng, 2005). The purpose of maintaining harmony on 
the Internet is to stabilise the leadership of the Communist Party, (Hu, 2007; Zhu, 2010) 
and for this reason, online content is mechanically and manually overseen, filtered and 
censored by the cyber police. In the cyber police’s words, malicious content (“anti-nation 
or anti-Party content” as P05 interpreted) has to be filtered and eliminated.  
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The attitude and protocol of censoring online news media is discussed. Since both officers 
have the same administrative ranking, the cyber police communicate and coordinate with 
the online news media in the process of overseeing online news content, rather than being 
instructive or dictatorial. The publicity departments, a third party that play a significant 
role in this process, are also explored as they are responsible for overseeing the online 
news content. Together with the cyber police, publicity departments press the online news 
media and influence the outcome of online news content in China. 
 
The third theme of this chapter is to explore how cyber police control the activities of 
Internet users in China and how decisive/manipulative cyber police are in influencing the 
news content that users can access. The protocol of controlling online users has three 
stages: 1) censoring and filtering, 2) verification and investigation, and 3) sanctions. The 
sanctions are the main method which the cyber police employ to punish users who violate 
the regulations of the Internet, for example, bypassing the firewall or accessing banned 
online content. These acts may be treated as crimes (Liang & Lu, 2010). Lastly, this 
section concludes with discussions of the issues of privacy violation of users in the 
process of online censorship, and the cyber police’s strategies for identifying, controlling, 
and regulating users. 
 
5.3. Functions of the cyber police 
The cyber police are occasionally known as the Internet supervisors, or IT squad (Yan, 
2010; Yang, 2015). This type of police force, which is acknowledged by the public as a 
special police force, was institutionalised at the beginning of the massive growth of the 
Internet in China in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Netease, 2008). This section reveals 
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the functions of the cyber police, in order to ground the discussion in a firm understanding 
of its systematic protocols. The institutional functions and roles can further explain the 
mechanism of Internet control and the institutional pressures that force the online news 
media to censor its news content. In addition, the cyber police monitor the online activities 
of Internet users in China, and filter and censor the online content that these users can 
access. The cyber police’s background of being a sub-division of the public security 
system also gives them power to sanction users who attempt to bypass the firewall and 
access banned content. 
 
This section depicts the framework of China’s governmental system, namely the 
institutional structure and ranking system in the Chinese government. It then pinpoints 
where the cyber police fit in this institutional structure. Having established this 
understanding of the structure of the administrative aim of state censorship, I look at the 
characteristics of the cyber police from a number of different aspects, including 
recruitment processes, requirement for anonymity, and special regulations in censoring 
operations.  
 
5.3.1 Institutional structure and jurisdiction 
There are 27 levels of administrative rank in the Chinese government. The highest rank 
is the state-leader level; the President and the Premier are both ranked at this level. The 
lowest rank is the 27th; most junior clerks are at this level. Table 2 shows the construction 
of different ranks in the Chinese government and where the Public Security Bureau and 
cyber police sit within the hierarchical system. 
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Table 2 Administrative ranking of the main sectors of the Public Security and cyber police in the 
Chinese government 
 
Rank 
Administrative 
level 
Post example(s) in Central 
Public Security 
Post example(s) in local Public 
Security 
Rank 1 
State-Leader 
level 
    
Rank 2 to 
4 
Vice-State-
Leader level 
    
Rank 4 to 
8 
Ministerial 
(Provincial) 
level 
Minister of the Public 
Security, Ministry of the State 
Councilor 
  
Rank 6 to 
10 
Vice-
Ministerial 
(Provincial) 
level 
Vice ministers of the Public 
Security ministry of the State 
Councilor; director of the 
national bureaus of Public 
Information and Internet 
Security (cyber police) in the 
State Councilor 
  
Rank 8 to 
13 
Bureau-
Director level 
Director of the State 
Commission office for 
Safeguard Stability in State 
Councilor; director of the 
China Crime Information 
Center 
Directors of the Public Security 
department of provinces, direct-
controlled municipalities, and 
autonomous regions 
Rank 10 
to 15 
Deputy-
Bureau-
Director level 
Deputy directors of the State 
Commission office for 
Safeguard Stability in State 
Councilor; deputy directors of 
the China Crime Information 
Center 
Deputy directors of the Public 
Security department of provinces, 
direct-controlled municipalities, and 
autonomous regions 
Rank 12 
to 18 
Division-Head 
level 
Division head in the 
departments of the national 
bureaus of Public Information 
and Internet Security (cyber 
police) in the State Councilor 
Public Information (cyber police) 
division heads in the department of 
Public Security of provinces, direct-
controlled municipalities, and 
autonomous regions; heads of Public 
Security bureaus in prefectural cities 
Rank 14 
to 20 
Deputy-
Division-Head 
level 
Deputy division heads in the 
departments of the national 
bureaus of Public Information 
and Internet Security (cyber 
police)in the State Councilor 
Public Information(cyber police) 
division deputy heads in the 
department of Public Security of 
provinces, direct-controlled 
municipalities, and autonomous 
regions; deputy heads of Public 
Security bureaus in prefectural cities 
Rank 16 
to 22 
Section-Head 
level 
  
Public Information (cyber police) 
section heads of the Public Security 
bureaus in prefectural cities; heads of 
Public Security bureaus in counties 
Rank 17 
to 24 
Deputy-
Section-Head 
level 
  
Public Information (cyber police) 
section deputy heads of the Public 
Security bureaus in prefectural cities; 
deputy heads of Public Security 
bureaus in counties 
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Rank 18 
to 26 
Senior Public 
Information 
officer 
  
Senior cyber police of Public 
Information (cyber police) in 
prefectural cities; team leader of 
Public information (cyber police) in 
counties 
Rank 19 
to 27 
Junior Public 
Information 
officer 
  Junior cyber policemen 
 
In the public security system, the cyber police department and technology department are 
parallel, but with different sets of policemen. The technology department recruits 
technicians, who are in charge of data gathering and technical support, whereas the cyber 
police department recruits implementers, whose responsibility is to analyse and execute.  
 
The cyber police department is subordinate to the public security system in China. The 
cyber police department falls within the jurisdiction of the higher-division of its public 
security bureau, while the administrative level of the cyber police department is ranked 
one level lower than its bureau. For example, in a public security bureau, whose 
administrative rank is section-head level, the cyber police department in the bureau is 
ranked as deputy-section-head level; whoever has an administrative rank as division-head 
level, has a cyber police department ranked as deputy-division-head level. 
 
The cyber police receive their instructions directly from their supervisors in the public 
security bureau. Like other civil servants, the cyber police officers are obliged to follow 
instructions from their supervisors. The officer (P07) specifically addressed his 
understanding of ‘serve and obey’. Here, he explains his work routine:  
 
“I attend meetings and arrest people. […] We have meetings in our bureau several times 
a week, regularly or irregularly. Giving and receiving instructions, alerting the virus 
attacks, and updating domain controls” (P07). 
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The statement above suggests that the cyber police’s duty is remarkably similar to other 
kinds of police force. They have obligations to receive and obey instructions from their 
supervisors, to attend meetings and briefings, and to participate in operations. However, 
it is worth noting that the cyber police officers specified that they normally take little part 
in technical work, such as information gathering and IP tracking. This type of work is, 
usually, led by the parallel technology department. The technology department, which is 
also known as the IT department, is usually in charge of technical support for cyber police 
and other departments in the public security system. 
 
Both cyber police participants were frank about the topic of the IT department, as they 
both admitted that they were not experts in IT technology. For example, the officer (P07) 
indicated that they need to collaborate with the IT departments on a daily basis, in order 
to work efficiently: 
 
“We had technicians in our office and they solved technical problems. I was not an expert. 
The community LANs were what we were busy with on most occasions. And they would 
also be responsible for building up LAN firewalls for schools, preventing them from virus 
attacks” (P07). 
 
Likewise, the director (P05) distinguished his institutional responsibilities from technical 
support in terms of what he referred to as ‘supervising’ and ‘executing’ for the benefit of 
the harmonious atmosphere of the Internet: 
 
“This task requires a conjunction team to work with the technical department. […] We 
unify them (websites) as a whole, monitoring and updating its firewall, preventing attacks, 
and tracking the suspicious IPs” (P05). 
 
A plausible reason for the research observation that the cyber policemen spoke without 
inhibition is that the implementation of technology was insensitive compared with other 
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aspects of their institutional responsibilities. As the result, they appeared cautious when 
they were asked to reveal their administrative responsibilities, but less guarded in 
discussing the technical methods that had been used in the process of online surveillance. 
 
The discussion around cyber police’s jurisdictions, duties, and work ethics contributes to 
an understanding of its function, and also to the construction of online censorship within 
the broader picture, which will illustrate and situate the censorship mechanism of Chinese 
online news. The setting-up of Internet censors is important to the operationalisation of 
the model of different censorship levels (Chapter 1: 1.2.5), which need both technology 
and manual processes to function in a combined manner. Furthermore, clarifying the 
cyber police’s administrative rankings in the public security system and the government 
helps this study explain within which organisational structures the authorities reinforce 
their control over online news. As Zhao (1998) and de Burgh (2003) have argued, news 
media organisations in China were constructed in a way that ensures the authorities can 
influence the output of news content. Arguably, the setting-up of Internet censors has the 
same function. It allows the authorities to have a group of specialised implementers who 
are ranked in the governmental sectors, overseeing news content on the Internet.  
 
5.3.2 Recruitment 
Most cyber police officers are recruited by the public security system when they graduate 
from the police schools. But not every graduate has specialised in the relevant IT skills. 
The recruitment criteria vary in different cities and provinces, but they share some basic 
standards relating to physical fitness and political background (see Appendix F). A 
normal recruitment process for a citizen to become a local cyber policeman has six stages: 
recruitment examination in the police schools, registration of the police schools, literary 
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examination, physical tests, interviews, and political background verification (Sina, 
2008b; Guangzhou Net, 2014). 
 
The recruitment process of the cyber police demonstrates the fact that IT expertise is not 
a primary consideration for cyber police officers. In other words, cyber police officers are 
not required to possess high-end IT techniques and become Internet experts. Some 
candidates do not voluntarily choose the cyber police as their career path. After their 
graduation from the police schools, they are assigned to their cyber police posts. And 
some of them, according to the interviewees, may be reassigned out of the posts due to 
different administrative demands. The officer (P07) explained his assignation as follows:  
 
“I graduated in 99 from police school and I was recruited as a criminal investigation 
police officer. But I was assigned to my current department 4 years ago. And I have been 
a cyber policeman ever since” (P07). 
 
The reason that I discuss the recruitment process is that the process itself allows 
reflections on the type of personnel required for the role. Unlike their technologically-
oriented-colleagues in the technology department, cyber police officers are recruited 
through athletic-oriented criteria (see 3, 4e, 4f, and 4g), institutional-oriented criteria (2 
and 3), and political-oriented criteria (4a and 6). The institutional and political criteria 
indicate that the cyber police are required to be intellectually able to understand their 
institutional responsibilities and obedience before their recruitment. These are the 
characteristics that the cyber police officers explained in their role as agents in the process 
of censorship of the Internet.  
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5.3.3 Anonymity 
Gaining access to cyber police interviewees was difficult from the start of the 
interviewing process, as there was insufficient communication beforehand. For example, 
the director (P05) was difficult to communicate with by email and phone. He chose his 
words carefully and avoided discussing topics in detail before the formal interview started. 
During the latter stages of the interview, he explained his cautiousness as follows:  
 
“[…] you have to forgive me that I didn’t talk too much on the phone to you. […] it’s just 
what I do. I communicate in the same way with my family as well, [...] because every time 
you use an electronic device, you leave your trails, and people with technical expertise 
can dig you out” (P07). 
 
Before the face-to-face interviews, the cyber police participants reacted in an evasive way 
due to the privacy threat that the Internet presents. The risk of disclosing their personal 
information, as they interpreted, could cause trouble and jeopardize their political careers. 
P05 further explained his approach of distancing online disclosure as follows: 
 
“I don’t use QQ or Weibo. […] When I see many officials signing up to their accounts on 
Weibo, uploading their pictures and tweeting their thoughts, some using WeChat for 
vocal chatting, I think that can be dangerous. If some of them can be completely off these 
apps, they might avoid a lot of risks and scandals” (P05). 
 
Apparently, the cyber police intentionally chose to be excluded from social networks on 
the Internet. For the cyber police, the acts of civil servants who embrace social networks 
and trust Internet technology can be seen as ‘dangerous’ for their political careers. Both 
participants appeared to slow the pace of their speech and choose words more carefully 
when they discussed their personal involvement on social networks. I concluded that the 
function of cyber police work made this necessary. As mentioned earlier, cyber police 
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officers tend to be vigilant and politically sensitive, but not enthusiastic about new 
technology and media change.  
 
Cyber police are cautious about their personal activities on the Internet. They barely 
participate in online social networks, and they normally do not have personal accounts 
for these social networks websites or apps. By acting in this way, they are convinced that 
the risk of disclosure can be lowered. The participants’ attempts at keeping themselves 
away from Internet social networks indicates their fear of the damage of disclosure to 
their political careers. It is, though, difficult to be certain that these acts of distancing were 
self-motivated. However, the participants had shown their evasive attitude towards social 
networks, as they are self-estimated as a group of people who understand thoroughly that 
Internet social networks can trigger disclosure of personal identity and exposure of 
privacy. For instance, the P05 explains his attitude as follows:  
 
“The more advanced a device is, the more dangerous it can be. You take a picture on 
your mobile, and upload it on the Internet, Weibo, Twitter […] And if somebody wants to 
find you, they can find you even if you delete it later. Now some smart phones are designed 
in a way that you cannot remove the batteries, […] you thought you disconnected the Wi-
Fi and you didn’t upload it (pictures). But I can still find you, we have technology which 
can track you down and bring up your picture. Your phone records, messages, everything” 
(P05). 
 
According to their description, they had witnessed a number of incidents when civil 
servants found themselves in trouble when they were personally too close to online social 
life, as their personal information was exposed from their personal accounts on social 
networks. These social network accounts, and the personal information within them, can 
cause civil servants to become vulnerable on the Internet because they allow other users 
to search and review their personal life. The cyber police are aware of how fragile a 
person’s privacy can be on the Internet if his or her identity and other personal information 
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are disclosed. From their technical perspective, every trace that users have left on the 
network can be tracked. The disclosure of identity, as both participants admitted, no 
longer required high-end hacker techniques. It means the chances for users to counter-
monitor the activities of cyber police have risen, which P05 also admitted was not in the 
cyber police’s favour. This would explain the cyber police’s evasive attitude towards their 
personal and private involvement on social networks.  
 
Furthermore, cyber police participants tended not to use smart phones, or to send texts 
and pictures via mobile networks, for the same reasons - that they object to social network 
websites and apps. The cyber police share a common belief that technology discloses, and 
the more advanced technology is, the more it discloses. Cyber police’s treatment of 
mobile devices is particularly contradictory to the demands and nature of their work. 
Their job responsibilities require of them to use the Internet, yet in their personal and 
daily social life they choose to distance themselves from the Internet. Cyber police are 
fearful of disclosure and attempt to “keep a low profile’ (P05 and P07). By doing so, they 
minimise the potential risks of jeopardising their careers. The discussion on cyber police’s 
treatment of mobile devices, therefore, leads them to fear having their activities on social 
media monitored. Here, the crucial questions are: How seriously can the cyber police 
officers’ careers be jeopardized if their personal information is disclosed on the Internet? 
Or, what would the consequences of disclosure on the Internet be for a cyber police officer? 
 
To answer these questions, I go back to the table of public security administrative 
rankings, and cross reference them with the Chinese culture of official circles and civil 
servants. It is worth noting that ‘keeping-a-low-profile’ is one of the unwritten workplace 
rules for Chinese civil servants. Cyber police, who are essentially civil servants, also obey 
the ‘keeping-a-low-profile’ rule to protect their anonymity.  
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In the context of Chinese culture, ‘keeping-a-low-profile’ shares similarities with humble 
and modest behaviour, two characteristics which many Chinese civil servants worship. 
‘Keeping-a-low-profile’ contains a number of meanings that humble and modest stand 
for, such as meekness in behaviour and attitude, submissive respect, unpretentious 
behaviour, and freedom from showiness and ostentation. The value of being a humble 
and modest person can be traced back to Confucius, who was devoted in preaching his 
idea that a humble man can earn respect (Makeham, 2003; De Bary, 1991). At present, in 
the context of the Chinese culture of official circles, ‘keeping-a-low-profile’ also has 
additional meanings such as staying away from the spotlight, keeping a distance from the 
media and the public, and avoiding scandals. Thus, the impression that Chinese civil 
servants are difficult to approach is commonly accepted in the Chinese news media. 
Hence, the cultural roots of ‘keeping-a-low-profile’ explains why cyber police officers 
are evasive about personal participation on social networks or use of smart phones, in 
order to stay away from the spotlight, and keep a distance from the media and the public. 
 
Before and during the interviews, the participants’ conservative style was also reflected 
in their attitude toward electronic recordings. Both cyber police participants refused to 
allow leads them to fear having their activities on social media be monitored This caused 
difficulties for the researcher in recording their words. Extra efforts were made for the 
two transcripts of the cyber police officers. They were recorded by intense handwriting 
and the researcher’s memories, and they are the only two interviews not transcribed from 
electronic recordings, at the request of the participants (See details in Chapter 3: 5.5.2 & 
5.5.3). 
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During the process of approaching the participants, and before interviews began, the two 
cyber police officers expressed their deep concerns about electronic recording, which 
eventually led to the decision not to use it. Both of them had taken the precaution of 
anonymity, though the degrees of their resistance were different. The director (P05) 
refused firmly and stated clearly that “no audio record must be made in the interview”, 
whereas the officer (P07) hesitated for a while, and then refused the use of a recorder by 
asking “Can we leave the recorder out?” In the interview process, despite admitting that 
there was no rule against police officers doing interviews, both cyber police officers 
brought up the anonymity issue more than once, and re-emphasised the importance of 
leaving their names out of the transcripts. 
 
The influence that marketisation has had on news media and social networks is enormous, 
and has also had a significant impact on the way in which these Internet censors think and 
approach the Internet. While the cyber police officers may not exhibit the same hostile 
attitude towards the corruptive western capitalism as did the censors in the Cold War era 
in China, the awareness of and caution towards potential political threats were inherited 
and embedded within the structure of the government.  
 
The caution in the disclosure also verifies the influence of media marketisation, which 
shifts the press’ loyalty from the authoritarian state to the market and financial advertisers 
(Esarey, 2005). The government officials can no longer be protected from scandals, nor 
can they arbitrarily interfere in the production of investigative journalism. The cautious 
attitude can therefore be considered a result of media supervision. This is similar to the 
idea of building a system that allows journalism to be critical, which Maoism had 
proposed before the establishment of the PRC. In this system, government officials and 
party members have to be supervised by the press and be self-disciplined. Although the 
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difference between the self-disciplining of Maoist political reformatory (Mao, 1964) and 
the careful treatment of political careers is distinct, they both result in, ideally, a similar 
political climate where media supervision is effective. Thus, this phenomenon of caution 
amongst Internet censors can be considered as one of the liberalising effects of 
marketisation on the freedom of press in China.  
 
5.4. Oversight of online news media 
5.4.1 Administrative responsibilities of the cyber police 
The cyber police play the role of implementer of state censorship for the online news 
media: in their terms, to ensure and guard the safety and harmony of the Internet. To 
achieve this goal, cyber police filter and censor the contents that the online news media 
produce. This explains why, in the interviews, both cyber police participants used typical 
diplomatic terms such as ‘organise’, ‘supervise’, ‘guide’, ‘study and formulate 
regulations’, and ‘protect’ in describing their responsibilities in overseeing online news. 
Participants suggested that having cyber police monitoring online news media was for 
virtuous purposes, rather than for ideological control, or violation of free speech and free 
press. For example, the director (P05) explained his work as follows: 
 
“[…] first, we are responsible for organising, instructing and supervising our lower 
division’s websites […] Second, we research, formulate and prevent… what we call 
online-violence incidents, and any kind of criminal activities on the Internet. And then, 
we are responsible for supervising and executing… for the benefit of the health of the 
Internet” (P05). 
 
Similar wording came from the officer (P07):  
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“We have meetings in our bureau several times a week, regularly or irregularly. Giving 
and receiving instructions, alerting the virus attacks, and updating domain controls” 
(P07).  
 
I cite these kinds of diplomatic phrases as signs of the cyber police’s institutional 
characteristics. Cyber police are considered as the watchdog for online news media. 
Although it is not essential that every bit of news content that is produced by the online 
news media be filtered and examined by the cyber police, any content that is determined 
as ‘politically incorrect’ and unsuitable for publication by the cyber police may be 
assigned a warning, or removed. Hence, the institutional authority that the publicity 
administrators and the cyber police have is recognised as the external motivation for 
online news media’s self-censorship. The cyber police participants hold a strong belief 
that the most significant justification for censoring online content is to achieve the 
‘harmony of the Internet’, which is seen as the origin of all the applications and state-run 
surveillance. 
 
Although the Cultural Revolution, a social movement which de Burgh (2003) calls 
‘destruction of journalism’, ended in the late 1970s, the construction of the propaganda 
mechanism is still having an impact on today’s news in China. In terms of serving the 
majority and the collective, Confucianism has arguably contributed to the construction of 
governmental surveillance and online news media. In the previous section on institutional 
structures, I have argued that the setting-up of cyber police within the public security 
system and the government ensures the authorities’ impact on the news content. The 
construction of cyber police allows the authorities to have implementers who are 
specialised in overseeing news content on the Internet. This job responsibility is not 
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limited to the content that has already been produced, but also extended to preventing the 
potentially ‘contentious’ (Petley, 2009: pp.3-4) raw material that is yet to be produced. 
 
Overall, the institutional set-up of cyber police ensures that the pressure of censorship can 
be effectively transmitted through their daily practices onto online news workers, who 
are instructed to comply and produce synchronised news content (Hu, 2007). The process 
of pressurisation may not be commonly seen in some western models of journalism found 
in democratic countries, for instance, the UK and American systems. But it is now 
important protocol for the Chinese authorities to interfere in online news production and 
to set the rules for journalistic norms, by instructing the online press about what they 
should do, and sanctioning online news workers for doing what they shouldn’t do. This 
protocol is operationalised via the institutional setting of cyber police.  
 
5.4.2 Harmony of the Internet 
Participants mentioned the phrase ‘harmony of the Internet’ several times during the 
interviews. ‘The harmony of the Internet’ is a significant term that is widely used in 
describing the online news media environment in some official documents released by 
the government. The notion of ‘harmony of the Internet’, though it may slightly vary in 
different contexts, is generally defined by the media as free from rumours, malicious 
speech, and pornography (Wang, 2015; Xu, 2015). 
 
The noun ‘harmony’ is an unconventional choice of word, because in the context of the 
Chinese language (Mandarin), it was originally used to describe the well-being of 
individual units’ physiological or psychological functions. The meaning of ‘harmony’ 
overlaps with physical health to some extent. Therefore, the word was originally used for 
living entities whose components are functioning effectively to fulfil their purpose: to live 
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or survive. Its extended meaning is also used to describe some social mechanisms or 
systems. For example, Chinese media often mix the use of ‘healthy’ and ‘harmony’ to 
describe a well-functioning social order or public opinion environment (Liu, 2014a; 
Wang, C. 2011). A public opinion environment which has few malicious verbal attacks 
and slanders is considered as being in ‘harmony’. Nowadays, being in ‘harmony’ is more 
frequently used in describing the environment of the Internet. 
 
By looking at the development of harmonisation in a historical context in China, there is 
significant evidence of how Confucianism was shaped, developed and integrated with the 
concept of harmony and of national benefit. In Mao’s earlier times, he advocated criticism 
and self-criticism as one of his important political agendas in the Communist Party. Tong 
(2011: p.23) argues that this political proposition can be seen as an embracing gesture for 
media supervision. For the purpose of purification within the party and the government, 
it suggests an open and free environment for political discussion both inside and outside 
the party’s circle. News workers were, therefore, encouraged to conduct investigative 
journalism and play the role of holding political power to account. But from the late 1960s, 
the trend shifted and liberalism was radically criticised. The political climate in China 
was against liberalism and a free press, which wasr seen as an account of corrupt thought 
stemming from the capitalist world, and posing a threat to the solidarity of communist 
comradeship. Throughout its development up until the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 
the 1980s and Hu Jingtao in the 2000s, the need to maintain this solidarity of communist 
comradeship was gradually extended to outside of the party’s circle. It became, in Hu’s 
words (2007), about maintaining the harmony of the society, the news media and the 
Internet.  
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The ‘harmony of the Internet’ refers to at least two aspects. Firstly, it refers to maintaining 
a status in which minimal cyber virus and crimes exist. I call this status ‘functional 
harmony’. Functional harmony of the Internet is similar to what harmony originally refers 
to: well-being of units’ functions, unaffected by viruses, and different components of the 
whole system functioning properly to fulfil its purpose. The second aspect of the 
‘harmony of the Internet’ refers to more than maintaining the Internet functionalities. In 
some situations, it is believed that harmony refers to stable leadership of the Communist 
Party, which is achieved by restricting malicious speech on the Internet (Liu, 2014a; 
Wang, 2011; Zhu, 2010). Therefore, the meaning of harmony extends to political content. 
When the director (P05) was trying to define what he understood as ‘malicious’ on the 
Internet, he said:  
 
“[T]hose anti-Party and anti-nation opinions. We have to deal with them very seriously. 
But many opinions are not that obvious. A lot of hatred speech seems to walk a fine line. 
I see much sarcasm” (P05). 
 
One of the significant and typical examples that can cross-verify what the director (P07) 
said is the infamous Qi Bu Jiang (also known as the Seven forbidden topics), leaked by 
Professor Zhang Xuezhong in May 2013. According to Zhang Xuezhong’s blog, 
(accessed on 11 May, 2013; deleted on 13 May, 2013; endorsed by a number of other 
academics), the Qi Bu Jiang was from the official announcement entitled “Concerning 
the Situation in the Ideological Sphere”. The announcement warned academics and civil 
servants to combat ‘dangerous’ Western values and other perceived ideological threats. 
It consisted of a list of appalling rules, restraining speech and forbidding topics in 
university lectures and on the Internet. The forbidden topics were: universal values, 
freedom of the press, civil society, citizenship, history of political mistakes of the 
Communist Party, crony capitalism, and judicial independence.  
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The content of the list was beneficial for the leadership of the Party in China, as these 
restrained topics were feared by the Party as threats to the harmony and solidarity of the 
Internet. For example, restraining public discussions of universal values may be beneficial 
for consolidating the belief of communism amongst the young people, restraining the free 
press may be beneficial for top-down speech control, and forbidding discussions on the 
political mistakes that the Party made in its history is beneficial for the image-building of 
the Party itself. Discussions of these topics on the Internet were considered as a threat to 
the harmonious atmosphere on the Internet and its relationship to the leadership of the 
Party. This can be linked back to Confucianism as it undermines freedom of the individual 
and implies that freedom of the press needs to be limited to avoid discussion of politically 
sensitive topics. As Petley (2009: pp.3-4) indicates, listing banned topics and works, and 
forbidding people from publishing and accessing them is one of the tactics that the 
authorities use to limit and censor the news.  
 
In chapter 3: 3.2, I presented a detailed discussion on how the notion of morality was 
historically developed and revolved around Confucianism which suppressed individual 
freedom to serve the benefactor and the state, while chapter 3: 3.3, unpacks an explicit 
discussion on how this philosophical school was criticised, developed and inherited in 
social movements before 1949 in China. It is clear that Confucianism in contemporary 
China has embedded itself in the current political agenda. Overall, Confucianism is 
integrated with the communist political proposition. The communist account of criticism 
of Confucianism developed from advocating autonomy and individuality to the 
suppression of liberalism and free press. Despite the liberalising effect that marketisation 
has had on the news industry, news media is still instructed to synchronise its tone with 
the authority. Harmonisation is a key notion for both online and offline news workers to 
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keep in mind. The censors, on the other hand, ensure that the official doctrine for 
“constructing a modernised socialist country” (Hu, 2007) and the stability of a developing 
economy (Goodman, 1990; Zhang, 2011) are presented as a harmonious image in news. 
Other contentious news content, which may or may not cause potential political setbacks, 
has to be approached and filtered carefully. Hence, I conclude that the substantial purpose 
of censoring news content on the Internet and limiting these sensitive topics is not only 
to maintain the harmony of the Internet, but also works to the benefit of the leadership of 
the Communist Party. 
 
5.4.3 Protocol of online news media censoring 
Cyber police have different attitudes in censoring the content of online news media and 
the ordinary Internet users who access online news content. The difference in attitudes 
results from having different protocols of censorship. For online news media, cyber police 
usually work closely with the publicity department. Cyber police may have the media 
involved in the censorship process by communicating and negotiating with the leaders of 
media organisations in various ways. The outcome of online news content, in this sense, 
can be seen as the product of the collaboration by the cyber police, online news media, 
and the publicity departments in a matrix power-flow. However, for everyday Internet 
users, the protocol is straightforward and less subtle (See Chapter 5: 5). 
 
5.4.3.1 Attitudes to the oversight of the online news media 
Although both cyber police and online news media are steeped in an administrative top-
down culture, and employers of these two organisations are accustomed to receiving top-
down instructions from their supervisors and higher-ranked officials, there is no sign of 
direct top-down instruction-giving to the online news media by the cyber police. The 
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reason that the cyber police do not direct the online news media over news content is 
because these two organisations are ranked at the same administrative level. 
Insubordination is disallowed in Chinese political culture, as the institutional hierarchy is 
strictly adhered to and thus retains stability. This hierarchical system sets out the rule that 
the directives that come from a higher ranked office cannot be disobeyed by the lower 
ones, whilst offices at the same level cannot overrule one another. The Cyber police’s 
attitude towards censoring the online news media is therefore determined by this political 
culture. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, in local government, the public security bureau and the press and 
publication bureau are two parallel offices that lie under the jurisdiction of the local 
government, and the heads of these two bureaus are ranked at the same administrative 
level. To be precise, the director of the cyber police department of the public security 
bureau is ranked at section-head level, as well as the heads of section directors in the local 
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news groups of the same prefectural city. For example, in Wenzhou News, where the 
observation was conducted, the director is ranked at section-head level, equivalent to the 
director of the Wenzhou cyber police department. In the administrative sense, they are 
equipotent. By administering control over the licencing of online news media, the local 
government retains dominant power over the online news organisation. This type of 
administrative controlling corroborates the existence of one of the tactics in Chinese 
online news control, which Petley (2009) refers to as the licensing of the press to regulate 
the inclusion and exclusion of news content.  
 
The cyber police and online news media coordinate in a way that involves negotiation 
and communication, as the heads of cyber police and leaders of online news media 
negotiate and communicate over the online news media on a regular basis. The 
relationship between these two parties is seemingly harmonious. The cyber police do not 
directly involve themselves in the process of giving instructions to the online news media, 
or supervising the process of online news production. The top-down instructive 
operations, such as instructing the online news media to delete a specific piece of news 
or to orientate public opinion, are given by the local government at a higher rank.  
 
The cyber police have responsibilities in overseeing the online news content but cannot 
overrule the online news media or play the role of instructor who gives top-down 
instructions, thus the relationship between them is subtle and seemingly harmonious. 
There is no sign of an intense atmosphere between these two offices, as their equal 
administrative ranking does not allow them to overpower one another. The publicity 
department, as the third party that is involved in this power-flow, plays a significant role 
in the online news censorship. Here, the ‘publicity department’ refers to the specific 
department that the Communist Party runs. Unlike the governmental cyber police and 
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online news media, the publicity department is subordinated to the Communist Party. As 
the table 2 (Chapter 5: 3.1) and figure 5 (below) shows, the Central Commission for 
Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress is the highest section, whereas the local publicity 
offices are the lowest: 
 
In general, the publicity department is tasked with ensuring a harmonious society. In the 
process of censoring online news media, it is specifically in charge of ideological control 
on the Internet to orientate public opinion (see Chapter 1:5.3), and to ensure that content 
produced by the online news is consistent with the interests and benefits of the party (He, 
2004; He, 2008). Furthermore, it coordinates and harmonises the relationship between the 
cyber police and the online news media.  
 
Hence, the harmony between the cyber police and news media can be interpreted as a 
consequence of Chinese political culture, in which the different governmental and Party 
Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 5 Institutional structures of the Communist Party’s publicity 
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departments manage to build a subtle balance via administrative levels and ranking 
systems. This hierarchical ranking system is rigorous and rigid; all civil servants and 
formal employers who work in governmental organisations have their corresponding 
administrative levels, where insubordination is forbidden. The hierarchical ranking 
system determines a number of aspects of the careers of Chinese civil servants and 
governmental employees, such as their political influence, boundary of authority, welfare 
and wages, and the social etiquette and relations among them. That is, higher-ranked civil 
servants and governmental employees have more political influence and a more extensive 
boundary of authority than lower ones; they are better paid, and may have an absolute 
authority that cannot be opposed by their lower-ranked colleagues at work. In this 
political culture, any insubordination of the administration level is therefore intolerable. 
And for this reason, the attitude of cyber police overseeing the online news content is not 
straightforward and dictatorial. Rather, they are being communicative and co-ordinated. 
It is important to establish this understanding here, as their co-ordinated relationship in 
the process of online news production will be explored further in 4.3.2 of this chapter and 
Chapter 7: 2, in which the matrix amongst the publicity department, the cyber police and 
online news media in the censorship of online news content will be detailed.  
 
In this sense, the way that cyber police influence the process of online news production 
is indirect. Due to their levelled ranking within the governmental organisation and the 
emphasis of Chinese political culture on being harmonious, they are in a collaborative 
relationship rather than a radical and hostile one. The existence of cyber police may keep 
reminding online news workers to “deliberately” (Horton, 2011) avoid discussing 
sensitive topics, but they do not participant in the process of online news production. 
Their job responsibilities do not include journalistic practices, for instance. Concern for 
journalistic professionalism, widely discussed by western schools, and focusing on values 
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such as objectivity, quality, legitimacy and credibility (Soloski, 1989; Drechsel, 2000; 
McNair, 2009; Schudson & Anderson, 2009) is not found. Thus, the existence of cyber 
police may influence the output of online news content in such a way that online news 
workers need to approach sensitive topics carefully and consider reporting them with fear 
or favour. However, the actual journalistic practice and the process of self-censorship 
have to happen within the online newsroom where cyber police are excluded.  
 
5.4.3.2 Protocol for censoring online news content 
The protocols for censoring online news can sometimes be difficult to summarise, 
because the processes and outcomes of the negotiation and coordination among the cyber 
police and online news media vary. As already established in 4.3.1 of this chapter, the 
institutional background of the administrative level system in Chinese culture does not 
allow one office insubordinately to challenge another. Thus, there are several 
governmental and party sections and departments involved in the protocol matrix for 
censoring the online news media; and they all play significant roles in the process of 
communication, negotiation and concession.  
 
An extreme case that can reflect the complexity of the process is the political unrest 
between March and April in 2012 in China when Bo Xilai, the disgraced Chinese 
politician and a former member of the Central Politburo, was dismissed, arrested and 
accused of murder, corruption, and treason. Massive rumours of a coup, disruption of the 
politburo of the CPC, and the emergence of unidentified troops in Beijing, rushed onto 
the Internet. Cyber police worked extremely closely with the publicity department, and 
issued fine tickets to the online news media which were accused of fuelling the rumour-
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spreading. The director (P05) explains that this was to preserve regional stability and 
bolster civilian morale.  
 
“We gained support from websites, tracked down those criminals, located them, and 
finally brought them to justice. Overall, incidents as radical as this (Bo Xilai’s downfall) 
are rare. The most usual are where people are affected by malicious speech on the 
Internet… they may come to hate the government” (P07). 
 
Here, in the interview, significant attention is paid to the relationship between the online 
news media, the cyber police of the government and the publicity department of the party. 
And this aspect is illuminated in the process of observation, as the consistent 
communication of the supervisor of online news media with the publicity department and 
the cyber police was witnessed. In addition, the publicity administrators and cyber police 
officers often join the internal media briefing. 
 
This phenomenon is intriguing because these two offices share few similarities in terms 
of their responsibility. The cyber police, as mentioned earlier, are a public security force 
of the government, which is responsible for preventing online criminal activities, whereas 
the publicity department is often in charge of political propaganda and dissemination of 
the Communist Party view. It is the pressure of keeping the Internet harmonious that 
brings them together at the media briefing desks. The director (P07) implied the close 
collaboration between these two departments in Bo Xilai’s case as follows:   
 
“I had an urgent meeting with Director Wu (of the publicity department of Hangzhou 
People’s government) and fellows from Zhejiang News Group. We discussed how we are 
going to deal with the scandal, because that was serious. […] The meeting was held in 
Director Wu’s office, as it is always is” (P05). 
 
178 
 
P07’s statement indicated that the shared ground of responsibility in maintaining the 
harmonious atmosphere over the Internet is what links the cyber police and publicity 
department. In handling sensitive incidents like Bo Xilai’s story, which involves a number 
of aspects that could damage the harmonious atmosphere, such as reactionary acts, the 
murder of an elite political figure and abuse of power, the cyber police and the publicity 
departments worked together to oversee the decision making in the newsrooms of the 
online news media. Along with their collaboration with the online news media, a three-
party matrix in the power-flow of news production and news censorship was therefore 
constructed. The dynamic interactions and responsibilities among the online news media, 
cyber police and publicity departments can be illustrated, as Figure 6 shows: 
 
 
The online media coverage of Bo Xilai’s case can be interpreted in the sense that high 
pressure from the publicity department and the cyber police forced the online news media 
to avoid producing news content that is incongruent to the interests of the authorities, 
Communicating & negotiating 
Online news media
Publicity 
department Cyber Police
Coordination in ideology 
Governmental 
sections Party section 
Figure 6 Dynamic interactions among the online news media, cyber police and publicity department 
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because the cyber police force are not entitled to pursue this task on their own as they are 
parallel offices with the online news media. Here, the publicity department has two main 
responsibilities in incidental news reporting. First, the publicity administrator is 
responsible for ensuring ideological control over the news media. That is, the publicity 
administrator is expected to deliver clear and specific requirements to the online news 
media and the cyber police are expected to regulate news coverage and delineate taboos 
to avoid, control news story angle, and how best to censor users’ comments. Secondly, 
the publicity administrators support the cyber police to regulate the online news media 
according to these requirements. In this sense, the publicity department is the coordinator, 
whereas the cyber police are the implementer. 
 
In extreme cases like Bo Xilai’s, if news workers did not have an awareness of latent rules 
that warned them away from the minefield in the news, they might drag down the websites 
which they worked for. It is the authority of the government and the Party that forces the 
news workers to self-censor their news content carefully.  
 
As implementers in the process, the cyber police issue online news media fine tickets and 
announce other sanctions. In extreme cases involving sensitive political issues or ideology 
control, they again need to collaborate with the publicity department to discipline online 
news media. The administrative disciplines can cause news media and their websites huge 
political pressure and financial loss. For example, the political prospect of the online news 
media’s director and chief editor would be affected because they are normally party 
members. The administrators of the Southern Weekly were forced to compromise and 
were re-staffed by the authorities during its planning strike (Cao, 2013). Also, if a website 
was forced to close down, it would cause the failure of its commercial contracts and result 
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in financial loss. Hence, together with the publicity department, the cyber police have a 
certain administrative deterrence that the online news media cannot ignore or provoke.  
 
A phenomenon that caught my attention is that the administrative sanctions cannot be 
appealed against. On most occasions, once the sanction is announced and the fine ticket 
is issued to the online news media, the decision is final. It can be neither appealed against 
nor amended. As the director stated: 
 
“There are many (websites which suffered sanction). I remember there were about 20 
last year. Mostly, they received notices of criticism, only a few were fined, from 20 to 50 
thousand yuan. […] I don’t think we have been bothered about considering appeals on 
these causes” (P05). 
 
The administrative management is regarded as imperfect and arbitrary. The cyber police 
and the publicity department have authority and veto power over the online news content, 
though the process of censorship involves the participation of the online news media. 
Consequently, news workers have to censor the content they produce in order to comply 
with the regulations and avoid taboos. Therefore, an online news story has to go through 
at least two filters in the process: firstly, the news workers have to self-censor and censor 
the news content within the newsroom before publication; secondly, both the cyber police 
and the publicity administrators oversee and filter news content to ensure they are 
‘politically correct’. If a news story causes “unnecessary troubles” or “negative social 
effects” (P07), the producers of the story have to take responsibility: the process of news 
production would be shifted, or the news media would be disciplined. 
 
The way that cyber police influence the output of online news content is similar to their 
attitude toward the oversight of online news. Cyber police do not get involved in the 
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process of news conception and editorial control. Their role in the protocol of online 
censorship is delicate and in-direct. They are not even gatekeepers as Singer (1997) and 
Shoemaker and Vos (2009) have described. Their rank within the office limits their 
oversight. For decisions that have to be made in the online newsroom, such as inclusion 
and exclusion of news content, evidence shows that cyber police are not involved either. 
However, it does not mean that the setting-up of Internet censors is insignificant. Their 
engagement in the matrix indicates that they are important implementers who make sure 
that the image of a harmonious society (Hu, 2007) is portrayed, and that the priority to 
“maintain the fast-growing economy of China” (Petley, 2009: p.101) is supported in 
online media. Despite their disregard for some common news values, such as negativity, 
meaningfulness (Brighton & Foy, 2007: p.7), truthfulness, sense of humanity (Steel, 2009: 
pp.584-5), novelty, and story quality (Gans, 1980), their concern to maintain the image 
of hegemony for the Chinese authorities holds importance above all else. They added 
manual methods to the protocol of online censorship, which makes them a significant aid 
to the whole mechanism. Furthermore, in the sense of the internalisation of control within 
the newsrooms (Jansen, 1991), the existence of the cyber police and their activities out of 
the spotlight have demonstrated their quiet but consistent symbolic power in the 
background, by ensuring that Chinese online news workers conform to appropriate norms 
of behaviour.  
 
5.5. Control of online news users 
5.5.1 User sanctions 
In contrast to the cautious attitude of censoring the online news media, cyber police have 
a straightforward, non-negotiable, and an indisputable attitude in censoring the users 
without the constraints of the hierarchical administrative ranking system. The cyber 
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police have a number of sanction methods for users who violate Internet regulations, such 
as bypassing the firewall, accessing banned online news content, posting malicious 
speech and spreading rumours. This research addresses the differences between the cyber 
police’s attitudes to censoring the online news media and the users because the 
distinctiveness of these attitudes determines the differences in censorship protocols. The 
protocol of censoring the users is therefore different from the protocol of overseeing the 
online news media; it is summarised and illustrated in the figure: 
 
 
Censorship of the users employs three methods: firewall monitoring, civil informant from 
the public, and inspections and patrols. Firstly, the use of the firewall and filtering system 
is considered as the first filter stage for monitoring the users. Due to the enormous number 
of users in China and the volume of news content that is produced on the Internet, cyber 
police participants admitted that it was impractical to thoroughly censor the users via 
social inspections. The use of the firewall filtering is to establish the first stage of online 
content control, as P07 explains:  
 
“Normally, the firewall would label websites and user IPs in colours to indicate their 
degree of danger. The green lights means they are good, the red lights means they have 
problems. The red-labelled ones would be banned directly by the firewall. But on some 
occasions, the machine would label websites and IPS in yellow. That indicates the firewall 
is not secure. For these yellow-labelled ones, we are required to verify their safety 
manually” (P07). 
 
Sanctions
Online sanction Security sanction Penal sanction 
Verification & investigation
Censorship methods
Firewall monitoring Civil informant Inspection & patrol
Figure 7 Process of users’ censorship 
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For cyber police officers, the use of the firewall frees them from manual online 
inspections, and promotes the effectiveness of Internet filtering and monitoring at work. 
Furthermore, the application of highlighted text inspection establishes a buffer area for 
online inspections. The firewall is employed to highlight uncertain information which the 
machine may not be intelligent enough to identify, and allows the cyber police officers to 
manually inspect this information at the later stage of filtering.  
 
Secondly, employing civil informants is another method for the cyber police to control 
news content on the Internet. The wide-ranging civil informants may cover some blind-
spots of the firewall and manual filtering. The officer (P07) explains the process of 
civilian tip-off from the web-pages of the cyber police websites and other websites which 
have the cyber police’s links, as follows: 
 
“You roll the (website’s) page to its bottom and you will see the cartoon police figures. 
Some pages have only one policeman, some have a pair, a policeman and a policewoman. 
[…] You click onto them, and enter our webpage. We have a click button for reporting 
on the page, a big blue one on the very right side on the top. You click on it, fill the form, 
it’s done” (P07). 
 
The reason for discussing the development of mobilising citizens in Chinese culture is 
that the philosophy that backs the idea of employing civil informers on the Internet and 
having convenient links for the public to alert ‘malicious speeches and behaviours’ to the 
police, has historical origins. For example, the Cultural Revolution, which encouraged 
civil informants and cross-surveillance, created awareness of class struggles among 
civilians and destroyed trust between friends, family members and colleagues (Deng & 
Treiman, 1997; Burgh, 2003). This encouragement of tip-offs was instigated by the 
authorities in the name of ‘the greater purpose’, but civil informants were not given 
enough information in the process for them to make rational judgments, like questioning 
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the sanity of launching class struggles among families and friends through the Cultural 
Revolution (Zhang & Schwartz, 1997; Zou, 1991), and rationality of banning users’ 
access to Party-unfavourable news content nowadays. For the authorities, mobilising 
citizens still works effectively, as both interviewees mentioned many times that they 
gained a great number of sources about Internet crimes and malicious speech from public 
informers or through ‘tip offs’. Compared with the direct sources from civil informants, 
the records in the firewall system act as a well-established backup copy which provides 
direct data support for the cyber police.  
 
The third method of censoring the users is inspections and patrols that mainly cover 
Internet cafés. Unlike the first two indoor methods, inspections require fieldwork for the 
cyber police officers. As the participants claimed, Internet café inspections are their most 
important outdoor duties: 
 
“We casually will launch operations to inspect and patrol. This is part of our job. An 
Internet café is often a place where the rumours started spreading. We find out that, on 
most occasions, the rumours were from Internet cafés” (P07). 
 
So far, from the evidence of the participants’ descriptions, all Internet cafés are within the 
cyber police’s jurisdiction areas. The routine inspection of the Internet cafés is considered 
as one of the significant parts of the protocol of user censorship. The local Internet cafés 
were portrayed as places full of different kinds of unemployed and low-income people. 
Some of them, according to the interview subjects, cannot afford to have a computer at 
home, therefore they pay the cheap Internet-surfing fee at Internet cafés and may be 
involved in activities such as accessing banned online news content and spreading 
rumours that are unfavourable to the authorities. For the cyber police officers, these 
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people are potential troublemakers who are most likely to violate the regulation of the 
Internet. 
 
The participants also estimated that the age of users who commit crimes on the Internet, 
compared with the age of criminals in general, is younger than average. The officer (P07) 
described some of the online criminals as “almost kids”. However, both cyber police 
participants were not inclined to underestimate those young troublemakers, because as 
far as the police were concerned, the IT techniques that these so-called ‘kids’ possessed 
had enough potential to cause serious security troubles, as P07 pinpointed:  
 
“Now the hackers are getting smarter, some hackers will try to hide their real IP 
addresses. They may use multiple proxies to interfere our attempts to locate them, and 
they have excellent counter-surveillance skills” (P07). 
 
By having the counter-surveillance skills and hacker techniques, as the officer (P07) 
indicated, young online troublemakers would be able to commit various crimes, such as 
online scams, false information trading, rumour spreading, online assault, and even a 
series of acts endangering the national security. Noticeably, the term “corrupting thoughts 
from the west” was used by the director (P05) when he interpreted the meaning of a series 
of acts that could endanger the national security as ‘pornographic’, ‘anti-socialistic’, and 
‘anti-government’. He further explains: 
 
“There are a lot (of acts that can endanger national security). For instance, advocating 
corrupt thoughts from the west, attempts at spreading cults, and some agitations for mass 
incidents” (P05). 
 
The sanctions for users who violated Internet regulations can be roughly categorised into 
three levels. As Figure 8 shows, the severity of sanctions are categorised at different levels. 
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The lightest sanctions lie on the first level. Internet users who attempt to access banned 
foreign websites may be sanctioned by cutting off their Internet connections and banning 
their access. At this level, cyber police officers usually do not confront the users. Instead, 
they use distant filtering and censoring to implement the sanctions. Acts such as 
bypassing the firewall and attempting to access banned foreign websites are called 
‘circumvention’, which is a primary but forbidden technique for hackers who possess 
knowledge of using proxy servers. The second and third levels of sanctions escalate to 
punishments. They are the security punishments and penal sanctions. Both of them 
involve confrontations between the cyber police and users. The significant difference 
between them is that the penal sanctions must be judged and announced by the court, 
whereas the security punishments such as detentions and fines can be directly 
implemented clandestinely by the security services. 
 
 
At the first level of sanction, the cyber police officer admitted that the population of users 
who attempt circumvention was “beyond imagination” but they were rarely sanctioned 
because the consequence of personal circumvention was considered low impact. The 
officer (P07) explained that the firewall did most of the work so the cyber police did not 
need to confront the users. However, there was a significant loophole in the system: 
First level: Online sanctions
(cutting off the Internet, banning 
accessibility, etc.)
Second level: Security 
sanctions
(detention, fines, etc.)
Third level: Penal 
sanctions
(sentencing)
Figure 8 Reverse-pyramid of the types of sanctions and 
punishments for Internet regulation violators 
187 
 
 
“The Great Firewall can detect you if you attempt to access some banned foreign websites, 
and it will block you immediately. But the system works automatically. [...] Your attempts 
will be recorded. But the record only survives for a short period of time. […] Soon your 
record will be overwritten by new records, which is someone else’s record as they are 
also attempting to do the same thing as you do. It is likely that your record would be 
overwritten about a minute or so after it was recorded. […] a user’s attempt at sneaking 
through the GFW is generally safe, we wouldn’t go to you” (P07). 
 
This description suggests that there are massive numbers of users circumventing, but 
overall they would not be troubled by the cyber police due to the loophole of the firewall. 
The records of these circumvention attempts would not be kept and therefore sanctions 
would not be implemented. However, it also indicates that attempts at circumvention will 
immediately cause web traffic to block within the security system. It commonly appears 
to the users as the network connection cutting-off: 
 
“[…] the system will cut off your Internet connection for a while, and before it turns back 
on again, you will temporary lose your connection to the Internet. The cutting-off time 
can be manually set up by us, we usually set it for 60 seconds, in some places they may 
go for 100 to 200 seconds. You cannot use the Internet during that time, but your 
connection may indicate that it is functioning well. [...] After 60 seconds, you can gain 
accessibility again” (P07). 
 
Again, even though there is no direct evidence, telecommunication companies and 
network companies voluntarily provide access to users’ data for the cyber police; some 
indirect phenomena have suggested that cyber police and telecommunication companies 
may collaborate and exchange data. The Internet network which allows the cyber police 
to oversee online news media and their users is established by telecommunication 
companies, and users’ activities on the mobile phone cannot be monitored on a colossal 
basis without the support of a mobile network, as P07 explains: 
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“Mobile devices and computers are the same. You attempt to access a banned website at 
home with your phone, the firewall will cut off your home Wi-Fi. […] We can locate 
people via phones, unless you unplug the battery. But for some phones, their batteries are 
build-in, some laptops are the same. […] They (mobile devices) are all alike to us” (P07). 
 
It is worth noting that though the focus of this research is censorship of online news, the 
reason for discussing users who are members of the public is that protocols of censoring 
these non-journalistic users are similar and users also use online news media, which 
makes their activities on the Internet inseparable from censorship of online news content. 
 
In this sense, the use of informers is considered to be a real-time example of the 
‘panopticon’ (Crandall, et, al., 2007; Jansen, 1991), where the pressure of censorship 
promotes self-censorship. The idea of establishing this protocol is therefore to create a 
virtual form of a surveillance network on the Internet which provides technical aid to 
manual censoring , and allows public informers to tip off authorities in order to expand 
the range of censorship of online content. This form of surveillance can be traced back to 
1988 when Zuboff introduced the idea that computer technology can be used to create an 
information Panopticon for surveillance, and through its development the use of the 
network enables a panoptic form of observation for social control (Brigrall, 2002).  
 
5.5.2 Privacy violations 
Privacy violation is a highly significant aspect for the cyber police in the process of 
controlling the users (Lyon, 2003; Raab, 2005). In the interviews, both cyber police 
officers refused to deny the fact that, during the process of surveillance and censorship 
on the Internet, violating users’ privacy was unavoidable. The follow-up problem for the 
cyber police officer is that they would also be vulnerable when they are using the Internet, 
because their personal information and social networks could also be disclosed. This goes 
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back to the discussion earlier in this chapter (3.3), that the cyber police officers, regardless 
of their administrative levels and authority ranks, are fearful of disclosure.  
 
The awareness of disclosure and professional understanding of disclosure also increase 
the cyber police’s fears about the Internet’s social networks. The Director (P05) sniffed 
at social networks: 
 
“[…] for people who work in the NIS like me, Weibo isn’t safe. Not just Weibo, We-chat, 
QQ, all the apps are dangerous. And the applicants as well. The modern devices are not 
safe. None of them. The more advanced a device is, the more dangerous it can be” (P05). 
 
This bureaucratic culture can explain the reason why cyber police officers tend to hide 
behind the digital screen and watch people over the Internet secretly. Their identity in the 
social network is hardly ever traced, because they keep an extremely low profile and 
attempt to remove their traces of online activities. This was what the director (P05) meant 
when he claimed that complex devices are more dangerous. By enforcing his point, he 
interpreted as follows: 
 
“My mobile is the oldest and simplest one, it only has basic functions such as dialling 
and texting, no other attachments. And I never send any texts. […] Calling should be as 
short as possible. A three-word deal should not be extended to four words. If you want to 
talk, talk to me face-to-face”(P05).  
 
It is obvious that cyber police officers dislike their privacy being violated as they 
understand how Internet hacking and monitoring operates. Their use of the simplest 
devices which are unlikely to be traced or hacked can be seen as an awkward but effective 
method to shield themselves from disclosure. In their social life, they distance themselves 
from the Internet. Apparently, they are violating people’s privacy when they know exactly 
the danger privacy disclosure can cause (Chapter 5: 3.3). 
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The descriptions of the cyber police participants also indicate that all users in China run 
the risk of being unaware of surveillance when they are using the Internet. Due to the 
existence of the powerful Great Firewall, users in China can be watched, and their 
locations, gender, social classes, political positions, and nationalities can be identified or 
accessed by the cyber police. The phones can be hacked, the e-mails can be read, chatting 
content can be recorded, and personal pictures and diaries can be scanned. In short, the 
surveillance reaches into every possible corner of private space. 
 
Even though the users may be law-abiding citizens and have not shown any intention of 
breaking the law, their privacy can be violated on the Internet. This is for the purpose of, 
paraphrasing the participants’ statements, ensuring Internet security and preventing 
potential harm to the harmonious Internet. 
 
In this sense, the nature of cyber police officers’ work shares ideas similar to the infamous 
PRISM program which is operated by the National Security Agency of the USA. Both of 
them operate as clandestine surveillance programs, and claimed that their original 
intention was to prevent and disrupt potential danger: against terrorism for the PRISM 
(Acohido, 2013; Braun, S.; Flaherty, A., Gillum, J., & Apuzzo, M., 2013) and to protect 
the harmony of the Internet in the Chinese case. A difference between PRISM and the 
cyber police is that Chinese policemen focus on the domestic users and people who use 
the Internet on China’s territory only. There is no evidence to suggest that the cyber police 
can work on an international basis. 
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Undoubtedly, hacking into users’ computers without a warrant is against the Chinese 
Constitution, (Liu, 2004) as the Constitution itself states in Article 40: 
 
“No organization or individual may, on any ground, infringe upon the freedom and 
privacy of citizens' correspondence except in cases where, to meet the needs of state 
security or of investigation into criminal offences, public security or procuratorial organs 
are permitted to censor correspondence in accordance with procedures prescribed by 
law” (NPC, 2004). 
 
However, in cyber police officers’ daily work, violations of the privacy of citizens and of 
the law are routine. I recognise that this is another reason for cyber policemen to keep a 
low profile and avoid public attention, as the cyber police participants who actually 
participated in operations admitted that hacking into private computers without a warrant 
“might” be unlawful, which, in the officer’s words (P07), is a “grey area”: 
 
“To my understanding, it is the grey area in law. In our country, the legal system is 
imperfect, so are the articles of privacy protection. So if there isn’t any written law 
indicating that what we do is illegal, then it isn’t illegal. There is ambiguity here, so I’d 
say it is not illegal” (P07). 
 
A traditional operation routine for cyber police officers was to locate users’ IPs, and 
operate a search and arrest strategy for those who violated the regulations on the Internet. 
The operational process requested manpower at the search scenes and permitted access 
to users’ databases. The process, therefore, went through a procedure which required not 
just a warrant, but possibly the involvement of lawyers and legal disputes (Yang, 2015; 
NETEASE, 2008). But as the participants had explained, now the cyber police can 
oversee a particular user whom they suspect from a distance through their firewall system. 
The distant Internet observation technology enables the cyber police to locate users, and 
access users’ data with ease (Yang, 2015), a process which P07 described as “the grey 
area” of privacy law in China. 
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5.5.3 User focussed strategies 
Four strategies for censoring users can be identified. In the first, the colour alarm system 
is applied to free the cyber police from the heavy duty of online inspections. Secondly, 
cyber police officers launch Internet café inspections and patrols which, in the officer’s 
(P07) view, are the origin of most rumours. The protocol and advantages of these two 
strategies are detailed in 5.4 in this chapter. 
 
The third strategy is what I call ‘the adjustment’. One of the daily duties of the cyber 
police is to record the occurrence of malicious comments that are posted by ordinary users 
in online news webpages. The number is used as an important criterion by which the 
government judges whether an online news medium poorly manages its online content 
control. When an online news medium allows malicious comments to exceed a certain 
quota, it risks receiving sanctions. The tricky fact here is that this quota may only be 
determined by the cyber police officers according to their inspection experience. That is, 
the quota can vary according to the size and influence of media organisations. The director 
(P05) explained that the tolerance of ‘malicious speech’ on the webpages is influenced 
by the number of clicks of the website: 
 
“We don’t punish a website as soon as we find the evidence. For example, in some famous 
forums in Hangzhou, we can spot about 100 to 200 instances of malicious speech every 
day. They are mostly from ordinary users. But we have a quota for websites. That means… 
normally, say, a one-million-daily-click website is allowed to have less than 500 case of 
malicious speech” (P05). 
 
However, this quota of total-clicks/total-allowed-malicious-content is not always fixed. 
It appears adjustable by the cyber police for some special occasions and incidents, as the 
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participants indicated that at times “people need the chances to express and vent”, and so 
more malicious speech might be allowed: 
 
“If an online news medium wrote something critical, it would be acceptable. We did not 
interfere too much. People sometimes even cheered the criticism (of the government) from 
the media, but when the wave is gone, it is gone, it will be calm. […] We used it ten years 
ago, on newspapers. When a crisis occurred, we would allow local newspapers to write 
critical editorials to cater to people’s anxiety, allow people to let negative feelings out. 
Now the method on the Internet is the same” (P05). 
 
This ability to make adjustments has its positive effect, as it allows users to vent their 
dissatisfaction towards the government on special occasions and during exceptional cases. 
This strategy can find its historical home with the channelisation theory (see Chapter 2: 
2.1) and reflects the criticised and self-criticised culture of the Communist Party (see 
Chapter 2: 3.2). Secondly, like the Tong’s “guerrilla tactics” (2009), the adjustment also 
ensures the mediation of safe information along with censorship, as it can prevent removal 
of news content which is alleged to cross-the-line. 
 
The fourth strategy of the cyber police is to hire hackers to improve and enhance their 
surveillance and censoring techniques. Some freelance hackers who are considered as 
elite in their field are recruited by the cyber police. However, this recruitment is a 
privilege that only a high-ranked public security ministry may exercise, as the officer 
(P07) admitted that a lower division of local public security is not entitled to hire these 
freelance hackers: 
 
“I know some hackers were recruited and work for the government. Some of them are 
top-class, and they are working for us now. But we can’t recruit them. We do not have 
the rank. Beijing’s bureau does” (P07). 
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Chinese history books call this kind of recruitment “zhao an”, meaning that the 
government offers amnesty to rebels. It is seen as a strategy, through which the 
government authorises and legalises some illegal organisations or individuals for political 
purposes of stabilisation and harmony. The history of amnesty in China can be traced 
back to the prime time of feudal society. In the Tang Dynasty (618-907), Huang Chao 
(835-884), the leader of a peasant uprising, requested amnesty from the Emperor Xizong 
of Tang (Fairbank & Twitchett, 1979). In the late feudal society, along with the 
enforcement of centralisation, uprisings increased constantly. The imperial court offered 
more amnesties to rebels in order to maintain its dominance (Fairbank & Twitchett, 1979). 
Comparing the historical amnesty and current hacker recruitment, some resemblance is 
revealed. Firstly, these two strategies have a similar political purpose. They are both 
conducted to preserve the stability of the central government. Secondly, the government 
converted rebels/troublemakers into subordinates. For the cyber police, recruiting hackers 
can also soothe and assuage a number of technical elites who may disapprove of Internet 
surveillance and censorship. Some hackers who possess knowledge of posting threats to 
the censorship mechanism may be enlisted, meaning the number of hostile elements is 
reduced. Lastly, both feudal amnesty and current hacker recruitment can enhance the state 
apparatus, because new techniques and sources are brought in when rebels, troublemakers, 
or hackers are enlisted as flesh and blood.  
 
Banning potentially contentious news material from being produced, and forbidding 
people from both publishing and accessing it are commonly seen as effective tactics for 
the authority to control and censor news media (Petley, 2009). This institutional set-up of 
cyber police reflects what Petley has argued is the use of the above mechanisms extended 
into cyberspace. Although many have indicated that the development of technology and 
information has potentially contributed to the liberalisation of the press (Castells, 1991; 
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Yang, 2003; Esarey, 2005), the development itself also aids the Chinese authorities to 
reinforce its control over the press. In this sense, cyber police adds manual assistance to 
media control, including what has been presented so far: filtering online information, 
banning political sensitive topics, and blocking access for people who discuss them on 
the Internet. The mechanism of this censorship is not limited only to online news, but also 
to those Internet users who may pose a threat to the image of harmonisation. I cannot but 
conclude that the prioritisation of presenting a harmonious society is a nationwide 
political campaign with historical roots in Confucianism and morality, developed through 
Maoism and the leadership of Deng and Hu, and has now become a significant stronghold 
of the ideological apparatus for Chinese authorities.  
5.6. Conclusion 
By revealing and studying the institutional mechanisms of the cyber police and their 
systematic protocols in censoring the online news media and users, this chapter has 
discussed the administrative apparatus available to the Chinese authorities to censor and 
control content online. By doing so, it provides an account of how control is both enacted 
by individuals within administrative contexts, and presents the perspective of those who 
function within this context. It also describes how the users are monitored, censored, and 
at risk of being sanctioned if they bypass the firewall or access banned content online. 
Furthermore, it defines the notion of ‘harmony of the Internet’, which is believed by the 
cyber police officers to be the main driver of the application of Internet censorship. 
Furthermore, the existence of the cyber police demonstrates their symbolic power in the 
sense that censorship and control of the Internet are internalised within the newsrooms. 
The journalists are therefore required to conform to appropriate norms of behaviour in 
the process of online news production. 
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The next chapter will focus on the observation materials which explore the hierarchical 
structure in Wenzhou News, a local online news media. It will discuss Chinese online 
news workers’ different roles and responsibilities in the process of online news 
production, how they act, react, and interact with the pressure of censorship in the 
newsroom, and how media supervision and Party infiltration influence the outcome of 
online news content. 
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Chapter 6 Data & analysis II: Observation 
in the online newsroom of Wenzhou News 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses aspects of Chinese online news censorship by presenting and 
analysing observation data in the following ways. Firstly, it presents a visual 
representation of the hierarchical structure of the online news media in the Wenzhou News 
(WN), a regional online news media organisation in China. This hierarchical structure 
determines the ranking differences of online journalists, editors, and web administrators, 
and influences the autonomy of these news workers in the processes of online news 
production. Secondly, a layout of the newsroom presents the setup of the observation 
location. This assists in the presentation of the workflow dynamics, and highlights 
relational routines in news production. It particularly focuses on the protocol of how 
online news workers respond to censorship pressure from the Chinese authorities, and 
reclaim autonomy within the online newsroom using journalistic tactics. Thirdly, by 
discussing the different roles that these online news workers play in censoring online 
news content, such as user-generated content monitors, pseudo commentators, and 
supervisors, a key mechanism of Internet censorship established by the Chinese 
authorities in the online newsroom can be identified and understood. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion on the liberalising effect that marketisation has had on 
Chinese online news media in the ongoing media transformation, and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s infiltration within the hierarchy of online news media.  
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Therefore, this chapter answers the following research questions:  
1) How does the hierarchical structure of the online news media in China influence the 
process of online news production?  
2) How do different online news workers in China respond to censorship pressure from 
the authorities? 
3) What are the protocols through which the Chinese authorities maintain control over 
the online news media? 
4) Are there journalistic responses for these online news workers in China to resist 
censorship? If yes, how do they resist? 
 
6.2. Framework 
6.2.1 Observation setting 
To respond to the research questions listed above, this chapter lays out the details and 
findings of a four-week observation at Wenzhou News (WN). The observation period 
lasted from 6th May to 3rd June in 2011. The observation location was WN’s 21st-floor 
office, the main online newsroom where different kinds of news workers, such as online 
journalists, editors, and supervisors, worked. As mentioned in Chapter 4: 4.4.4.1, I chose 
to keep record of the observed actions within the online newsroom in handwriting. During 
the four-week observation, the daily routine would begin at 8 a.m. when online journalists 
and editors started working. A lunch break lasted between 11:30 a.m. and 2 p.m. During 
this period the observation was paused. From 2 p.m. until 6 p.m. the observation was 
resumed as online journalists and editors started working again. It is worth noting that 
some journalists and editors might have left work earlier in the afternoon once they 
completed their daily tasks, whereas others might have worked overtime until late hours 
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of the day. For the purpose of data standardisation, the observation period was set to stop 
at 6 p.m. daily.  
 
The observation of WN’s online newsroom had two research aims. The first was to obtain 
a description of the dynamic interaction of online news production, where different news 
workers acted, reacted, and interacted in relation to the need to acquiesce to or negotiate 
with censorship within the newsroom. The second aim was to provide a basis upon which 
interviews could be conducted. A sketch of how censorship becomes operational within 
the newsroom was needed, along with an understanding of the roles and responsibilities 
of key players and the protocol of censorship in the process of online news production. 
 
On account of ethical considerations, participants mentioned in this chapter are only 
labelled by their occupations. None of their names are mentioned, and their gender is not 
disclosed. This is to protect the identities of those who participated in the observation. In 
addition, for purposes of conducting non-participant observation the researcher exercised 
self-regulation and control in order to minimise their interactions with news workers. In 
doing so, the researcher reduced their interference and influence on the processes of 
online news production, ensuring that sound data was obtained for analysis. 
 
6.2.2 Thematic outline 
A number of themes are discussed in this chapter. They can be classified into two main 
types: the first is discussion on key roles and responsibilities of different news workers in 
the online newsroom, and the second is detailed accounts of how censorship becomes 
operational within the online newsroom. 
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The analysis starts with introducing the background of the Wenzhou News and its host 
media organisation Wenzhou News Media Group. The discussion, then, continues to 
identify the responsibilities of different online news workers, particularly how they 
responded to censorship and what role they played in censoring online news content. This 
observation focuses on the activities of three kinds of actors in the online newsroom in 
China: online journalists, editors, and web administrators. This discussion focuses on the 
responsibilities of these different news workers in the context of the hierarchical structure 
in the news group, which systematically determines the level of autonomy that individual 
news workers have within the newsroom. To be precise, higher ranked web administrators 
have more autonomy in the newsroom than lower-level news workers in deciding on 
online news content; editors have more autonomy in changing, amending, or deleting 
online news content than online journalists, who are often ranked lower. The hierarchy 
also influences how the online newsroom is set up. The layout of WN’s online newsroom 
on the 21st floor of its main building provided a visual demonstration of how the set up in 
the newsroom strengthens the distinctive roles of those who give and receive instructions, 
as the lower ranked news workers were physically separated from their superiors. The 
setting reflects the divisional characteristics of the hierarchy. It ensures the Chinese 
authorities can make political demands and give instructions to specific individuals in 
news organisation, and pass these instructions down to each journalist who works within 
the organisation. The study of this hierarchical structure therefore unveils the power flow 
between different activities in the online newsroom in China, and lays the foundation for 
later discussions of protocols and triangular models (Chapter 7: 4) of Internet censorship. 
 
The second theme focuses on detailed accounts of how censorship becomes operational 
during the process of news production. The briefings that are regularly scheduled and 
held in the online newsroom are considered as a significant method for online news media 
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to deliver censorship instructions to news workers. News briefings are also a channel for 
the authorities to deliver their censorship pressure to the individual news workers, 
reminding and orientating them to censor, monitor, and filter online content. This online 
content includes not only the news content that online journalists and editors produce, but 
also user generated content. By making online news workers responsible for the online 
content that appears on their webpages, the authorities establish a significant protocol of 
censorship in the online news media and maintain control over it.  
 
Apart from their roles in the journalistic field, online journalists and editors are also 
required to be user-generated content monitors and pseudo commentators, two roles that 
are considered irrelevant to online news production but heavily influenced by censorship 
pressure. The former role requires news workers to scan, filter, and delete user-generated 
content which is “crossing-the-line”, while the latter requires them to pretend to be 
ordinary users, and generate content that is favourable to the authorities in order to create 
a harmonious atmosphere on the website and orientate other users’ perspectives.  
 
Another focus is on the role of the messenger that the web administrator plays in the 
process of online news production. The existence of supervision in the online newsroom 
in China was observed to be a key mechanism for the authorities to ensure that online 
news was politically correct, in order to produce online news content that synchronised 
with the official line. Lastly, this chapter concludes with discussion of what I call 
“journalistic tactics”, in relation to Tong’s “guerrilla tactics” (2009). Both terms refer to 
a number of tactics that online news workers in China use to ensure the safe mediating of 
information in the context of censorship.  
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6.3. Online news media: Key roles, responsibilities and 
hierarchy 
6.3.1 Hierarchical structure of the WN 
To understand the protocol of online news censorship, it is crucial to untangle the 
hierarchical structure within the online news media (Cottle, 2003). The structure of 
China’s news media is arguably integrated within the structure of communist politics 
from before the 1980s (Lin, 1970). Broadly speaking, there tend to be two kinds of 
accounts of Chinese media structure and political power. The first sees the construction 
of Chinese news media as a form of integration within the authoritarian control. The main 
structure of news media was firmly established before the media transformation, for 
which reason the authorities now show little sign of lessening its control over news 
(Esarey, 2005, p56). The second attempts to interpret the impact of media transformation 
on the construction and shaping of the loyalty of Chinese news media and the normativity 
of Chinese journalists (Pan & Chan, 2003, Esarey, 2005; Tong, 2009). Thus, it is 
important to look at the hierarchical structure of the observation location at an early stage 
of analysis. 
 
The pilot study discovered that the roles of editors and web administrators overlapped in 
some areas. Both these roles had responsibility for monitoring online news content on the 
website. The news workers’ rankings and their autonomy within the newsroom are 
believed to be determined by the organisation’s hierarchy. This led the research to focus 
on the hierarchical structure of the online newsroom in the formal observation period, and 
a hierarchical structure of WN was drawn (Figure 9 below). 
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Although both editors and journalists have responsibilities for deleting or removing 
online content before the content is presented to the public, journalists were rarely found 
to be obliged to do so. The hierarchical structure indicates that journalists work at the 
bottom of the news production chain in the field. A higher rank in this structure gives 
more autonomy in the newsroom. The web administrator level is, as the hierarchy 
indicates, the most powerful in the chain; beneath this level, supervisors are in charge of 
implementing administrative instructions to editors and reporting back to the 
administrators. Editors are sandwiched between supervisors and journalists. Along with 
photographers and commentators, journalists are the lowest level in the online newsroom. 
Hence, journalists possess the least autonomy in altering, changing and editing online 
content.  
 
The online media supervisors sit under the directors of the media group. They are also 
considered to be members of the web administrators group. The supervision team is 
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known to be senior employees of the media group who communicate, coordinate and 
oversee the common news workers on a daily basis, and pass on instructions from the 
directors. It is worth noting that most web administrators are Communist Party members.  
 
Following the suggestion of Paulussen and Ugille (2008) to consider the hierarchy that 
exists between different departments in the news media group, I also paid close attention 
to the internal competition between different departments over financial income. This 
competition was observed within departments of online news, blog/microblog and forum. 
These departments operated independently, and produced online content to increase their 
attractiveness and competitiveness to the market, which would eventually result in more 
commercial contracts and income for their webpages. As an example, in celebrating 
Children’s Day on 1st June, the blog/microblog department launched a special event for 
children. Bloggers were encouraged to write about their happy childhood memories using 
the hashtag #ChildrensDay in their posts, and in doing so would stand a chance to win 
prizes. The event attracted sponsorship from Dodola, a local children’s fashion brand 
which eventually turned into profit for the organisation. Such competition, under the 
supervision of the media’s directors and utilised by the participants, influenced the 
protocol of censorship within the newsroom as news workers sought to consider how they 
could produce market orientated content.  
 
6.3.2 Layout of the online newsroom 
Inspired by Harrison’s investigation of Britain’s TV newsrooms (Harrison, 2000), I drew 
a diagram of WN’s online newsroom layout (Figure 10). It shows the geographical setting 
of WN’s 21st-floor office where the main online newsroom is located. Different colours 
represent different professional categories and their working zones. Navy blue represents 
where meetings and newsroom briefings are held; yellow shows where the supplementary 
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equipment is located; and black dots represent the areas of digital devices. The layout of 
this online newsroom displays characteristics of a hierarchical structure: instructive and 
divisional, which coincides with the lack of autonomy in the newsroom. It helps 
determine how the hierarchy of the online news media influences the workflow of news 
production. The approach of sketching the layout of the observation location is also 
referenced by Harrison (2006). In her discussion of terrestrial TV news in Britain she 
illustrates the layout of ITN channel’s newsrooms to demonstrate the workflow of news 
production (Harrison, 2006: pp.93-98). 
 
 
WN’s online newsroom had adopted a traditional layout in which different activities were 
divided and isolated in their own working zones. For lower-level online news workers, 
their supervisors’ work space was close to them. This setting allowed supervisors to 
Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 10 Layout of WN's online newsroom i  10 Layout of WN's online newsroom 
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monitor and assess the work rate of online journalists and editors at close range, whilst 
these lower-level employees could also gave immediate reports to their supervisors during 
the process of news production.  
 
Directors, on the other hand, had their own individual offices. A distinct line was drawn 
between these administrative workers and other news workers. They could not have clear 
sight of what was happening in the hall because their view was blocked by the solid walls 
of their offices and a large billboard. In the hall, online news staff and forum staff were 
separated into two different sections, and TV monitors, printers and scanners formed a 
fence-like barrier between them. To some extent, the setting of the newsroom discouraged 
interactions. Journalists, editors and web administrators were identified by their working 
zones: their journalistic practice was limited to their own working zones, and 
communication with other activities was impractical because of the walls and the barriers. 
Some editors and journalists suggested that they were not convinced by this style of 
setting because the visible barriers created inconvenience, but most of them appeared 
adaptable as the setting had been established when WN was founded in “ancient times” 
(P01). Zhao (2000) and Pan and Chan (2003) have argued that the transformation of the 
media organisation is incomplete in newspapers and TV. The barriers between higher and 
lower hierarchies suggest that this incompletion also applies to online news media. In a 
conventional newsroom, demonstrating and distinguishing the hierarchical differences 
between the common online news workers and website decision makers through work 
zone positions, barriers and walls seemed to be a more important factor than newsroom 
dynamics. Moreover, interactions were not absolutely necessary in all stages of the news 
production process because supervisors and other web administrators often instructed 
journalists and editors, rather than interacting with them. By far, the setting of this layout 
only suggests a necessary classification of hierarchical differences. 
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6.4. Operationalisation of censorship in the online 
newsroom 
6.4.1 News briefing 
News briefing is a crucial routine that had been found in the process of online news 
production. It is considered as unique in the context of Chinese news media not because 
it is a required and mandatory step for journalistic normativity, but because it is 
constructed for the purpose of ensuring consistent pressure of censorship from the 
authorities. The routine is institutionally set up within the news production team, however 
the content in many briefings was found to be ideological rather than journalistic. This 
phenomenon reflects what Zhao (1998 & 2000) calls paradoxical in China’s media; while 
the development of the Internet accelerates marketisation in the online news industry the 
authorities also intend to maintain control over it. By outlining notes from the fieldwork, 
this section explains the procedures behind news briefings in the online newsroom and 
how different procedures represent factors of operationalisation of censorship.  
 
The length of the formal observation was set at four weeks. An important factor in 
determining the length was the discovery by the pilot study that WN’s production cycle 
was roughly four weeks. It is worth noting that the production cycle here does not 
exclusively refer to a comprehensive period of being productive for certain news stories. 
The cycle was understood as a period of administrative choice, as the four-week period 
was scheduled by the WN as a comprehensive cycle for its news production. Certain tasks 
that online news workers worked on in this production cycle might be continued to the 
next; and a news worker was likely to work on multiple tasks in any production cycle. 
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For instance, some junior editors of the WN had responsibilities for news editing and 
being pseudo users (Chapter 6: 4.2) who pretend to be ordinary users, make comments 
on news stories and attempt to swing public opinion.  
 
The WN was divided into a number of divisions. These were online news, forum, and 
blog/microblog. All held individual briefings at the beginning of every week, and at the 
beginning of every month an internal briefing, comprised of all divisions, was held. Staff 
from every division were required to attend this internal briefing. This monthly internal 
briefing provided guidelines for the divisional briefings in the following weeks, and 
distributed tasks for news workers. One monthly internal briefing was recorded during 
the observation; the details and agendas of this briefing were as follows: 
 
[…] 
[9:35 a.m.] The briefing is called.  
[9:35 a.m.] Journalists and editors pack up their notes and pens, head to 
the main meeting room. 
[9:40 a.m.] Deputy Director enters, and starts his speech. 
[9:40 a.m.] Deputy Director highlighted three news workers, 3 journalists 
and 1 editor, for their contribution during last month. Together they 
produced 16 news stories and 2 news features. A story about civil 
plant engineering was highlighted as last month’s the most popular 
story.  
[9:52 a.m.] Deputy Director described a meeting with the publicity 
department that he attended last weekend, delivered what he called 
‘the spirit of the meeting’, and emphasised the importance of 
‘grasping the orientation of harmony’.  
[9:52 a.m.] Some attendees seem bored. A few start chatting in whispered 
voices. 
[10:05 a.m.] Deputy director summarised two deficiencies from the last 
month: a commercial on the main page of the website was 
misplaced, and the microblog platform was dysfunctional for 10 
hours or so. 
[10:09 a.m.] More attendees show their tiredness.  
[10:09 a.m.] Deputy Director stops his speech and asks whisperers to be 
quiet. 
[10:11 a.m.] Deputy Director resumes. 
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[10:14 a.m.] Deputy Director finishes his speech. 
[10:14 a.m.] Chief editor of online news gives briefing about forthcoming 
events of his section. 
[10:27 a.m.] On behalf of the chief editor of forum, an editor from the 
forum gives briefing about forthcoming events of his section. 
[10:40 a.m.] Chief editor of blog and microblog gives briefing about 
forthcoming events of his section. 
[10:58 a.m.] Briefing over. 
[10:58 a.m.] Attendees leave the main meeting room one after another. 
[…] 
 
As the record above shows, in the monthly internal briefing, communication between the 
presenter and audience was unidirectional: the presenter delivered the messages whilst 
the audience received them. The audience was not required to give feedback, nor did they 
become involved in any discussions. Although all the briefings in the newsroom were 
strictly and regularly scheduled, the duration of the divisional briefings seemed 
spontaneous. For instance, the longest divisional briefing lasted an hour and three quarters. 
Compared with other divisional briefings in the following weeks, the monthly internal 
briefing lasted a shorter time, and was more compact and less communicative, whereas 
the briefings that were held by separate divisions were more relaxed and interactive. For 
instance, one of the division briefings of the online news was recorded as follows: 
 
[…] 
[9:10 a.m.] The briefing is called.  
[9:10 a.m.] Journalists and editors head to the main meeting room. 
[9:10 a.m.] Chief editor (of online news) heads to the main meeting room. 
[9:10 a.m.] Audience chit-chat casually.  
[9:14 a.m.] Chief editor starts his introduction.  
[9:14 a.m.] Chief editor summarises the work and achievements from last 
week. 
[9:17 a.m.] Other journalists and editors are involved, through discussion 
of their achievements. 
[9:20 a.m.] Audience makes jokes, and they laugh. The atmosphere is 
relaxed. 
[9:23 a.m.] Chief editor asks for focus. 
[9:23 a.m.] No attendees show obvious tiredness.  
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[9:23 a.m.] Chief editor starts distributing tasks for this week: 1) 
Collaborating with the blog/microblog section, feeding the 
microblog with news stories as the Deputy Director requires. 2) A 
reminder to focus on censoring user-generated comments on the 
website. 3) A new rota for night shifts. 4) Appointing journalists for 
attending the provincial sport events in Hangzhou next month.  
[9:35 a.m.] Chief editor finishes his distribution. 
[9:35 a.m.] Journalists and editors start discussions relating to the tasks. 
[9:35 a.m.] A journalist complains about the mandatory collaboration 
with the microblog. 
[9:40 a.m.] An editor gives his suggestion and reminds others to pay close 
attention to those who speak highly of government officials when 
they are censoring the user comments, as some users may be 
sarcastic. 
[9:40 a.m.] Some of the attendees seem to be drifting away from the 
discussion. Some of them show tiredness. 
[9:50 a.m.] Briefing over. 
[9:50 a.m.] Audience leaves the main meeting room one after another. 
[…] 
 
Agendas were delivered in these monthly internal divisional briefings. From these field 
notes, I can therefore generalise that four main agenda items were either delivered or 
discussed in briefings in the WN newsroom, which were: 1) summarising the work and 
achievements from the last period; 2) briefing about forthcoming events and distributing 
tasks to different groups and individuals; 3) calculating and analysing the mistakes and 
errors that occurred in the last period, and 4) delivering instructions from the publicity 
department and the government on issues such as news production and the direction of 
public opinion. 
 
The first two agenda items were considered compulsory. In all four briefings that I 
attended, the meeting chair, either the Deputy Director or chief editor of online news 
sections, presented the summaries and distribution of tasks. However, the third and fourth 
agenda items were only discussed when the Deputy Director was presiding.  
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Therefore, the four-week observation was determined by the length of WN’s production 
cycle. The newsroom’s basic objectives of newsgathering and reporting were not changed 
within this time, so the four-week period can be seen as a self-contained and complete 
cycle for its news production. It was estimated that the content within this period – such 
as the different roles in the newsroom, general workflow, protocols of news reporting and 
the influence of Party intervention – could be observed, recorded and explored thoroughly 
from beginning to end. The results of the observation confirm that this estimate was 
accurate.  
 
There are at least two factors that need to be flagged in news briefings. Firstly, there is a 
significant legacy evident in the news hierarchy that can be considered a left-over from 
the pre-transformation era. The leadership of the authorities and the political demand to 
support the ideology is ensured by the hierarchy within the news organisation (Zhao, 1998; 
McNair, 2009; Lee, 2005). To serve this purpose, Chinese journalists are instructed on 
the inclusion and exclusion of their news stories. This leads to the second factor; this 
hierarchy and news briefing system impact the process of judging newsworthiness and 
can therefore influence the output of news content. In this sense, the news values are 
influenced by what Gans (1980) calls ‘organisational requirements’ and ‘external 
determinism’, where the hierarchy of the organisation and ideology affect story choices. 
In this stage, news briefing is considered institutional as few signs of marketisation and 
resistance to political interference were witnessed.  
 
6.4.1.1 Manifest pressure of censorship 
The process of revealing and observing online news production and relationship between 
online news and the authorities was a developing one. As the observation progressed, I 
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established and expanded a number of models regarding this relationship and the 
mechanism of online censorship. For instance, the observation on single briefing recorded 
how the instruction was given and received within the newsroom, but the records of 
monthly internal briefings and divisional briefings transmitting the demands of the 
Chinese authorities indicated where the censorship pressure came from. The pressure of 
censorship, which mainly focuses on synchronising the tone of news media (Hong, 2006), 
serves the purpose of maintaining the stability of Chinese society (Hu, 2007, Zhang, 
2011). Thus the briefing is key to passing the political demands of Chinese authorities 
down the chain of the organisational structure, in which Chinese online news workers 
have to “deliberately” (Horton, 2011: p.93) avoid discussing contentious topics because 
they are likely to cause offence to the authorities. In this sense, these particular sensitive 
topics, which are understood as ‘minefield’ areas, or a ‘propaganda minefield’ in general 
(Tong, 2009: p.595), can also be witnessed in online news production. 
 
The pilot study (Chapter 3: 4.5) delivered two preliminary findings. First, it established 
a rough model that demonstrates the unidirectional relationship between the authorities 
and the online news workers (figure 11). Web administrators are the only group of people 
in the online newsroom who regularly communicate and exchange information with the 
authorities. On the other hand, the authorities give instructions relating to news reporting, 
public opinion orientation and taboo subjects in online news via the web administrators. 
It is worth noting that in this model, the hierarchy in the online newsroom is yet to be 
precisely distinguished, and the rank difference between editors and journalists is not 
realised. However, the reasons for keeping and analysing this model are: Firstly, the 
original first model that was generated in the observation presents an initial relationship 
between the authorities and online news media, which was unidirectional and dictatorial. 
Secondly, through the process of data analysis, this model is developed and expanded on 
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to become interactive and multidirectional (Chapter 7: 4) and demonstrates the power 
flow between the online news media, cyber police and the publicity departments. Figure 
11 presents how the protocol of Internet censorship appears to those who are outside the 
Chinese online news industry, whereas the later triangular models (Chapter 7:4) present 
the power flow and network within the online newsroom in China. A demonstration of 
how these models are developed and expanded can provide a thorough landscape of the 
matrix in online news censorship.  
 
 
Figure 11 shows the links between the authorities and the different types of roles in the 
online news media, as well as the indirect connections between the authorities and lower-
level news workers. It was found that neither the cyber police officers nor publicity 
officials had frequent direct interactions with editors and journalists. Instead, the web 
administrators acted as intermediaries. However, as mentioned above, the hierarchical 
difference between editors and journalists is not demonstrated in this model; nor does it 
indicate significant interaction between these two areas of work. The representativeness 
of this relative lack of interaction will be discussed in the next chapter. Journalists and 
editors from other online newsrooms also admitted that they did not know many publicity 
officials or cyber police were charged with online censorship, due to the lack of 
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communication between them and members of the authorities. The censorship pressures, 
however, were strongly felt, as they were frequently reminded and briefed to self-censor 
the news content that they produced and self-estimate if this content might cause 
intervention from the authorities. Censorship therefore becomes internalised. This reflects 
one of the tactics that Petley (2009: pp.3-4) outlines: the authority using this mechanism 
to prevent contentious material from being produced in the process of news production. 
It is worth noting that Petley’s argument is not only limited to newspapers and TVs, but 
is also evident in cyberspace, in authoritarian and democratic countries. From here, the 
argument formulated in this model can be legitimately extended to the process of online 
news production. 
 
One of the main differences between editors and web administrators is that web 
administrators are heavily engaged in corresponding with the publicity department of the 
government on a daily basis, while the focus of editors is on content monitoring. Web 
administrators often gave top-down instructions, whereas editors censor what online 
journalists produce, and sometimes play a crucial role in lubricating the relationship 
between online journalists and the web administrators.  
 
Besides their responsibilities in censoring the news content that they produce, online 
journalists and editors are also obligated to monitor the online content that users produce 
on their webpages. The divisional briefings were also recorded to warn and remind the 
news workers to censor this user-generated content, for instance: 
 
[…] 
[9:35 a.m.] A journalist complains about the mandatory collaboration with 
the microblog. 
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[9:40 a.m.] An editor gives his suggestion and reminds others to pay close 
attention to those who speak highly of government officials when they are 
censoring the user comments, as some users may be sarcastic. 
[…] 
 
This example reflects a typical protocol of news control on the Internet. Petley (2009) has 
argued that preventing contentious material from being produced is one of the tactics that 
the authorities use to maintain its control over news content. Here, in practice, this form 
of news-briefing is a less drastic approach to controlling compared to the sanctions and 
fines which come directly from the authorities. I had earlier established that the shared 
professional normative amongst journalists do not guarantee a trouble-free situation for 
news organisations (Soloski, 1998: p.213). Thus, the news organisation has to adopt this 
briefing procedure into its day-to-day journalism routine, in order to restrict online news 
workers from producing contentious material. 
 
The local publicity department was perceived as having a huge influence over the online 
news. In the monthly internal meeting, the Deputy Director gave briefings about 
instructions from the Wenzhou publicity department. The theme of these instructions was 
interpreted as public opinion orientation (Chapter 1: 5.3). The chief editor delivered, as 
he phrased it, ‘the spirit of an important meeting’ that he had attended the previous 
weekend at the Wenzhou publicity department. The conversations and discussions that 
followed were focused on the topic of this ‘spirit of an important meeting’: the publicity 
department briefed the major news websites in Wenzhou about ‘further standardisation 
and orientation of Internet news media’. This standardisation was translated as ‘enhancing 
the roles of the commentary team in orientating and monitoring online user-generated 
content’. The censorship pressure from the local publicity departments was enormously 
influential, so much so that one of the purposes of the briefing in WN was to orientate 
journalists and editors to the role of pseudo commentators. 
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In summary, there are a number of discussions on how Chinese authorities have managed 
to maintain control over news media (Chen & Lee, 1998; Zhao, 1998; de Burgh, 2003; 
and Petley, 2009). It is evident that this mechanism is also applicable in online news. By 
analysing the  field notes and interpreting key factors, it is legitimate to conclude that the 
hierarchy and the embedded party organisation within online news media allow the 
authorities to prevent or ban the production of contentious content that is contrary to their 
interests (Petley, 2009: p.101). Furthermore, the mechanism of news briefing allows 
authorities to give instruction to higher levels of hierarchy in the online newsroom, which 
ensures that political demands can be effectively passed down to lower levels of hierarchy, 
that is, the individual online news workers. 
 
6.4.2 User-generated content monitors and pseudo commentators 
Along with their responsibilities in the process of news production, it was observed that 
both editors and journalists had roles as pseudo commentators and user-generated content 
monitors. The responsibility of being user-generated content monitors, as the name 
indicates, is to monitor the user-generated comments on the website’s news pages. As 
part of their daily routine, online news workers in the WN were required to both scan and 
filter user-generated content and delete those items which were alleged to have ‘crossed 
the line’ (P00 & P06). It is seen as an authoritarian tactic of “preventing contentious 
material” (Petley, 2009: pp.3-4), or the synchronisation of tone in news media (Hu, 2007) 
in order to maintain an image of a harmonious society. Prohibited speech which criticised 
particular officials, personal attacks, speculation and rumours, and advertising links could 
all be considered as contentious or unfavourable. Some parts of the field notes recorded 
the process of scanning and filtering as follows: 
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[…] 
[12:14 p.m.] Editor A starts to scan the user comments. 
[12:14 p.m.] Editor A logs into the backstage platform, types key word 
‘discount’ in search, and quickly browses the search results. 
[12:18 p.m.] Editor A clicks some results that match the key word ‘discount’, 
deletes those he finds to be advertising links posted by users. 
[12: 20 p.m.] Editor A searches key word ‘government’, and quickly browses 
the search results. 
[12:25 p.m.] Editor A clicks on some results that match the key word 
‘government’, deletes those he finds to be spreading rumours about the 
government or personal attacks on officials. 
[…] 
 
[…] 
[03:20 p.m.] Editor B starts to scan the user comments. 
[03:20 p.m.] Editor B logs in to the backstage platform, types key word 
‘corrupt’ in search, and quickly browses the search results. 
[03:27 p.m.] Editor B clicks on some results that match the key word 
‘corrupt’, but does not delete any user comments. 
[03:30 p.m.] Editor B searches key word ‘official’, and quickly browses the 
search results. 
[03:40 p.m.] Editor B clicks on some results that match the key word 
‘official’, deletes those comments related to personal attacks on officials. 
[03:40 p.m.] Editor B revisits the searched page of ‘corrupt’, and quickly 
browses a number of comments. But he does not delete any of them. 
[03:50 p.m.] Editor B searches key word ‘mistresses’, and browses the search 
results. 
[04:00 p.m.] Editor B clicks on some results that match the key word 
‘mistresses’, deletes one comment he finds likely to be a personal attack on 
officials. 
[…] 
 
The notes present a standard procedure of how the user-generated content was filtered 
and censored in the WN. Journalists and editors used keyword searching to scan and filter 
user-generated content on the webpages, in order to pick up and delete content that was 
prohibited. Editor A’s filtering on the keyword “discount”, as he explained, was for 
commercial reasons, because users were not allowed to post free advertisements on the 
website. Apart from this financial consideration, other keywords that editors focused on, 
such as “government”, “corrupt”, and “official”, were all political. These words could 
often appear in the text which users commented on, and relate to prohibited speech which 
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criticised particular officials, personal attacks, speculation and rumours. This content was 
considered to have crossed the line and therefore had to be deleted by user-generated 
content monitors.  
 
However, the process of this keyword scanning and filtering was highly unsystematic and 
heavily relied on the personal judgment of user-generated content monitors. Although 
both journalists and editors were required to monitor as part of their daily work, the 
frequency and time length of scanning were not fixed, nor was the amount of content 
specified. This means journalists and editors had autonomy in choosing how often to 
monitor the user-generated content, how long the process lasted and how much content 
to go through. Moreover, journalists and editors decided whether to delete certain user-
generated content merely on their personal judgment, because they admitted the content 
that needed to be scanned was “too much and impossible to go through thoroughly”. The 
scanning and deleting was therefore a random and flexible process that was based on the 
first instinct of these user-generated content monitors. The range of key words covers a 
broad scope of politically sensitive topics. It indicates that one of the significant purposes 
of conducting this filtering is to maintaining a harmonious image on the Internet. Online 
news workers did not voluntarily filter and delete user-generated content, but as an 
important phase of censorship of online content these acts can be considered as an 
application of the political demands of authorities. The requirements or instructions from 
news briefing are applied as the online news media needs to maintain a hassle-free and 
trouble-free environment on its webpages. In this sense, these acts are not considered to 
be gatekeeping because their purpose if not to promote “storytelling” (Singer, 1997:p.97) 
or “quality controlling” (Canter, 2014:p.112) of news content. 
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Unlike the responsibility of user-generated content monitors, which was foreseen before 
the observation, the existence of pseudo commentators was rather unexpected. The work 
of being a pseudo commentator involved editors and journalists pretending to be normal 
users, and generating content on the news pages, online journalists and editors were 
required to register and log into their multiple user accounts from their own websites, 
pretending to be normal users and post comments. Having pseudo commentators allowed 
the online news to have control of creating the harmonious atmosphere on the website, 
and orientate other users’ perspectives by filling the user comment pages with massive 
synchronous content. In the field diary, I recorded a story of a robbery that broke out in a 
local market: 
 
“This breaking news enabled me to witness another function of the online news team, 
which I named, ‘pseudo commentators’. Editors switched between lots of different user 
accounts that they owned to create different comments for a news story. The hits on the 
robbery story suddenly boosted up and it became the most popular news. Soon it was 
headlined on the homepage” (Diary of ‘13 May 2011, Friday’). 
 
Due to the contribution of these pseudo comments, the robbery story became popular on 
the website, and a significant influence was witnessed, as other users’ comments were 
heavily guided: 
 
“The comments on the news of the robbery and arrest were unexpectedly harmonised. 
Users were orientated to praise the shoppers and securities’ courage (of stopping the 
crime) and condemned the lawlessness of the rogues. Editor C roughly went through the 
comments, but didn’t find any comments he needed to delete” (Diary of ‘13 May 2011, 
Friday’). 
 
The pseudo commentators switched between many different user accounts that they 
owned to post different comments for news stories. By doing this, hits for news stories 
would sharply increase and the stories then became popular. A news story, therefore, may 
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appear to have a higher profile than it actually has. Moreover, the pseudo commentators 
contributed to the news hype and effectively manipulated public attention. In this way the 
online news provider could influence the news hits on the website and choose which news 
stories it wanted to popularise. The pseudo commentators, as their name suggests, 
orientated the overall tone of user-generated comments on the news website, where the 
news pages and user comment pages were filled with massive synchronous content that 
eventually appeared harmonious. 
 
The existence of pseudo commentators in the online newsroom is a peculiar phenomenon 
which triggered my attention during observation. Having a group of pseudo users pretend 
to be someone else and attempt to influence public opinion in the process of censorship 
may seem absurd, but it displays certain rationality. What McNair (2009: p.240) refers to 
as Chinese journalism is part of an institutional ideological apparatus of the authoritarian 
state, and Lee’s (2005) characterisation of Chinese journalists having dual roles and 
having to paradoxically serve the communist authorities, can be found in the Chinese 
online news industry.  
 
Similar to their role as monitors, the role of pseudo commentators is also an application 
of the mechanisms behind news briefing. The hierarchical structure ensures that online 
news workers orbit the central purpose of maintaining stability, and the press itself orbits 
the party state (Zhao, 2000: p.3). To make this mechanism functional there is also a strong 
element of Confucianism at play. Confucianism proclaims morality that undermines 
individual freedom for the benefit of the collective (Gardner, 2003). This notion may have 
been modernised (Passin, 1963) and radically criticised (Schwartz, 1986: Lee, 2005), but 
it remains influential in online news production even today, as this study has found.. The 
content of news briefing, and instructing to monitor, censor and pretend to be pseudo 
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commentators to influence public opinion suggests that Confucianism had not only had a 
huge impact on the press in China before the era of the Internet (Levenson, 1962; Passin, 
1963; Lee, 2005), but also after it.  
 
6.4.3 Supervision and Party infiltration 
Supervisors of the online newsroom repeatedly used the term ‘we journalists’ or ‘us 
journalists’ during the observation period, which implied that they were self-manifesting 
their heavy involvement in the news production process. Evidence also indicated that they 
were convinced that their work was part of the news production, and their role in the 
newsroom was essential. However, newsroom observations indicated that their 
involvement in the processes of news production was not as vital as they self-perceived 
and claimed. There is a distinct difference between what supervisors think they do and 
what they actually achieve in journalistic practice. The field notes recorded as follows: 
 
[…] 
[14:05 p.m.] Supervisor of online news walks into the newsroom, and engages 
in random discussions with other editors. 
[14:07 p.m.] Supervisor of online news discussed with editor D and editor E 
over the subject of ideology control. 
[14:07 p.m.] Supervisor of online news asked “can you imagine what these 
young journalists would write if we didn’t remind and repeat to them ‘do not 
cross the line’? A website without supervision would be a disaster. ” 
[…] 
 
Despite their self-identification as journalists, supervisors were found to have little 
participation in journalistic practices, information gathering, interviewing, and news 
production. These journalistic practices, however, were carried out by journalists and 
editors. A standard protocol of writing-up news stories is the job of online journalists, and 
editors are responsible for censoring the content and discourse. At this stage, editors have 
to take account of both the public readership and the authorities, as they may suggest a 
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re-work if they feel the angle or expression of news stories might be unfavourable to the 
authorities. For example, the observation notes recorded a request by an editor to re-work 
a news story protesting against local government and its policies, because the journalist 
who wrote the story was assessed as biased and showing “too much sympathy” to the 
protesters: 
 
[…] 
[11:18 a.m.] Journalist A finishes an electronic version of a story of a rural 
market fair. 
[11:18 a.m.] He saves the file in the internal storage, and sends message to 
editor F, informs the editor of his submission 
[…] 
 
[…] 
[4:50 p.m.] Editor G accesses the internal storage. He clicks on the most 
recent news draft, and starts editing.  
[4:55 p.m.] Editor G mumbles while he’s reading the news draft on the 
expansion of city green belt.  
[…] 
[5:15 p.m.] Editor G starts editing the next news draft on housing demolition 
conflict, written by journalist B. 
[5:20 p.m.] Editor G sends message to journalist B. 
[5:25 p.m.] Journalist B comes along. 
[5:25 p.m.] Editor G says to journalist B: “This work is no good to me. What 
were you thinking?” 
[5:25 p.m.] Journalist B explains his conception process to Editor G. 
[5:30 p.m.] Editor G says to journalist B: “Your thinking was understandable, 
but you should always spend less words on protesters for news like this. Here 
is what I think…” [The context of protesters and the news unknown] 
[…] 
[5:35 p.m.] Editor G says to journalist B: “Rewrite this story, and delete the 
part about protesters. Try not to be inclined to the protesters.” 
[5:35 p.m.] Journalist walks away. 
[…] 
 
Supervisors were not found to be involved in the process of censorship described above. 
However, this does not mean that supervisors have little influence on the production of 
online news, as the request to re-work the choice of news angle and the unfavourable 
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attitude of sympathy towards the protesters were all considered as consequences of news 
supervision. Supervisors were found to be heavily involved in pre-production, where 
online journalists and editors were briefed by the supervisors to keep news content 
“politically correct”. Thus, the news media supervisors are likely to be ideological guiders 
or political gatekeepers rather than actual online news workers who are doing journalistic 
work in the newsroom.  
 
Here, observation also examined the influence that supervision had on the editors and 
journalists. The information in the news reports is included or excluded throughout the 
process. The inclusion and exclusion of content is heavily influenced by the underlying 
ideology and understanding of the socio-political situation (Tong, 2009: p.594). What 
Tong (2009) categorised as key factors in the practice of self-censorship among 
newspapers in China is also evident in the online news media.  
 
Other web administrators also acted as the messenger for the authorities, as they delivered 
pressure from the authorities to online journalists and editors. For instance, the director 
of the WN constantly emphasised the importance of keeping a ‘harmonious atmosphere’ 
for the website: 
 
[…] 
[9:52 a.m.] Deputy Director described a meeting with publicity department that he 
attended last weekend, and emphasised the importance of ‘grasping the orientation of 
harmony’. 
[…] 
 
Therefore, the reason for having supervision in the process of online news production is 
to have a reminder and ideological guide for the journalists and editors. Throughout the 
process of news production, web administrators do not participate in journalistic work, 
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but their existence constantly reminds journalists and editors to remain politically correct 
in producing online news content. They deliver the censorship pressure from the 
authorities to individual news workers in the online newsroom, and their political tie to 
the Communist Party also indicates which camp they are in and whose interests they 
represent.  
 
This phenomenon reflects what Lee (2005) characterises as the “communist/capitalist 
journalists” in modern China (Lee, 2005: p.117-21). These communist/capitalist 
journalists paradoxically negotiate between the underlying communist ideology and 
capitalist market operation. As is required of their dual roles, they have to sustain political 
sensibility and bypass the minefield of political taboos, while at the same time efficiently 
producing news content of interest to other journalists and the public. Tong (2009) 
referred to this form of censorship in the newspaper as a balance of powers (Tong, 
2009:p.607-8). In this regard, the online news workers are no different from newspaper 
journalists and editors.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter (3.1), most web administrators were found to be 
members of the Communist Party. Senior web administrator posts were mostly occupied 
by Party members, and a high percentage of employees were members of the Party or its 
Youth League (Gong Qing Tuan). The high percentage of Party and Youth League 
members in the hierarchy can be interpreted as infiltration of the online news media by 
organised and functional Party forces. The supervisors sat between the directors of online 
news and the lower-level news workers, and they coordinated and passed on messages 
for the directors. Party branches were established within the online news operation, which 
seemed to have little relevance to the work of the newsroom but were a significant symbol 
of the Party’s control over the website. A Party branch and a Youth League branch were 
225 
 
established’, and supervisors of the online news and blog/microblog sections served as 
the heads of these branches respectively. Its effect on journalistic practice could be to 
make the media consider the Party’s interests as the top priority rather than news values:  
 
[…] 
[10:40 a.m.] Supervisor of online news walks into the newsroom, tells chief forum 
editor and chief news editor to have a look at a number of comments and posts on the 
website. 
[10:40 a.m.] Supervisor of online news said: “Seems there is a leak, I don’t know if it’s 
true. Rumours say the deputy director of Land Management has a mistress. She 
exposed the scandal to some local bloggers, and users are now all talking about it.” 
[10:40 a.m.] Editors search the comments and blogs. 
[10:45 a.m.] Chief forum editors said: “No matter if it’s true, we have to delete them 
(comments).” 
[10:45 a.m.] Some editors agree. Other silent ones do not object. 
[10:45 a.m.] Supervisor of online news stresses: “Get everyone to work, delete 
anything you found suspicious. Delete things you found may be suspicious. And shut 
down the search engine for key words ‘land management’ and ‘mistresses’, and any 
other words that you think can be related to this. I forbid you to report it until we get 
firm feedback from the publicity department.” 
[10:45 a.m.] Supervisor of online news adds: “I’d erase 100 true feeds, rather than 
letting a single rumour leak, at least not from our website.” 
[10:50 a.m.] Chief news editor distributes the task of comments-deleting to his editors 
and journalists. 
[10:50 a.m.] Some news workers complain. 
[10:55 a.m.] Chief news editor said to his editors and journalists: “I’m sorry, but it’s 
your time to show some political consciousness.” 
[…] 
 
These phenomena indicate that the Party is solidly in control of online news, as an editor 
reluctantly admitted that “we know who the real boss is”. The reason for stressing the role 
of Party infiltration is that the later stages of this analysis explain certain principles of the 
coordination and restriction triangular models. In the triangular models, which will be 
elaborated in the next chapter, Party influence goes beyond one governmental 
organisation controlling another news organisation. Rather, the infiltration is believed to 
make the news organisation partially a governmental one. That is the reason I prefer to 
use the word ‘infiltration’ rather than ‘influence’ here to describe Party control and power. 
The nuance is that ‘infiltration’ had made the online news process into a coordinator or 
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facilitator of online media censorship, whereas the term ‘influence’ suggests the news 
was forced to conduct self-censorship in a totally unwilling way. For other non-Party 
news workers, the identities and roles of these Party workers were transparent. The 
existence of the Party branch and youth league branch was embedded in the structure of 
media organisation since the day of its establishment. Thus, none of the non-Party news 
workers found it was unacceptable or inconvenient in the process of news production. 
 
The reason that the Party’s interests of maintaining stability and harmony in the economic 
and social environment overrule other aspects of news value, can be explained by what 
Zhao (1998) calls ‘the party principle’. He argued that “the news media must accept the 
Party’s guiding ideology as its own […] and they must accept the Party’s leadership and 
stick to the Party’s organizational principle and press policies” (Zhao, 1998, p. 19). 
Newsroom observation reveals that this requirement for obedience and adherence to the 
Party’s interests is present. It indicates that other universal news values, such as 
truthfulness, entertainment, and sense of humanity (Steel, 2009: pp.584-5) can be 
undermined or compromised in the production of online news for purposes of sustaining 
the Party’s interests. This includes that online news are sometimes instructed to deliver 
an image of a harmonious society by concealing social conflict (Tong, 2009: p.607). From 
the perspective of supervisors, the existence of supervision is considered as an 
irreplaceable organ of the hierarchical construction, without which the mechanism of 
censorship in online news media may collapse. However, some crucial factors such as 
journalistic professionalism and normativity were found absent within the profession. 
Objectivity, which many have argued is an important professional norm (Soloski, 1989; 
Schudson & Anderson, 2009, Kalathil & Boas, 2010), is obviously overlooked by 
supervisors in online news media when it contradicts the interests of the Party. Quality 
controlling (Canter, 2014: p.12), commitment to truth, and a sense of humanity (Steel, 
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2009: pp.584-5) can also be compromised for the purpose of maintaining a harmonious 
image on the Internet. 
 
6.4.4 Journalistic tactics 
Although the hierarchy is well established within the online news media and supervision 
is considered as suppressing press freedom, it does not mean that online news workers 
have to compromise completely. It has been argued that the development of the Internet 
has shaped the way Chinese journalists judge what is newsworthy (Zhao, 2000; Winfield 
& Peng, 2005), and has enhanced their awareness of professionalism (Pan & Chan, 2003: 
p.653). The media transformation has contributed in such a way that Chinese news 
workers have a normative commitment to public service. It was shown that there were 
some online news workers who were resistant to the pressure of censorship, and during 
the process of news production, resistant online news workers had developed tactics to 
respond to censorship. They used what I call “journalistic tactics” or “journalistic tricks” 
to ensure the integrity of the news content that they produced. “Journalistic tactics” was 
a term that developed from Tong’s guerrilla tactics (2009). Both terms refer to a number 
of tactics that online news workers in China used to ensure the safe mediation of 
information in the context of censorship. Tong (2007) explains that the use of these tactics 
can “avoid the political mine fields and yet meet their professional calling” in reporting 
investigative journalism. It was found that online news workers use similar tactics to meet 
their professional obligations. A significant example would be the “illegal strip club” 
story mentioned in the observation notes as follows: 
 
[Double teams on illegal strip club story] 
>An editor received an anonymous call, saying that there was an underground strip 
club in their town of Wenchen (a county of Wenzhou), next to a police station. The 
strip club seemed illegal. The source further said that the police had received many 
reports from the neighbourhood but the club owner was never caught red-handed.  
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>The source claimed it was suspected that at least one of the officers from the police 
station was corrupt; the police took dirty money and protected the club owner.  
 
>Given the circumstances of a possible corrupt police station, the editor promptly 
proposed a tactic for reporting and precaution. Four journalists were sent to the scene 
for the story. They were separated into two teams. Team A went to the police station 
and reported for the illegal strip club, while team B took a hidden camera and went 
into the club.  
 
>Team B aimed to capture a retreat scene in the club if the owner was informed by 
his ‘mole-friend’ in the police station - if there was any.   
 
>The editor briefed the whole plan for both teams, and said he was looking forward 
to this big story. He asked the journalists to go for the story, and let him take care of 
the administrative work. 
 
>The plan did not work. When team A, disguised as civilians, reported to the police 
station, two officers in the station refused to take any action. One of the officers said 
“there is no such thing (as an illegal strip club nearby).” 
 
>Team A pushed again. They showed the officers their journalist IDs, and claimed 
they were led by a source. Again, the officer took no action. 
 
>Team A recorded the whole incident with a hidden camera and edited the story. 
Although Team B did not capture the retreat from the club, the story was ready to go. 
 
>The editor held the story until 6:00 p.m., 30 minutes before the online broadcast. He 
went into the online news supervisor’s office and briefed the supervisor on the whole 
story. 
 
>The supervisor made a call to inform the director of Public Security bureau of 
Wenchen, including the broadcasting time and theme, and further informed the 
director to ‘take a look’. The director, showing a little sign of panic on the phone, 
asked: “which boss of yours should I speak to, if you could remove this news?” The 
supervisor replied reluctantly: ‘my bosses are all off work now, the news is 
broadcasting any minute; there is no time (to remove it).” 
 
Journalists and editors involved in reporting this story considered themselves to be 
‘winning a battle’ with ‘wisdom’. In the observation, news workers saw this kind of 
wisdom as their necessary asset. As one of the editors from the Wenzhou News admitted, 
some “journalistic tricks had to be played in order to report stories like this”, otherwise 
the public would have little chance to learn the real news. To avoid an intense 
confrontation with the mechanism of censorship and the authorities, many online news 
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workers were encouraged to negotiate with the pressure of censorship in order to ensure 
the safety of online news content. As Tong (2007: p.534) argues, media control in China 
makes it more difficult for journalists to fulfil their journalistic ideals when they battle 
censorship. Thus, investigative journalists must “constantly search for the location of the 
ideological mine fields and consider the most effective reporting and writing tactics for 
going around them” (Tong, 2007: p.534). The example of the illegal strip club report 
demonstrates that this journalistic tactic can also be applied in online news media. It 
ensures the successful publication of the news content whilst bypassing the censorship of 
the authorities.  
 
Thse journalistic tactics, however, are considered as the product of a combination of 
journalism training and journalistic practice (Soloski, 1998: pp.212-3). Arguably, 
Chinese online news workers may operate within a freer working environment than 
Chinese journalists who work in print and TV, but they still have to struggle with various 
forms of censorship: administrative interference, regulations and instructions from 
supervisors, surveillance by the publicity departments, and in the case of the ‘illegal strip 
club’ story, potential interference from other governmental officials who are irrelevant to 
news media. In the context of Singer’s (2003: pp.156-7) argument that “a commitment to 
truth over novelty or expediency is a core professional normative”, many Chinese online 
news workers would qualify as “professionals”, as they attempted and sometimes 
succeeded in serving the public with the truth.  
 
It is worth noting that the use of journalistic tactics is considered as a temporary counter 
strike to administrative interference. Chinese online news workers may have improvised 
ways of practising journalism to balance commercialisation and political control (Lo, 
Chan & Pan, 2005: p.156), and use these tactics to ensure the safety of news content 
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(Tong, 2007). However, these phenomena are significantly characteristic of the current 
media transformation (Zhao, 2000; Huters, 2003). What affect future developments of 
this transformation will have on journalistic practise in China remains uncertain.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
By observing and identifying the responsibilities of online news workers in the WN, 
particularly how they responded to censorship and what roles they played in censoring 
online news content, and revealing the operational process of online content censorship 
on its webpages, this chapter has highlighted one of the mechanisms of censorship within 
the online news media in China. Obtaining a description of actions, reactions and 
interactions between online journalists, editors and web administrators in the newsroom, 
it provides an account of how censorship becomes operational and influences the process 
of online news production, in which eventually the outcome of online news content was 
reflected. 
 
The next chapter will focus on the analysis of interviews with online news workers. 
Attention will be paid to the protocol of reporting critical news, and how online news 
workers perceive their autonomy within the newsroom. Triangular models will be 
detailed which involve the cyber police, online news media and the publicity departments. 
This will interpret the power flow within the matrix of these three parties in Internet 
censorship, as they restrain but coordinate with each other to interfere or influence the 
processes of online news production. 
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Chapter 7 Data & analysis III: Online news 
censorship and the perspectives of news 
workers 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Following the observation in the WN online newsroom described in chapter 6, this 
chapter addresses the issues of censorship of online news media from the perspectives of 
online journalists, editors and web administrators in China. Firstly, it looks at the 
censorship protocols by discussing self-censorship and editorial control in the newsroom. 
It aims to define the different levels of autonomy of online journalists and editors in the 
process of online news production, and their influence on the online news product. From 
there, the triangular models of online news censorship are analysed and detailed. The 
models consist of the online news media, the cyber police and the publicity department, 
which coordinate and restrain each other in influencing the output of online news content. 
The influence of online news on public opinion is addressed, and defined as providing 
leverage for online news workers to gain autonomy in the newsroom. Lastly, the chapter 
discusses the issues of what considerations the Chinese authorities make when deciding 
to interfere in the online news production, and what the perspectives of online news 
workers are in terms of their roles in assisting the building of ‘harmony of the Internet’ 
for the authorities. By addressing the liberalising effect that marketisation has had on 
Chinese online news media, this chapter also demonstrates how online news shift loyalty 
from the authoritarian state to financial advisor, and gain autonomy in reporting news 
against the pressure of censorship. 
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Therefore, this chapter aims to answer key questions as follows: 
1) How do the Chinese online news workers respond to government censorship? 
2) How can the existence of online censorship and propaganda in the processes of online 
news production be evidenced? 
3) How do online news media gain leverage over the Chinese authorities by using their 
influence over public opinion? 
 
7.2. Framework 
7.2.1 Interview setting and interviewees 
This chapter contains analysis of interview material based upon 6 interviews. The 
interviews were conducted from January 2012 to March 2013. An outline of the interview 
transcripts can be found in Appendix E. Again, like the cyber police interviews, the online 
news workers were labelled by numbers and remained anonymous as mutually agreed 
before the interviews. These six participants are labelled from P00 to P04, and P06, 
according to the sequential time when the interviews were conducted. In the text, they are 
also distinguished by their roles in the online newsroom. As explained in Chapter 3: 5.3, 
these online news workers are divided into three categories as follows: 
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Table 3 List of online news worker participants 
 
Code Gender Age Education background Administrative status Unit 
P00 F 24 Bachelor of Media 
Studies 
Journalist Wenzhou 
Evening Paper 
P01 M 33 Bachelor of Publishing 
and Editing 
Journalist Wenzhou News 
P02 F 30 Bachelor of Economics 
and Finance 
Editor Wenzhou News 
P03 M 54 Diploma of Chinese 
Literature 
Web administrator, editor Qianjiang 
Evening Paper 
P04 M 33 Diploma of Publishing 
and Editing 
Editor Wuhai Online 
P06 M 39 Bachelor of Politics Web administrator,  Qianjiang 
Evening Paper 
 
All online news worker participants gave their full consent to the disclosure of 
information in this chapter. The coded names and their positions are used in the text to 
protect the identities of interviewees (Chapter 3: 5.5.3 Ethics). However in the process 
of analysis some descriptions of interviewees such as their relevant work units, 
educational status and administrative status, are necessary as these descriptions contribute 
to the credibility and reliability of the data.  
 
7.2.2 Thematic outline 
This chapter opens with a discussion on what protocols are used by online news workers 
to censor online news content in China, and how these online journalists and editors self-
censor through the different stages of the processes of online news production. It 
articulates how these online news workers respond to the pressure of censorship that 
comes from their superiors, and how they think their journalistic work is being influenced. 
Having different levels of autonomy within the online newsroom, online journalists and 
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editors are adapted to the culture of ‘to think before you write’ in the processes of 
individual conception and editorial control. This ‘to think before you write’ culture, is 
further defined as a political and journalistic term. This means that conceiving a news 
story for these online news workers requires not only careful consideration of journalistic 
values but also political sensibilities, like what potential minefield they may need to avoid 
while reporting a news story and to what extent the news story can criticise the 
government and its policies (Reese & Dai, 2009). It argues that during this process, news 
values can be downplayed in online news whereas the political concerns of avoiding a 
minefield and serving the propaganda purpose of the Chinese authorities are enhanced. 
 
The second theme of this chapter is a detailed interpretation of the triangular models of 
coordination and restriction, the matrix which I argue presents the power flow between 
the online news media, the cyber police and the publicity department when they are 
involved in determining and influencing the output of online news content. Based on 
interviews, it focuses on discussion of how the authorities coordinate the online news as 
the influence over the public opinion of the latter appeared to be a leverage in the matrix. 
 
The last theme identifies a number of issues that need to be highlighted in the process of 
analysis. The first sub-theme is identifying what considerations cause the Chinese 
authorities to interfere in the process of online news production and put pressure on the 
online news workers. Summarising from the perspectives of interviewees, four 
considerations are flagged up. They are 1) involvement at the scale of the public sectors, 
2) practicality of converting critical news into public relations for the authorities, 3) 
degree of public attention, and 4) whether the Party’s interests are infringed upon by the 
online news content. The second theme discusses the issue of what online news workers 
think and how they respond when their professionalism is undermined, but their roles in 
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assisting the building of ‘harmony of the Internet’ for the authorities are required within 
the hierarchy of online news organisation. The last sub-theme focuses on identifying the 
influence of internal competition on the process of online news production and online 
news content, and thus completes this chapter.  
 
7.3. Censorship protocol of critical news 
7.3.1 Self-censorship, editorial control and autonomy in the 
newsroom 
This section looks at the operationalisation of censorship within the online newsroom, 
and specifically examines how the different professional roles of Chinese online news 
workers deal with inclusion and exclusion of news materials. This process of decision-
making throughout the production of online news relies on what Palmer (2000: p.45) calls 
“a system of criteria”.  
 
What can be considered self-censorship in this research? Defining the scope of the ‘self’ 
here is important because it was noted during observation and interviews in which 
journalists and editors kept talking about self-censorship but often referred to different 
notions and definitions of self-censoring. Horton (2011: pp.93-4) describes self-
censorship as a restriction where people “deliberately” prevent themselves from 
expressing particular ideas and perspectives because it is likely to cause offence. But he 
also admits that this notion is not equally valued across all cultures. Petley (2009: pp.1-2) 
argues that freedom of expression is not absolute in China or in other democratic societies. 
Particularly in the context of Chinese news media, there are certain perspectives or 
information understood by Chinese news workers as not suitable for transmission into 
news content. Despite the news value of these perspectives or information, they are 
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considered politically sensitive and must be approached carefully in news production. 
These are what Tong (2009: p.595) called ‘minefield’ areas, or ‘propaganda minefields’. 
What caught my attention during observation and interviews on the notion of self-
censorship or the process of self-censorship is that different participants have a different 
understanding of it. Considering the nuance in the scope of what is ‘self’, some news 
workers considered self-censorship to be evident in the final outcome of the news content, 
whereas others viewed it as a dynamic process of individual response to the pressure of 
censorship. The focus of the former is on the news product that is already done and 
presented to the public audience, and accessible through the online news outlet. It can be 
seen as an end product which has gone through the process of news production and has 
been complied amidst pressure of censorship from the authorities, such as what Petley 
(2009:p.3-4) exemplifies as: preventing contentious material from being produced, 
licensing of the press to enable control, listing banned work and forbidding people from 
both publishing or accessing it. The latter focuses on the dynamic process of individual 
journalistic practice , which involves judgment of newsworthiness, political sensibilities, 
and conception and composition of news material, along with briefing, discussing and 
compromising on the inclusion and exclusion of news content. It specifically pays 
attention to autonomy within the newsroom, where news workers have to judge to what 
extent they can produce news based on the sensitive material in their hands (Tong, 2007 
& 2009). 
 
At an early stage of the study, the notion of ‘self-censorship’ was considered as the online 
news media’s response to the government’s censorship policies. The word ‘censorship’ 
was used consistently in the observation notes and early interview transcripts to describe 
the Chinese government’s censoring actions and activities to control or manage the online 
news media. The online news media was seen as an undividable entity that came under 
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the pressure of censorship from the authorities and which responded to it. At this stage, 
‘self-censorship’ was understood as the way in which online news media self-adjusted its 
angle of reporting (Figure 12), which was either produced by its journalists or generated 
by users. In Figure 12, the first model of self-censorship, the government and the online 
media group are seen as two opposite entities; the interaction between them is 
unidirectional. Moreover, it simplifies the notion of self-censoring by only looking at its 
external manifestation in online news. In this model, online news self-censorship is 
passive and submissive. It also suggests that the government and online news are hostile 
to each other. However, as the observation and interviews went on, the notion of ‘self-
censorship’ was expanded, and the relationship between the Chinese authorities and 
online news was revealed, to some extent, as cooperative in the processes of online news 
production. Hence, different kinds of self-censorship within the newsroom were explored. 
This emerged as a significant factor during the interview stage, when interviewees were 
found to have different understandings of what exactly ‘self-censorship’ includes and 
excludes, and in some scenarios they were referring to different kinds of self-censoring.  
 
 
The following three segments are taken from transcriptions of interviews with P03 and 
P04, who described different types of self-censorship and censorship, in which some of 
Press to censor 
Self-censor to comply 
Chinese government China’s online news 
Figure 12 First model of censorship between the authorities and online news 
media 
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their response to censorship pressure, like being directly contacted and ordered to comply 
during the process of online news production, were also interpreted as another form of 
self-censorship within the online newsroom. The nuances were distinctive: 
 
a) “The editor asked me to have a careful think about what angle I should choose. He 
always says ‘to think before to write’. I now say the same to young journalists, too. 
(…)  But for some reports, journalists should understand that they would never have 
a chance to publish them, no matter what angle you choose. A young intern once 
brought me a report about local government involvement in hostile takeover of 
agricultural land. I can understand his passion… for trying to make things right. But 
a report (that criticises the government) like this can never be published” (P03). 
 
b) “The pressure (of censorship) could be shared. […] And beyond that, having 
journalists providing their thoughts in the process of news production, made the work 
easier. We may work together and come up with new and insightful angles, and 
produce something more suitable for broadcasting” (P04). 
 
c) “If we didn’t turn off the search for sensitive words like ‘Jiang Zemin’ and ‘Hu Jintao’ 
(both were leaders of the PRC), then one day the secretary of the publicity director 
would call my phone in the office. From my experience, he would either tell you 
directly to turn off search engines for these sensitive words, or imply to you that your 
website might have crossed the line. (…) I rather prefer that they (the publicity 
officials) would tell you straight away, because otherwise I would have no clue of 
which sensitive words were forbidden, and tell my people to turn off the search for a 
lot of words, in order to keep out of trouble” (P03). 
 
Schudson and Anderson (2009: p.94) argue that in China the social function of the 
objectivity norm is different to that in Western journalism, for example, American 
journalism. The three sets of data above reflect this argument, as they highlight the taboos 
of criticising certain policies and careful discussion of the Communist Party’s leaders. 
These sensitive topics are not within the framework of a western understanding of news 
values, such as reference to elite people, negativity, meaningfulness (Brighton & Foy, 
2007: p.7), importance, novelty, and story quality (Gans, 1980). In scenario (a), self-
censorship was interpreted as a process of how news workers perceived the boundaries 
of writing publishable news. In this scenario, P03 was absolutely certain that, based on 
their experience, the report of a hostile takeover could “never be published”. The phrase 
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‘understand’ that P03 used suggested this type of self-censorship was a process of 
empirical conception, whereas in scenario (b), the self-censorship referred to an editorial 
process: editors and journalists working together for “insightful angles”, and producing 
news stories that are “more suitable for broadcasting”. Here, this teamwork in the 
newsroom was understood as self-censorship with the purpose of “sharing” the pressure 
of censorship, which came from the publicity department, as P03 illustrated in scenario 
(c). In scenario (c), P03 described another type of censorship: the online news media had 
to block the searching of key words by users, in order to comply with the publicity 
department. The pressure of censorship came from the publicity department in the form 
of instruction or implication. P03 phrased the instruction as to “tell you straightforwardly”, 
or to “imply to you”. And for the online news workers in the newsroom, this type of 
censorship appeared in the form of internal regulation, which P03 described as to “tell my 
people to turn off the search”. 
 
For situations like scenario (c), self-censorship still refers to an administrative instruction, 
as the first model represented. But on other occasions, self-censorship and the editorial 
process of online news production were incorporated in the perspective of participants. It 
also, therefore, refers to a process of individual conception or an editorial teamwork 
activity, as the scenarios (a) and (b) described. During the editorial process in scenario 
(b), online journalists and editors still continued their individual conception as in scenario 
(a) because the work of editing and sub-editing also required them to be mindful of where 
the minefield would be and what political taboo they should avoid. All together, these 
efforts in different scenarios were to ensure the online content, either produced by online 
news workers or generated by users, was substantially complying with the authorities. 
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These scenarios also reflect the characteristic of gatekeeping in Chinese online news 
media. It has been argued that news media in China are instructed to synchronise with the 
tone of the Chinese authorities (Goodman, 1990; Hu, 2007). From the perspective of 
historical development of communist propaganda in China, it is understood that 
nationalistic salvation has been adopted by the Party as one of the key concepts in its 
propaganda strategy. Although it occasionally appeared as anti-Confucian, Mao and his 
leadership integrated the idea of undermining individual liberty for nationalism and 
salvation (Chang, 2001; Han, 2006), and it became a significant strategy for propaganda 
ever since (Lam, 2009; Zhang, 2011). This radical strategy was arguably relaxed during 
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jingtao (Goodman, 1990). However, its essence 
still addresses the importance of media stability and synchronisation. The emphasis on 
maintaining an image of a harmonious society and developing the economy as priorities 
remains a guideline for gatekeeping in news media, online news included.  
 
However, it is worth noting that different online news workers respond to internal 
censorship instructions differently. Significant activities exemplifying the online news 
workers’ struggle and resistance were also found. A few journalists and editors challenged 
instructions and self-regulated to meet the standard more subtly. Also, there were a 
number of online news workers who were found to be taking a balanced attitude. The 
resistant acts against censorship pressure and ensuring the safety of online news content, 
hence, required journalistic tactics which some online news workers called “journalistic 
tricks” (Chapter 6: 4.4). 
 
Against the compromised attitude, resistant online news workers blamed the journalism 
schools in China because they believed the schools did not fulfil the purpose of training 
professional journalists. Instead, young journalists coming from these schools yielded 
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easily. This is strikingly contradictory to some existing literature that had suggested 
journalism education improved awareness of professionalism in China. Xu et al. (2000) 
and Kalathil & Boas (2010), for instance, argue that journalism education is improving 
the professionalisation of the news media industry, assisted by marketisation and the 
development of the Internet. Being professional, in P03’s words, is being ‘honest, 
determined and tactical’. The young journalists-to-be were taught to be “over-
sophisticated and slavish”, sarcastic terms that were used by P02 to describe what he 
believed was the result of an educational failure of journalism in China. By the time these 
young journalists-to-be left school, they were lacking imagination and creativity, and their 
resistance had been worn away. P02 worried that many young journalists came into the 
online news business without vigorous energy:  
 
“Here, I had a new employee. He had just graduated from a good university… a decent 
man with a good C.V. and good writing techniques. The other day, he wrote a story of 
[…] It was, for sure, not harmonious. So I said, ‘we may not be able to put this on our 
website’, He looked at me, and said, ‘Okay, boss, you are the boss’. I felt terrible, because 
I didn’t discern any unhappiness or anger in him. He didn’t try to convince me or look 
for an alternative. It was clear that he knew how to obey” (P02). 
 
Journalist interviewees openly revealed their feelings about regulating themselves in 
writing stories. I labelled these confessions as ‘self-censorship of individual conception’ 
in the transcripts. Generally, the stage of ‘self-censorship of individual conception’ lies 
between the pre-production briefing and editing. It is a stage in which the online 
journalists internalised the pressure of censorship, self-edited the words of news stories 
and self-regulated the depth of reporting, based on their individual understanding of the 
administrative instructions. It is also a process through which they carefully deal with raw 
news material that needs to be categorised into either inclusion or exclusion (Harrison, 
2006; O’Neil & Harcup, 2009). Bearing in mind political sensibilities, material that is 
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judged as ‘contentious’ (Petley, 2009: pp.3-4) or deal with ‘taboos’ (Tong, 2009: pp.607-
8) may be excluded. 
 
Usually, the conception process is followed by the online journalists when they are 
writing up stories on their own. Their sensitivities and personal knowledge and experience 
influence the way they write their stories. P04 interpreted this conception process as ‘to 
think before you write’.  
 
“It’s always important to remember, for a journalist, to think before you write. […] I 
don’t like my interns to write me that kind of story… I have to go back to them and lecture 
them about not crossing the line or entering the minefield. Also, I don’t like to send 
journalists from my department to pursue a story that I am sure we’re not allowed to 
report” (P04). 
 
Individual conception is no doubt an almost certain universal requirement for journalists 
who write their stories, not only limited to Chinese online news workers. However, the 
distinctiveness of this individual conception in the online newsroom in China is that 
journalists and editors are consistently reminded by their supervisors to maintain the 
political correctness of online news content. For instance, in the WN, where monthly 
internal briefings and divisional briefings were set as important elements for the 
mechanism of Internet censorship, the journalists and editors were under a supervision 
which alerted them to keep political correctness in the processes of news production. 
Meanwhile, their personal judgment of the raw material also influences news content. 
Online news workers have to approach news material carefully and examine whether it is 
suitable for conversion into news stories without provoking the authorities. This is a 
practical phenomenon in Chinese online newsrooms where news workers “deliberately” 
(Horton, 2011: p.93) avoid including news material that may cause offence to the 
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authorities. The political concerns for these online news workers were reflected in their 
individual conception and eventually the news product.  
 
Thus, the culture of ‘to think before you write’ seemed to be well accepted in the online 
newsroom, where it was not an individual approach but a journalistic routine that took 
political concerns into consideration. It differs from journalistic values of being objective; 
rather it is a process of probing, guessing, and avoiding the intolerance of the authorities, 
which relied on individual judgement and experience of these online news workers. When 
the online journalists were spontaneously ‘thinking’, they would have to “evaluate and 
balance the outcome and risk of reporting certain critical news” (P06) before they decided 
to report it. Moreover, aspects like the angle of reporting, word choice, and how far the 
authorities could take criticism were also important for individual conception. The news 
drafts that the online journalists produced after thorough evaluation and consideration 
were handed in to the newsroom, where the editorial process operated. The awareness of 
this political sensibility is therefore gradually adapted in daily journalistic practice. These 
particular ideas and perspectives of where the ‘propaganda minefields’ exist in China’s 
news media (Tong, 2009: p.595), also apply to online news.  
 
The reason that the stages of editorial and administrative censorship are also labelled as 
‘self-censorship’ in the transcripts and analysis is that the notion of these forms of 
censorship was developed from the first model. Arguably, the editorial process is also 
considered to be a process of self-censoring, as inclusion and exclusion are understood to 
be practices of the politics of self-censorship (Tong, 2009: p.594). The first model of self-
censorship was expanded, and the second model of self-censorship (Figure 13) was 
generalised. Both editorial and administrative censorship can appear as self-adjustment 
in responding to censorship pressure from the Chinese authorities. Thus this self-
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censorship was recognised as submissive rather than partially voluntary. The essential 
difference between editorial self-censorship and administrative self-censorship is that 
they are operated by different professions in online news. I developed a second model to 
focus on the online news organisation and refine the different degrees of self-censorship 
(Figure 13). In the second model exploring notions of self-censorship, editorial self-
control and administrative self-regulation are distinguished in different colours (editorial 
in blue and administrative in red). Bearing in mind that the intention of self-censoring 
news material is to comply with instructions from the Chinese authorities (Petley, 2009: 
pp.101-2), editorial control is considered to be a stage where self-censorship of both the 
individual online news workers and the editing/sub-editing process occurred. 
Administrative control, on the other hand, continues its institutional obligation after the 
production process in the newsroom. Overall, Figure 13 illustrates how these mechanisms 
of censorship within the online newsroom examine, digest, and filter online news content 
which may pose a threat to the Chinese “monopoly on power” (Petley, 2009: p.101), and 
ensure the exclusion of this content. 
 
Figure 13 Second model of online news censorship: distinction between individual conception 
and editor control in the online newsroom 
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As Figure 13 indicates, conception and editorial self-censorship have overlaps. Online 
journalists may continually self-regulate their news content at the editorial self-censorship 
stage. The significant difference between conception and editorial censorship is that the 
former is not necessarily interactive whereas the latter often requires discussions and 
negotiations in the newsroom. Many interviewees called for journalistic professionalism 
in this process, as they believed journalists could be more active and less submissive to 
the pressure of censorship from their superiors. As P02 argued: 
 
“A journalist who offers his or her input (in the editorial self-censorship process) is not 
only tolerated, but also welcomed. I like my journalists to talk to me, why they choose the 
story, how they think, rather than take on board my editing unconditionally” (P02). 
 
Editor interviewees also stressed that they would like to see more interaction in the 
newsroom in the process of editorial self-censorship because they believed that, with the 
involvement of online journalists, the process of editorial self-censorship could be more 
insightful and thorough. As P04 argued: 
 
“The pressure (of censorship) could be shared. […] And beyond that, having journalists 
providing their thoughts in the process of news production, made the work easier. We 
may work together and come up with new and insightful angles, and produce something 
more suitable for broadcasting” (P04). 
 
Some editors prefer editorial self-censorship to be a process filled with discussions, 
negotiations and collaborations. They believe that this kind of atmosphere enables online 
journalists to share the responsibilities of self-censorship in the newsroom, and so the 
weight of pressure that comes from censorship regulation could be shared. In contrast, 
editors said that some online journalists’ submissive style of accepting every piece of 
advice from the editors was surprisingly not welcomed.  
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However, the interactive atmosphere which editors preferred in the newsroom does not 
equal the editors’ preference for journalistic proactivity in the industry in China. The 
hierarchy in the newsroom determines different levels of autonomy for different 
professions. Editors appear to have more influence on the output of news content, and 
may be perceived as disobeying the superiors. Chapters 6: 6.3.1 and 6.4.1 discuss the 
intolerance of insubordination in the newsrooms. The construction of online/offline news 
organisations, previously reviewed by Zhao (1998), Lee (2005) and McNair (2009), for 
instance, ensures that instructions coming from superiors are considered mandatory, with 
little room for discussion at the lower level. In this sense, the dynamic of the production 
process may be limited due to the hierarchy. How the autonomy of online news workers 
is restrained, is discussed further in Chapters 7.5.1 and 7.5.2.  
 
An ‘over-active’ or ‘over-resistant’ (P03) journalist may trouble the editors. Editors are, 
after all, more dominant than online journalists in the hierarchical structure in the online 
newsroom, and editors intend to keep it this way. Although the editor interviewees 
stressed several times that they saw all categories of online news workers as equal, the 
results of the observation suggested otherwise. Editors normally held a higher position in 
the online newsroom, and in the decision-making process within the newsroom it was 
down to the editors to make the final judgment. In short, editors normally have more 
autonomy than online journalists, and they were often in charge of making the final 
decision in the newsroom. The language that interviewees used also underpinned this 
hierarchical difference. Journalist interviewees called their editors ‘bosses’ at times in the 
interviews, which was evidence to suggest the editors’ dominance in the relationship.  
 
The process of editorial control can be seen as a result of the development of gatekeeping. 
In his discussion of the transformation of gatekeeping in online news media, Canter (2014) 
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argues that the traditional gatekeeper becomes a professional verifier of online news 
media. This section examines how these Chinese online news workers fulfil their 
traditional roles of acting by using the Internet as a news medium, a role that Canter (2014: 
p.112) outlines as watchdogs, quality controllers, analysers and storytellers. However, 
evidence has also shown that there is a certain degree of resistance in online newsrooms, 
where internal ideological and power struggles play out (Lam, 2000: p.42) and motivate 
online news workers to strive for autonomy. In terms of political sensibilities, ambiguous 
criticism of the authorities, officials and government policies, these are arguably sensitive 
areas that online news media have to approach carefully. Hence, this type of criticism is 
limited, controlled and constrained (Hong, 2006: p.299). The gatekeeping ensures that 
this criticism gets filtered in the online newsroom, and that the official doctrine for 
“constructing a modernised socialist country” (Hu, 2007) is propagandised. In the era of 
undergoing media transformation (Zhao, 2000; Huter, 2003) and press commercialisation 
(Zhang 2000; Winfield & Peng, 2005), advocating this doctrine may seem like a difficult 
task as perceived by the authorities. It prioritises the interests of the authorities in the 
process of online news production, but undermines a set of news values which are 
commonly seen by western academics as important to consider in the process of 
composing news, such as for instance, relevance, timeliness, unexpectedness, 
meaningfulness, and predictability/unpredictability (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Briton & 
Foy, 2007). Although there are differences in understanding what the exact propaganda 
minefields are for individual online news workers, the bottom line for online news 
organisations is to synchronise their tone with the Chinese authorities, which cannot be 
achieved solely through the use of mechanisms of censorship in the newsroom.  
 
249 
 
7.3.2 Manipulation of images 
Most self-regulating and self-adjusting of text means overwriting the original content and 
wiping out any trace of censorship, which often makes it difficult to access the original 
content and conduct a comparison (Jones, 1999). However, the censorship of images 
sometimes does leave traces that show the images were altered. For this reason, 
censorship of images is singled out in the analysis. This section explains how these traces 
of censorship were retrieved, and analysed, in the views of online news workers, why 
these images were shaped by photo journalists or editors during the news production 
period.  
 
Here, in this research, ‘photo journalists’ are distinguished from ‘online journalists’, who 
are responsible for producing text content. Attention was paid to photo journalists as their 
image products, mainly pictures and video footage, can only be amended or revised with 
difficulty, yet their rank in the media is equivalent to online journalists and their autonomy 
is insignificant. P01 described a case of image censoring which was considered as both 
dramatic and regrettable. He and his crew took pictures of the village chief and ‘his hired 
accomplices’ carrying hammers, shovels and hoes while ‘marching to a farmer’s house’, 
forced the farmer to move out of his own house, and dismantled the house violently. The 
pictures were later disapproved by the web administrators because they were considered 
as ‘posing a threat to a harmonised government image’: 
 
“We took a clear front shot of the village chief and his hired accomplices, with all kinds 
of hammers, shovels and hoes. […]A typical story of forced relocation with violence. A 
very powerful image, I should say. But it clearly had a very subtle touch to some… (pause) 
nerves. These kinds of powerful pictures are hardly seen by the public” (P01). 
 
The above statement can be seen as an example of how online news content is censored 
according to the requirement of harmony. As such, the gatekeepers of online news have 
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to consider the readership of the authorities when dealing with sensitive topics, which 
Zhao (2000, p.3) calls the media orbiting the party state. For public audiences, 
newsworthy factors behind the coverage of an event, such as timeliness, unexpectedness, 
negativity and its social and community relevance (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Brighton & 
Foy, 2007: pp.7-10) are arguably what makes the story valuable. However, for 
gatekeepers in online news, the potential threat of disrupting a harmonised government 
image can overrule them all.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3: 5.7, it is difficult for research to access examples of censored 
news content, because once these contents have been deleted, they may have been erased 
permanently for recovering. However, some news images provided precious data for this 
research. Not all these pictures are retrievable in their original version but, due to the 
uniqueness of the image content and rough photo-editing technique, some of them had 
clear signs of manual editing. One typical failure of photo editing was caused by poor 
editing technique. 
 
A picture from an infamous article “official paying visit to the elderly” (Tencent News, 
2013) caused controversy. It reported an ordinary story of officials paying a visit to elders, 
through a clichéd narrative intended to enhance the likability of the government officials. 
However, this PR intention was undermined by poor photo editing. Some clear marks 
gave away the inauthenticity of this photo: the outline of the image of the elder is clearly 
retouched and pasted from another picture, the size of the elder does not match with the 
officials, and the colour and transparency composition also indicates that this news photo 
was edited and altered with at least two other photos. The flaws in the editing may not be 
obvious in terms of textual content, but images can reveal the marks of distortion in 
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certain circumstances, as this picture demonstrates. Even without comparing it with its 
original version, the photo exposed what had been censored and edited.  
 
Apart from the poorly performed journalistic norm, this photo exemplifies the core of 
Confucianism thought which says that individuals should obey rational principles in the 
interest of the state (Gardner, 2003). The clumsy photo editing caught the public’s 
attention and stirred some doubts and criticisms of online news manipulation. It is 
reported that Chinese users doubted the authenticity of the news story itself, questioned 
whether the story actually happened or was just a staged event, and criticised media ethics 
(Sina News, 2013). To confront these doubts and criticisms, the local online news media 
reluctantly came forward and released other unedited photos of the same event in order 
to prove that the news story was genuine but the photo was tampered with because of 
‘imprudent mistakes’ (Tencent News, 2013). The media spokesman explained that the 
original reason behind the editing of this photo was that the photographer was an intern 
and he failed to capture all the officials and the elder in one proper photo. The editor 
chose to merge two photos into one because he was not satisfied with any of the photos 
taken by the photographer. In other words, the essential reason behind this incident was 
that the genuine photo did not meet the standard for its use as propaganda. The editor 
compromised the authenticity of the news image in order to coordinate the common 
interests of all the parties concerned, including having ‘all officials in one proper photo’ 
(Tencent News, 2013). 
 
These examples show evidence of the existence of manipulation of images in online news 
media. As mentioned earlier, censorship of images is different from textual censorship 
because editing and revising photos is more difficult than for text. Even without being 
able to compare the raw versions, photos that have been edited and tampered with by a 
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rough hand may expose the fact that Chinese online news media is censoring images as 
much as it is censoring texts. Here, the purpose of propaganda is considered a more 
important function for news stories than other values, such as truthfulness and authenticity. 
Photo journalists, who are ranked at the bottom of the media hierarchy structure, often 
possess little autonomy within the online newsroom. To sum up, the cases of clumsy 
photo editing exposed the fact that Chinese online news media downplay the importance 
of news pictures. Thus, I cannot but conclude that the function of propaganda in pictures 
can be considered more important than authenticity, and it overrules other news values in 
online news production in China.  
 
7.4. Triangular models of online news censorship 
This section looks at the mechanism of censorship from the aspects of coordination and 
restriction. Deriving from field notes and interviews, the triangular models of online news 
censorship (Figure 14 and 15 below) are the most crucial findings of this research. They 
were refined from observation and part of the general protocol from the interview 
transcripts, and used to demonstrate all the important aspects discussed in this study, 
including the autonomy of online news workers in the newsroom, journalistic 
professionalism and news values in China’s context, and the operationalisation of 
censorship in the process of online news production. The models aim to explain and 
demonstrate how the newsroom functions under systems of censorship and control. 
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Figure 14 Coordination triangular model of online censorship 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Restriction triangular model of online censorship 
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The models consist of three entities: the online news media, cyber police, and the 
publicity department. The green arrows represent their relationships in coordination, 
while the red arrows represent their relationships in restriction. The models present a 
stable and fundamental protocol of online censorship where all three entities coordinate 
and restrain each other. They form two enclosed matrices.  
 
7.4.1 Coordination between the authorities and the online news 
One of the core words in these triangular models of dynamic mechanisms is 
‘coordination’. Much literature indicates that China’s online news media are manipulated 
and oppressed by the Chinese authorities, and that online news media self-censor the news 
content they produce passively and reluctantly (Qin, J. L. 2000; He, Q. L. 2004; & He Q. 
L. 2008). The impression given by some existing literature suggests that, if pursuing 
freedom of speech and freedom of press is unquestionably ‘a just and ethical virtue’ (P02) 
for journalists, the Chinese government and the Communist Party must play the role of 
the villain. The Chinese authorities are against freedom and liberty and ruthlessly censor 
and bully those news workers who are striving for ‘just or ethical virtues’. However, the 
Chinese online news workers may find that the notion of ‘virtues’ is ambiguous in their 
journalistic practice. From the observation, the impression that authorities and online 
news workers were in opposition was found to be arbitrary and biased while other 
literature suggests there is a trend that press commercialisation has shifted media’s loyalty 
from the authorities to its financial supporters (Pan & Chan, 2003, Esarey, 2005; Tong, 
2009). The development of the Internet is arguably an important factor that accelerates 
this process (Zhao, 1998 & 2000; Yang, 2003). This dynamic change explains the 
relationship between online news media and the Chinese authorities. Online news 
workers have autonomy in the process of news production which government officials 
now cannot arbitrarily interfere with. For instance, in the observation, officials described 
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online news workers as ‘news friends’ and complimented them as being publicly 
influential by saying “times have changed; you news friends have a powerful pen to write 
with and we old comrades have to catch up.” This can be interpreted as a friendly gesture 
from the authorities as the result of online news media’s influence over public opinion. A 
sign of willingness to coordinate was shown; the authorities were not always aggressive, 
and the news workers were not always weak and submissive. All three entities in the 
triangular matrix possess autonomy in the news production and post-production period. 
It was not as simple as a dramatic case of the evil authorities versus the just and virtuous 
news workers. 
 
The triangular models present fluid loops where all three entities involved are active, 
communicative and coordinative. The coordination between the cyber police and the 
online news workers is detailed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 6:4.3). Here, this 
section pays attention to the coordination between the publicity department and the online 
news.  
 
The publicity and the news departments have a close relationship: the decision-making 
level administrators from the news shared a similar ideology with the publicity 
department; irregular meetings and briefings were held between them regarding the 
orientation of public opinion, and there were frequent exchanges of opinion during 
incidents such as natural calamities and man-made misfortunes. For example, in the case 
of Bo Xilai’s downfall, the publicity officials reacted instantly with the cyber police and 
web administrators of WN to draft joint guidelines for news reporting. The guidelines 
aimed to instruct journalists and editors; they included strategies for media coverage of 
the incident and favourable angles that would potentially direct public opinion about this 
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important story. These guidelines and regulations were instructed in a top-down form, 
which P03 described as follows: 
 
“I was informed, and I passed this to my men in office, I didn’t want to see Bo Xilai in 
our pages at all. It is not journalistic, it’s political” (P03). 
 
P03 pointed out that in circumstances such as this, journalistic values could be sacrificed 
because the purpose of maintaining harmony of the Internet ought to be served. P02 
recalled a similar situation: 
 
“We were told not to investigate the story of Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun (Bo’s former 
trusted follower and whistle blower), no matter how exciting it might be” (P02). 
 
Evidently, directives for critical news coverage are the outcomes of these timely meetings 
and briefings. I prefer to call these outcomes ‘directives’ rather than ‘protocols’ because 
they can be flexible in operation, and appear changeable and negotiable at times. The 
flexibility of the directives is embodied in different ways. Firstly, the scope of the 
directives may be vague. Directives normally include a summary of a few topics that the 
media should avoid reporting; for instance, in the Wenzhou train crash the instruction 
specified that news ‘should report less accountability and investigations’ and ‘avoid 
releasing pictures or news about casualties which may arouse public criticisms’ (P00). A 
number of interesting terms have been used to reflect on the relationship between online 
news media and the authorities. What has been suggested by Zhao (2000), Winfield and 
Peng (2005) about the impact of financial autonomy on news content is also found 
applicable to online news media. For instance, the use of moderate and suggestive terms 
such as ‘should’ and ‘avoid’ rather than strong terms such as ‘must’ and ‘prohibit’, and 
the vague term ‘which may arouse public criticism’ suggests that the instructor did not 
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strictly stipulate the boundary of news  exclusion. As a result, the force of these directives 
is debatable, as some news that seemingly violated the directives was still published.  
 
Secondly, these directives were not delivered in hard-copy but by word of mouth. Here, 
it is worth re-visiting the field notes of the monthly internal briefing, as the directive of 
censorship from the publicity department was delivered via the Deputy Director’s words 
(Chapter 6: 4.1 & 4.3). This suggests that the publicity department lacked written 
protocols to direct online news in reporting emergent incidents. To some extent, the 
publicity departments coordinate with the online media rather than instruct the news 
workers. This leads to the third aspect of flexibility: the publicity department’s lack of 
systematisation in overseeing the online news.  
 
From the perspective of the Chinese authorities, neither the publicity departments nor the 
cyber police have the resources to censor online news thoroughly. P03 called the rapid 
growth of online news an ‘information boost’, and this boost may trouble the authorities 
a great deal in online censorship. The cyber police adopted a technical approach to 
supplement its manual filtering, whereas the publicity department used briefings to 
control the online news. Therefore, the flexibility of directives can be seen to be the result 
of unsystematic flaws. Disciplinary actions against the online news might be 
happenstance, as the authorities’ subjectivity left enough loopholes for those online news 
workers who violated the directives not to be disciplined.   
 
The lack of systematic control and flexibility reflects Lam’s argument about institutional 
loopholes that allow news workers to circumvent limitations (Lam, 2000: p.42) The 
existence of loopholes in online censorship and the vague nature of the directives from 
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the censors (publicity department officials, cyber policemen, and even news supervisors) 
enhanced the importance of self-censorship of individual conception in the news 
production process, because online news content that is not well-conceived may result in 
deleting or denial of publication. For online journalists and editors in China, the directives 
may be vague, but restrictions and administrative interventions are decisive. For certain 
online news content whose news angles or word choice are not well conceived to comply 
with the authorities, its producers may find that their efforts in news production are wasted 
once they are instructed to delete. This goes back to, again, the need for online journalists 
and editors to internalise the vague directives, and probe and guess how much criticism 
the authorities can tolerate based on their personal judgement and journalistic experience. 
Overall, a significant finding of this coordinated relationship between online news media 
and the Chinese authorities verifies some of the theories that had been discussed in 
theoretical frameworks and literature. As their financial autonomy is gradually gained, 
online news workers are in a position to make decisions on inclusion and exclusion 
according to their public audiences. The authorities, on the other hand, appeared less 
hostile to online news organisations and their interference in the process of news 
production had shown signs of cooperation. 
 
7.4.2 Autonomy and influence over public opinion 
Another important aspect of the triangular models is that they present another force that 
operates between these three parties but has hitherto been ignored: restrictions. The red 
arrows in Figure 15 represent the dynamic cycle of restrictions, and between every 
random two parties, a red arrow represents a directive force that I call ‘restrictive’. The 
restrictive between online news media and cyber police was discussed in the previous 
chapter in terms of the equality of governmental institution ranks. That is, regional online 
news and cyber police are ranked at the same institutional level in the government. This 
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means that neither of them has the administrative authority to overrule the other in their 
routine work. In this chapter, attention is paid to analysing the restrictive power between 
online news and the publicity department, while the restrictive power between the cyber 
police and the publicity department will be discussed in Chapter 8:2.1, as it is unexplored 
and needs further study.  
 
The effective restriction leverage for online news is recognised as this media platform’s 
influence of the public. The officials and civil servants were found to be afraid of the 
public’s influence, as P05 indicated that he had witnessed how this influence translated 
into media supervision of civil servants. From the observation, a phrase that had been 
frequently used and can support this theory: ‘news friends’. It meant friends from the 
news industry. When officials from the publicity department visited and inspected WN, 
the phrase ‘news friends’ was mentioned several times. One of the officials said, and here 
I quote: “times have changed; you news friends have a powerful pen to write with and we 
old comrades have to catch up.” It is worth noting that publicity officials called the online 
news workers ‘news friends’ and complimented them as being ‘powerful’, which can be 
easily interpreted as a friendly gesture. Further, they called themselves ‘old comrades’. 
This can be seen as self-deprecation: admitting to being ‘old’ and to ‘have to catch up’ 
(with the changed circumstance or changed time in this context) is presumably a 
representation of weakness. The inspection might still be an inherited demonstration of 
the Party’s control over the online news media, but these deliberately worded details 
reflect the publicity department’s misgivings about the influence of the public (‘a 
powerful pen’) that online news possesses. 
 
Another unexpected phenomenon was the existence of a harmonised relationship between 
board members of online news and the publicity department. P02 described it as follows: 
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“The boss (the director of WN) has a good relationship with the publicity chief. It helps 
our work, and especially benefits journalists on political and economic news. We have 
journalists corresponding with government officials and publicity supervisors on a 
regular basis. These people from the government (and the Party), after all, are an 
important source.” (P02) 
 
There is a reasonable explanation for this harmonised relationship, though it was expected 
at the start of the research to be a tense one. Chapter 5 shows that the cyber police had 
learnt that neither they nor the publicity department possess sufficient manpower and 
material resources to maintain a refined online news filtering operation. When critical 
news is exposed on the Internet, the authorities have to adopt an extreme approach to fix 
the potential negative influence. Although these approaches for disciplining news 
workers (Chapter 5: 4.3) have clear boundaries and are well systematised, their deterrent 
force is weakened. Thus, the briefing meetings within the online newsroom are more often 
used to prevent critical news reports which potentially would damage the harmony of the 
Internet. 
 
The model also observes that the Internet and the popularity of online media have helped 
China to transform authoritarianism and pursue the “objective of building democracy and 
free media” as noted by Kalathil and Boas (McNair, 2009, p.241; Kalathil & Boas, 2010). 
In terms of striving for their autonomy in the processes of online news production, this 
study found that Chinese online journalists learnt to harness their influence over public 
opinion in their journalistic practice. The authorities, on the other hand, are found to be 
constrained by media supervision, which corroborates McNair’s (2009) argument. At the 
current stage of transformation (Kalathil & Boas, 2010) or reformation (De Burgh, 2003), 
the disagreement between Chinese online news media and the Chinese authorities was 
unavoidable. Nevertheless, Chinese online news workers did find themselves in the 
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position of having autonomy and being able to leverage with the authorities. In addition, 
it has been argued that the anti-traditional reformists of the media, particularly in online 
news, opposed the forces and ideologies of Confucianism (Lee, 2005: p.109). The 
Confucian proposition of sacrificing individual freedom for the benefit of the masses, 
along with traditional philosophical schools of morality and channelization, are 
embedded culturally and historically within the communist political philosophy. This is 
where the southern media in China stood up as a significant player against censorship.  
 
In sum, what needs to be highlighted is the confirmation of autonomy in the online 
newsroom, where online journalists and editors do not submissively accept instructions 
and comply with them without resistance. Apart from their call for professionalism 
(McNair, 2009; Tong & Spark, 2009), autonomy cannot be gained without media 
transformation, reformation of organisation, and the changing of political landscape. 
Social culture in China may still advocate traditional morality and limited freedom 
embedded in Confucianism, but the marketisation of online news has already had an 
impact on the output of news content and has shaped the way Chinese online news 
workers understand their transitional nature and political vigilance in journalistic practice. 
The criticism of government policies and individual officials before the era of media 
transformation may be seen as an act of anti-socialist or anti-nation salvation, but may 
now be tolerated by the authorities as a result of commercialisation. 
 
7.4.3 Southern media: an example of online news media’s autonomy 
An important new angle from this research’s observation and interviews is that significant 
attention has been given to investigating Chinese online news media organisations and 
exploring their complexity and relationship to power. Some literature that studied China’s 
censorship, media control and digital filtering techniques treated China’s online news 
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media as an inseparable entity (Qin, 2000; He, 2004; & He, 2008), but they often 
neglected issues of the dynamic struggle in the political, administrative or ideological 
levels of the entity. The complexity of the contradictory phenomena and inner 
mechanisms in the online news industry are too valuable to be ignored. Zhao (2000) 
argues that the current process of media transformation has created a paradoxical 
phenomenon. The market force has intensified for news media and has shifted media’s 
loyalty; while financial autonomy is gradually gained and market competition increased 
for some news media, the party has shown little sign of lessening control over the news 
(Esarey, 2005, p56). As stated earlier, this research aims to explore and analyse these 
mechanisms by looking at the contradictions, news incidents and phenomena from the 
perspectives of observer, interviewee and institution insider. I acted as an observer and 
interviewer throughout the processes, while the cyber policemen and news workers 
contributed their intelligence and thoughts as institutional insiders. One of the findings 
from the institutional insiders was that there is a censorship divide in China’s online news 
media industry, and it can be substantially distinguished in a geographical sense. The 
geographical distance from Beijing, China’s capital city and political centre, is crucial to 
the restrictive power of media censorship. Media located closer to Beijing usually endure 
more censorship pressure from the authorities, whereas the southern media in Guangzhou 
Province, located further from Beijing, are protected from the pressure to some extent.  
 
How southern media strives and struggles for autonomy can be considered as a living 
example of paradoxical phenomena. The ‘liberalising effect’ (Esarey, 2005: p.56) that 
media transformation brought about has conflicted with the reinforcement of authoritarian 
control. The southern media is a group of liberal and uncompromising media 
organisations that maximise the media’s restrictive power in China. Most of them are 
located in the south. The Southern Weekly (SW) is often seen as one of the leading media 
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organisation in the camp of the southern media. In recent years, SW has launched several 
campaigns against online censorship and has presented itself as a radical and trenchant 
opponent. P02 spoke highly of their resistance and bravery:  
 
SW enjoys support from their local government and readership, so they can sometimes 
write what they really want to write, criticise what really needs to be criticised. […] We 
once said that if all of us had the guts to do so, we would have a different situation in 
censorship now. (P02) 
 
However, P02 and other interviewees also admitted that one important reason that SW 
excelled in resisting censorship is its geographic advantage. Guangzhou is geographically 
distant from the capital and beyond the reach of the full intervention force of the central 
government. Also, Guangzhou has earned a historical reputation for being radical and 
revolutionary, and its recent rapid economic growth has also given it a crucial status in 
China’s political landscape (Jian, Sachs & Warner, 1996). In other words, it is believed 
that these historical and economic reasons have assisted the media in the territory to 
reduce the influence of Beijing’s centralised media control.  
 
By reviewing Guangdong’s revolutionary history and emphasising its economic status 
(see context details in Chapter 1: 4.2), it is understood that the southern media were 
heavily influenced by the aggression and liberal spirit of its regional tradition. It is 
reasonable to deduce that the SW and other southern media have inherited this distinctive 
revolutionary character, and the region’s economic strength sustains its influence of the 
public in China’s political landscape. 
 
At present, this distinctive revolutionary character may not require the presentation of 
violence, bloodshed or uprising as it did a century ago, but the spirit of pursuing liberalism 
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and resisting authoritarianism were inherited from Guangdong’s early revolutionists 
(Chapter 4:7). Here, the liberalising effect of southern media is attributed to the call of 
journalistic professionalism, which is arguably imported primarily from “outside China” 
and systems driven by “blatant commercialism” (Lo, Chan & Pan, 2005: p.156). The 
southern media often appear as liberal pioneers, showing their discontent with 
interference from the authorities. Their economic wealth and geographical distance from 
Beijing have helped the southern media to develop rapidly and more freely (Latham, 2000; 
Zhao, 1998). Their social influence has sharply expanded in recent years as several 
domestic debates were launched and spread from the south to the north. These debates 
included sensitive topics such as anti-corruption, constitutionalism, overseeing the 
government, and political and economic reform. In this sense, the southern media news 
workers indeed used their restrictive power efficiently. From the perspective of efficiency, 
the southern media have achieved positive effects that are admired by their northern peers. 
As P04 said in praise of them:  
 
“They (the southern news workers) truly have a pen that can write. That is, to me, very 
admirable” (P04). 
 
This admiration from other news workers may seem minor but it indeed describes the 
effect that positivity of media transformation and commercialisation has had on 
journalistic professionalism in China (Pan & Chan, 2003; Tong & Sparks, 2009). One the 
other hand, the authorities still maintain control over online news. In 2013, the newsroom 
staff of SW protested against censorship because SW’s New Year special editorial was 
changed under pressure from propaganda officers bypassing the normal publication flow 
(Xinhua News, 2012). The content of this special editorial was interpreted as leaning 
towards questioning and criticising the Chinese Dream, a political slogan proposed by 
President Xi Jinping (Xinhua News, 2012). After gaining support from other news 
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workers and users, the incident was escalated to include massive demonstrations on the 
Internet. For example, users were voluntarily posting pictures of lit candles, a symbol of 
good wishes, on Sina Weibo to show their support for the SW (Cao, 2013). But the 
protesters soon compromised after their actions backfired on Sina Weibo, and a number 
of SW’s administrators were removed from their posts. After President Xi Jinping and 
Premier Li Keqiang came to power in late 2012, they highlighted ‘enhancing the culture 
of inclusiveness’ and ‘advocating free thought and free press’ on several occasions 
(Xinhua News, 2013, People’s Daily Online, 2013; & Sina, 2008a). These speeches were 
interpreted as positive signs of political reform and a better prospect for free speech, 
because the leaders of PRC had demonstrated their attitude of allowing criticisms of the 
authorities (inclusiveness), and they were willing to loosen restrictions on news media 
(advocating free press) (People’s Daily Online, 2013; & Sina, 2008a). However, incidents 
such as SW’s New Year special editorial contradict the authorities’ claims. The intention 
behind their claims to enhance the culture of inclusiveness and advocate free thought was 
therefore in doubt. Throughout the incident, it is worth noting that news values such as 
truthfulness and sense of humanity (Steel, 2009: pp.584-5) are highlighted by southern 
media journalists. The advocacy of these news values reflects western models of news 
values (Harrison, 2006: p.13; Brighton & Foy, 2007, pp.7-9; O’Neil & Harcup, 2009). At 
times when these news values were contradictory to the interests of the Chinese 
authorities, southern media journalists strived for autonomy without institutional 
interference. It demonstrates Zhao’s (2000) and Winfield & Peng’s (2005) claim that 
financial autonomy encourages Chinese news workers to produce market-oriented 
content, which may minimise or oppose the effect of the interests of the Party in the 
process.  
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This brings us back to the question: can the southern media be a liberal example in China’s 
censorship over the news media? Or even further, can it be a pioneer against China’s 
censorship over all forms of news media and other online content? A pessimistic 
perspective is that it cannot be, because some interviewees were convinced that the 
southern media’s activeness and radicalism were containable within the overall 
framework of media censorship. In other words, their activities and radicalism are limited 
by the authorities. Underneath the active and radical surface, the authority’s control over 
news content, distribution and web portals is strong and unshakable, and the Party’s 
permeation of the southern media is no different than other news media. As P02 argues: 
 
“Most media like us (Wenzhou News Group) are alike, and so are online news media. We 
couldn’t be licensed if we didn’t structure as the government requested. That’s why you 
can hardly find a news website that overturns this institutional structure totally and starts 
with an original one with zero Party influence and intervention. We have our Party 
branch, and Mr Wu (the chief editor) is also our Party branch secretary” (P02). 
 
The institutional nature of the southern media determines the limits of their resistance as 
their structure was built under the heavy influence of Party infiltration. By examining the 
triangular models of online news, government sectors and the Party, it is understood that 
the triangular models ensure the authorities’ stable control over online news. Meanwhile, 
it is claimed that the key purpose of supervising online news is stabilisation (Liang & 
Gao, 2011; & Xiao, 2010). Recent incidents, which were initiated by the southern media 
and the social influence they have brought, were insufficient to convince the state and the 
public to reform the mature propaganda machine and the established censorship system. 
Moreover, the media cannot challenge censorship as long as its staffing is heavily 
permeated by the Party. Unfortunately for Chinese liberals, the spirit of pursuing freedom 
and professionalism that the southern news workers demonstrated is admirable and 
prospective, but not necessarily rewarding. For a force that aims to challenge a powerful 
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and well-established state machinery, the mere spiritual encouragement that the southern 
media provide is insignificant. On the contrary, the liberal sparks may lead the authorities 
to tighten censorship. As mentioned earlier, Guangdong has an important status in 
China’s political landscape. The growing trend of liberalism from the south has brought 
potential threats to the stabilisation policy. Evidence has shown that the authorities are 
tightening controls in the south: for instance, the SW and other southern media have been 
re-staffed dramatically (Xinhua News, 2012), and Hu Chunhua, a member of the Central 
Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPCP) and a promising candidate among the 
next generation of Chinese leadership, was appointed as Party chief of Guangdong in late 
2012 (Sina News, 2012a) 
 
The discussion on the southern media presents an example of how news media use their 
influence over public opinion to negotiate, leverage and struggle for autonomy. In the 
incident of 2013’s New Year special editorial, the southern media had demonstrated a 
fragility in the framework of the current mechanism caused by the absence of clear-cut 
laws (Lam, 2000). The “vague media laws and regulation” (Lam, 2000: p.37–46) that 
encourage self-censorship among news workers have the same effect on online journalists 
and editors. However, by the time that self-censorship begins to be rejected by online 
news workers, the whole system on which censorship is built, may also stop functioning. 
In this regard, the struggle of the southern media implies a refusal of general acquiescence 
to censorship and self-censorship. As the triangular model of restriction demonstrates, 
Chinese online news workers use media’s influence over public opinion to gain their 
autonomy in the newsroom.  
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7.5. Exceptions and protocol breaks 
In this research, one important question that needs to be answered is whether the online 
censorship protocol in China is systematic. The significance of this question is that it can 
contribute to many aspects of this research: it can clarify the mechanism for Chinese 
online news workers to report incidental critical news; it can interpret how Chinese online 
news workers balance interests in producing critical news; it can further testify to Chinese 
news workers’ professionalism, as being less dependent on political power and being a 
distinct occupational group with a distinct social function (Tong & Sparks, 2009) under 
the pressure of censorship; it can also contribute to our understanding of news values and 
user-generated content by studying how these online news workers carefully approach 
sensitive topics and avoid provoking the propaganda minefield (Tong, 2009: p.595). 
 
As the general workflow of online news media demonstrates (see detail in Chapter 6:2), 
throughout this general protocol, online journalists, editors and web administrators were 
all involved. In this general protocol, journalists may include reporters, photographers 
and correspondents; some journalists may even take over editorial responsibilities for 
their editors. As P04 said:  
 
“We are short of manpower (of editors). For some less important news stories, daily stuff, 
I leave experienced journalists to edit and decide. I also give them my full trust; their 
judgment abilities are good enough to make safe news” (P04). 
 
All interviewees affirmed the existence of the general procedure of online news 
production, but they also admitted that real-time news production might not always follow 
the protocol. Situations could change, and for critical incident reporting, journalists and 
editors were required to process the news differently and accordingly. The phrase ‘safe 
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news’ suggests that playing safe was arguably the goal of adapting these different 
approaches to producing news, in order to tactically balance both political uncertainty and 
financial advertisers (Zhao, 1998; Lo, Chan & Pan, 2005: p.156).  
 
The term ‘critical’ started off as defining news stories about either scandals, accidents, 
fraud, corruption, bankruptcies, people going missing or dying, or any stories that might 
give the audience negative feelings about society. It further refers to those news stories 
that bring negative images and criticisms of the government or the Party to the public. 
Critical stories about official scandals, corruption, accidents involving abuse of 
government power or misconduct, or too many people missing or dying in a short period 
that may affect the officials’ political careers can activate the protocol of online 
censorship. As P01 said: 
 
“We may be asked to downplay the scandals and corruption, unless we are instructed to 
report them on a large scale. The government sometimes wants to desalinate the negative 
effect […] It depends on how negative and containable the effect can be” (P01). 
 
Therefore, to determine the protocol of online censorship, the negativity assessment of 
critical news is the key. This section looks at considerations of interfering with online 
news production. By discussing and comparing incidents of Wenzhou’s train collision 
and Bo Xilai’s downfall, it examines what intrigues Chinese authorities’ vigilance. In 
addition, it further discusses the influence that a growing awareness amongst online news 
workers of being professional and committed to reporting news without fear or favour 
and commercialisation have had on the process of online news production. 
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7.5.1 Considerations of interfering with the online news production 
for the Chinese authorities 
This section attempts to analyse what factors can influence the negativity assessment of 
critical news, and illustrate how this assessment impacts on online news reporting. From 
the triangular models, it was asserted that coordination and restriction are two main 
factors that enable three players (online news media, cyber police and Party publicity) to 
dynamically interact and operate online news censorship. The models demonstrate the 
mechanism of online news censorship and explain many phenomena of routinisation that 
occurred in China’s online newsrooms.  
 
As argued, the Internet in China is built by the authorities to support and maintain its 
demand for economic growth, while also controlling threats to its authoritarian status 
(Petley, 2009: p.101). Manufacturing a public image of a harmonious society in the media 
is so important to the Chinese authority, that journalistic professionalism and normative 
can sometimes be compromised (Hong, 2009: p.299; Tong, 2009: p.607). 
 
However, there are some exceptions that cannot be eliminated. In some extreme cases, 
this triangular power-flow may be broken. In these cases, the three parties are unbalanced, 
and therefore the models are not suitable for extreme cases. One of the recent extreme 
cases was the Bo Xilai incident: online news media did not enjoy much freedom in topic 
selection and coverage range when the incident involved sensitive information about 
national security and political struggles in central government. Online news had little 
autonomy in updating the public about news of Bo Xilai compared to the newspapers and 
the television. On the contrary, when the news became less intense or related to political 
struggle, online news had more flexibility in providing updates. P03, who had experience 
working in both newspapers and websites, compared their differences: 
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“Unlike the newspapers, where every step of news production had established 
gatekeeping, the online news in China is new, and there are a great number of blanks to 
be filled. We don’t filter and deliberate over every single detail of the news on a daily 
basis. As long as the story is not as sensitive as Bo Xilai’s case, online news has more 
flexibility than newspapers” (P03). 
 
Here, the questions are: what was the key element that made the difference to online news 
media’s liberty in covering the train crash and in attempting to report the Bo Xilai incident? 
Furthermore, if some previous literature has argued that China’s free speech environment 
was improving because the rapid development of the Internet allowed people to access 
more varied news and to discuss political issues freely (He, Q. L. 2008.; & Wu. Y. 2012), 
why was censorship tightened up for the Bo Xilai incident more than for the train crash 
that happened two years earlier? 
 
The essential difference between these two incidents is their different level of 
infringement of the Party’s interests. The train crash might not be a natural disaster, but 
an accident. The news had the potential to be converted from a tragedy into a PR 
campaign. The crash brought massive public attention to civilian casualties, railway 
transport, first aid and medical treatment, rescue and other relevant public services, whilst 
the authorities had to face growing public fury over the crash (Branigan, 2011; Moore, 
2011). Silencing news of the collision was impractical. However, by using certain PR 
strategies, the collision was converted into a campaign of shaping a positive image. P00 
recalled the details of what happened after the collision: 
 
“We didn’t write features to accuse, or to question why the tragedy happened. […] Our 
position in reporting this, as we were instructed, was clearly and obviously advocating 
that Wenzhou was a city of great love” (P00). 
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Thus, after the collision, media and journalists were instructed to shift news angles from 
investigation and accountability to other stories that might help in shaping this ‘positive 
image’, like the spirit of utter devotion and the sparks of humanity that had been seen in 
medical workers, firemen, police and even civilian volunteers who participated in the 
rescue. To some extent, the shaping campaign alleviated the pressure and criticism of the 
railway service.  
 
In contrast, the Bo Xilai downfall was dramatically different, as it had little potential for 
the same strategy. Bo Xilai and his associates were recognised as being heavily engaged 
in high-end political struggles. There were fewer public sector actors involved, and public 
attention was unable to access confidential details of the central government. Silencing 
the news was, in this sense, easier.  
 
The above comparison helps this research to identify different censorship approaches that 
the Chinese authorities use for different critical news. Respectively, the online news 
media have to handle censorship pressure according to the nature of the story. It is argued 
that the triangular models illustrate the routinisation of online news censorship, where 
three different parties are coordinated and restrained in a dynamic flow. However, in 
exceptional cases, the autonomy of online news media can be downplayed by the extreme 
means deployed by authorities. This comparison further projects the mechanism of 
identifying extreme cases; that is, cases that can be considered so ‘extreme’ that the 
authorities have to ignore the media’s influence of the public, break the triangular power-
flow and overrule the online news, even if that means running the risk of being criticised.   
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7.5.2 Professionalism vs harmonisation 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some news workers appeared to struggle with 
instructions they received that were in contradiction to their professionalism, such as 
being objective, reporting without political interference (Pan & Chan, 2003: p.653), and 
articulating society’s conscience (Tong & Spark, 2009: p.340). It appeared that not all 
news workers were clear about the differences between government departments and 
Party institutions, as the image of the government and the Party is often presented as a 
united one to the public. However, all news workers know the importance of maintaining 
a harmonious atmosphere between different departments and institutions. Although 
during the interviews, online journalists and editors emphasised the importance of 
journalistic professionalism and ethics in the newsroom, I cannot but conclude from the 
observation and interviews that handling the reporting of critical news in a “harmonious 
way” seemed to be compulsory for Chinese online news workers.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3: 4.1, the culture of harmonisation has a historical background 
which can be dated back to Chinese feudal times. It was developed by Hu Jintao, the 
former president of China, as an emphasis on the importance of keeping a stable economic 
development trend and maintaining the mood of social harmony at all times. It appears 
that his philosophy of harmonisation derived from his early claim of avoiding self-
inflicted setbacks (Goodman, 1990) and became the guideline for the stabilisation of 
government (Tang & Iyengar, 2012). From the perspective of online news media, the 
political climate of harmonisation means critical news can easily be treated as a trigger 
for instability. Hence, online news workers starting work on a critical story have to 
carefully choose either to report it professionally or to avoid sensitive angles and play 
safe. 
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The media transformation arguably assisted the development of journalistic 
professionalism in China (Chan, Lee & Pan, 2006). This development has also been 
witnessed amongst participants in this research. The journalist interviewees and one 
editor interviewee (P02) recalled that they chose journalism as their career because they 
were convinced that it was a profession that would allow them to pursue a higher cause; 
in their terms, ‘to pursue the truth for the public’ (P02). This cause may be interpreted 
differently by different news workers, but its essence generally includes a number of 
values that are present in liberal contexts, such as feeding news to audiences, satisfying 
the public’s right to know, revealing and exposing injustice and social evils, devotion to 
journalism, and making sure the voices of the weak are heard. Objectivity was addressed 
and highlighted by interviewees as a norm that makes them ‘true journalists’ (P02), which 
Tong and Sparks (2009) call a distinct occupational group with a distinct social function. 
The sense of being objective in news reporting arguably emerges out of a combination of 
public intellectuals articulating society’s conscience alongside a reoccupation with 
western ideas of journalistic professionalism (Tong & Sparks, 2009: p.340). 
 
However, online news workers believed that the harsh environment of censorship in the 
industry has worn down their honourable passion for journalism , since some of them still 
do not feel any less dependent on political power. The censorship pressure on online news 
media was as rigorous as on print media. As P01 admitted: 
 
“We are also ruled by the government (as well as newspapers and magazines), the same 
department and the same regulation. After all, […] the government tightened the 
regulations” (P01). 
 
Likewise, editors believed that there would be less difference between the pressure on 
online news media and print media. Both online journalists and editors recognised that 
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the mechanism of censorship for Chinese online news media was well established: the 
government and the publicity department established a triangular model of authority with 
leading administrators of online news media, and the authorities having the dominant 
power over the online content. The dominance of this triangular model of authority will 
not be weakened by the openness of the Internet and the dynamic development of online 
news media. This dominant status is also an important reason for Chinese online news 
workers to adapt journalistic tactics (Chapter 5: 5.3) in order to ensure the safety of online 
news content in the context of censorship and meet their professional calling.  
 
However, as argued earlier in this chapter, the key to stabilisation and harmonisation is 
the obstruction of free speech and a free press. The demands for political reformation and 
a liberal media can be suppressed by accusations of instability or threatening 
harmonisation. This minor resistance and these small “journalistic tricks” from 
experienced online news workers merely scratched the surface of the censorship system. 
Although online censorship has flaws in its objectivity, execution and consistency, it is 
still a powerful state-owned machinery sustained by a resourceful government and a 
mighty infiltrative Party. The propaganda portrait of China’s Communist Party as the 
saviour of the nation (Wu, 2010; Chen 2014) may not be as important as it was during 
wartime and before 1949, however, building an image of a harmonious society is still a 
mandate for the Chinese authorities. IAt a time when this political agenda is conflicted 
with professionalism, Chinese online news workers have to make subtle choices between 
complying with the instructions of their superiors and persisting to produce objective 
stories. By reviewing a body of literature, this study has established that media 
transformation and commercialisation has already made Chinese online news a freer place 
with less institutional interference, however online news workers still face a significant 
commitment to publically resisting the political demands of the authorities.  
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7.5.3 Internal competition and commercialisation 
In the early stage of observation it was noted that the WN had considerable autonomy and 
marketing flexibility, as it had its own financial management, personnel management and 
marketing strategy. The director of a local online news operation such as WN could make 
decisions on sponsorship and advertisement, and the recruitment of editors, journalists, 
photographers and other employees. Market consciousness, as noted by Xu et al. (2000: 
p.75), is seen to be gradually awakening in China’s journalism education, and testing the 
limits of the authorities’ tolerance for news media pushing boundaries and violating 
traditional normative of propaganda. Xu et al. (2000) also argue that what has so far been 
taught in journalism school might not completely reflect journalistic practice, however, 
the study also found that this situation is changing.  
 
The online news media’s management has created internal competition among the online 
news, forum and blog/microblog divisions within the organisation. The different divisions 
operated with relative independence, as they had their own supervision, budget and 
staffing. The chief editors of these sections were not only responsible for the news 
production, but also for obtaining funds from commercial contracts. For instance, 
exclusive advertisements were displayed on the homepage and individual news page of 
the online news, and the funds for an internal party were raised by a number of sponsors. 
Some commercials and sponsorship were signed by the chief editor, whereas others were 
signed by the Director or the Deputy Director. The tendency of the online news is market 
oriented. 
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There was clear evidence that the existence of internal competition was intense. Editors 
mentioned that they sometimes experienced ‘a little bit of stress’ because their chief 
editors needed to compete with their colleagues from other sections over commercial 
income, and sometimes the chief editors asked them to share the pressure by looking for 
sponsorship. This suggested that the responsibilities of the editors extended to revenue 
control.  
 
Interviewees also indicated that the primary reason that different sections of WN were 
competing with each other was that sections needed to gain more commercial income. As 
P02 said: 
 
“The board decided a long time ago, maybe even from the establishment of WNMO, that 
we (departments) had to sort out most of our funding ourselves. So we have to have more 
hits for our webpages as more hits means more money […] I have cameras and 
microphones that need to be updated, mouths to feed, programmes to run; they all cost” 
(P02). 
 
The need to gain commercial income is believed to be the driver for the website’s 
concentration on market-oriented news content. Editors and supervisors had realised that 
the importance of improving the website’s market attraction was as important as 
developing its competitiveness. P03 recalled his ten-year experience in the online news 
industry, and admitted that there was a trend of transformation from the mode of ‘planned-
economical-like’ to a more market-oriented one:  
 
“For some local events, we are allowed a certain liberty in writing our own investigation 
reports. This is a step forward compared to 10 years ago when I entered this business for 
the first time. We were completely monitored and instructed by the publicity department, 
but now I can freely encourage my journalists to go out and find me interesting stories. 
[…] The interesting stories that can attract people’s attention and feed their appetite” 
(P03). 
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In this sense, online news workers are more inclined to produce news which will feed the 
appetite of the public audience, in order to gain popularity for the websites and attract the 
readership. On the other hand, web administrators also demand the facility to attract 
sponsors which will financially maintain the running of the online news organisation. 
Evidence shows here that what the market consciousness has brought to online journalism 
is optimism, as the “testing ground” (Xu et al., 2000: p.75) has extended from journalism 
training to the online newsroom. This study has established that marketisation in online 
news media has had a liberalising effect on the industry, and has significantly contributed 
to the freedom of press. This includes a growing awareness of professionalism amongst 
online news workers, a loosening of dominant control by the authorities, a shaping of the 
understanding of ideological vigilance, and a shift in media’s loyalty from the Party to its 
financial advertisers. All in all, marketisation is arguably a glimpse of light breaking the 
existing mechanism of censorship in online news media in China. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
By discussing the censorship protocol of critical news in online news media, this chapter 
develops and articulates the triangular models of online news censorship where the online 
news media, the cyber police and the publicity departments restrain and coordinate to 
influence the production of online news. It also demonstrates the different layers of 
censorship in the process of news production, as self-censorship of online news workers, 
editorial controls and autonomy in the newsroom for different professional roles are 
interpreted from the perspective of online news workers. A number of aspects are defined 
and refined, such as the manipulation of images, negativity assessment of critical news, 
and the journalistic struggle to maintain professionalism and ethics in the face of the 
prevailing political climate.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
Numerous scholars who have studied Chinese news media have argued that the news 
media in the country started going through a process of transformation in the last few 
years of the last century (Zhao, 1998 & 2000; de Burgh, 2003, Winfield & Peng, 2005; 
McNair, 2006; Petley, 2009; Tong, 2009). From being an integral part of the communist 
propaganda machine, the news media have become a significant element of 
commercialisation in China. The process of this transformation involves a number of 
aspects that influence the mechanism of censorship of news media and aspects of 
journalistic practice in newsrooms. In this context, some have argued that the 
development of the Internet in China accelerated the process of this commercialisation in 
the online news industry (Xu, et al. 2002; Pan & Chan, 2003; Esarey, 2005; Lo, et al. 
2005). A review of theoretical frameworks clarifies the academic fields in which this 
study is located, and how the shift of online media’s loyalty from the authoritarian state 
to the market has influenced journalistic practice and online news content. The literature 
review, on the other hand, focuses on the historical development and construction of news 
media in China. It provides historical and social context to censorship protocols of online 
news. The review reaches the conclusion that, while marketisation is having a liberalising 
effect on the news industry and free press, the Chinese authorities are not showing signs 
of lessening their control over online news. Therefore, through an analysis of observation 
of an online newsroom, and interviews with cyber police and online news workers, the 
findings of this research contribute further to the understanding of how the mechanism of 
censorship is operationalised, what is happening within the online newsroom, and how 
online news workers process the pressure of censorship. This thesis therefore provides a 
unique account and analysis of censorship and protocol of Chinese online news media. 
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In answering the four research questions that were posed in Chapter 1: 1, four points of 
analysis are explored respectively in this chapter, in order to expand the analysis of 
reactions to censorship of online news media in the previous chapters within a broader 
context of mechanisms of Internet censorship in China. The first section draws a model 
of the mechanisms of online censorship, which presents five different levels of censorship 
and identifies the functions of different kinds of mechanism that are used by the Chinese 
authorities. From there, it further discusses how these mechanisms are operationalised. 
The triangular models which demonstrate the power flow between the cyber police, the 
publicity departments and online news media reveal how these three parties coordinate 
and restrain each other, in order to influence the output of online news content. The 
mechanisms of censorship within the online newsroom are operationalised via internal 
briefing, editorial control and self-censorship of online journalists and editors. Thirdly, 
the section discusses how online news workers experience and perceive censorship; it 
particularly looks at the stage of editorial control and individual conception of online 
news production, where they need to respond to the pressure of censorship that comes 
from the Chinese authorities, and to make their individual judgements about whether the 
news content that they produce can be considered as harmonious. Lastly, the section looks 
at how the mechanism of online censorship impacts on the journalistic work of online 
news workers, who are required to bear in mind the political correctness of online news 
content that they produce.  
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8.1. What are the mechanisms of online censorship used by 
the Chinese authorities? 
One of the aims of looking into different forms of censorship mechanisms in China is to 
explore the intellectual justification that supports the censorship of Chinese news media. 
In other words, one of the important questions of this study is “on what basis do the 
Chinese authorities censor the news media?” There are a number of interesting elements 
and discussions on the relationship between the construction of Chinese news media and 
the authorities who control it. For example, Petley (2009: p.101) argues that the Chinese 
communist party organisation within news media allows the authorities to control news 
content and ban that which they believe may pose a threat to its monopoly. The hierarchy 
of news media ensures the leadership of the party, and its instructions can be passed down 
to specific news organisations and news workers (Zhao, 1998: p.14-9). Chinese 
journalists are also politically obliged to support the dominant ideology as part of their 
roles in the newsroom (McNair, 2009: p.241; Lee, 2005: pp.117–21). Thus, this study has 
examined how these ideas permeate the newsroom and operationalise censorship, and 
concludes that the need to maintain the harmonious society, or at least the need to portray 
an image of the harmonious society in online news, is key to answering the ‘why’ question 
outlined above.  
 
‘Harmony of the Internet’ is arguably one of the most important concepts within the 
context of censorship of online news media, seeing as the notion of the ‘maintenance of 
the harmonious Internet’ is thought to be the main factor driving the cyber police to 
pressurise the online news media, and for the online news workers to censor news content 
accordingly. The concept of harmony may be traced back to feudal times in China 
(Hucker, 1975). By looking at the development of harmonisation in a historical context 
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in China, Confucianism was shaped, developed and integrated with the concept of 
harmony. The early political proposition was interpreted as an embracing gesture for 
media supervision (Tong, 2011, p.23), which suggested an open and free environment 
both inside and outside the party’s circle. But political climate rapidly changed. News 
workers were no longer encouraged to conduct investigative journalism and play the role 
of holding political power to account from the late 1960s, when liberalism was criticised 
as a corrupting influence that may threaten the solidarity of communist comradeship. A 
contemporary interpretation was advocated by the political agenda of Hu Jintao, the 
former president of the PRC from 2005 to 2013. His proposition of harmonisation focused 
on the priority of maintaining social stability and developing the economy in China, and 
avoiding the self-inflicted setback of political struggles (Hu, 2007). This proposition was 
interpreted as a sign of emphasising “stability maintenance” (Wei Wen, in Mandarin) in 
China, and constructing social harmony, which was portrayed as having a decisive role 
in “… the mission of re-rise of Chinese awakening and revival” (Hu, 2007). This thesis 
has demonstrated that the proposition reflects a strong historical inheritance from the 
propaganda tactics of the Chinese Communist Party, in which national salvation and 
salvation in journalism are integrated with the stability of the Party’s monopoly. National 
salvation is a significant, if not crucial, element that the Communist Party uses to unify 
the majority and reinforce its dominant state (Goodman, 1990; Chang, 2011; Han, 2006). 
In news media, advocacy of the Party as the saviour of Chinese nationalism addresses the 
importance of stability and synchronisation, through which an image of harmonious 
society is maintained (Hu, 2007). The proposition of harmonisation is interpreted, in this 
research, to have had enormous influence over the construction of online news, as Brandt 
(2008), Harwit, and Clark (2001) argued that this is how a policy from the central 
government in China can shape the construction of the news media industry in the whole 
country. Therefore I cannot but conclude that the mechanisms of online censorship are 
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constructed in a way which attempts to ensure that the authorities can oversee and censor 
online news media, and serves the purpose of maintaining a harmonious Internet’ 
environment.  
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, forms of online censorship are varied, from technological 
deployment such as GFW, and pre-instalment filtering software, to public security and 
administrative control of online news. However, the common purpose that underlies these 
mechanisms reflects what Petley (2009: pp.3-4) outlines as “preventing contentious 
material from being produced”. An inverted pyramid model of online censorship in China 
is drawn to demonstrate the variety and functions of censorship that the Chinese 
authorities have established. It consists of five levels that are applied by either social or 
technological means, or combinations of both. Not all of these mechanisms are effective, 
but a failure of one can be amended or adjusted by another. For instance, when the 
regulation for compulsory pre-installation of filtering software in personal computers 
failed, the GFW, which can filter online content via scripts and code algorithms, provided 
additional support for online surveillance (Bristow, 2009). This research specifically pays 
attention to another four kinds of mechanism. These four mechanisms are: public security 
monitoring, administrative gatekeeping, editorial control in the newsroom, and self-
censorship of online news workers. These four forms, which are derived from analysis of 
fieldwork data, are significant to the findings of this research. 
 
The public security monitoring is controlled by the cyber police, the police force who are 
responsible for monitoring and filtering online content by means of technologies and 
manual scanning, and together with the publicity departments pressurising the online 
news media to censor online content. As the pressure is applied top-down, online news 
media use internal briefings and supervision to remind and regulate online workers to 
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comply with the censorship. The supervisors in the online newsroom, though, who were 
found to have little participation in the process of online news production, are mostly 
members of the Communist Party and have sensibilities towards sensitive news content. 
Their functions in the newsroom are considered as political rather than journalistic. The 
assessment of whether a news story is over-critical is also reliant on the individual 
judgement of these supervisors. Little evidence has been found to suggest that there are 
systematic guidelines for the boundaries of political correctness or sensitive topics, as the 
directives that come from the authorities keep adjusting, and supervisors therefore have 
to determine these boundaries by their experience and understanding of the political 
climate.  
 
Working at the bottom of the hierarchy of online news organisation, editorial control and 
self-censorship are the last two mechanisms that complete the picture of censorship of 
online news media. Apart from their roles in the journalistic field, online journalists and 
editors are responsible for monitoring user-generated content and being pseudo 
commentators. These two roles, that are seemingly irrelevant to online news production, 
are detailed in Chapter 6:4.2 and are worth re-addressing here: user-generated content 
monitors are required to do random searches for user-generated content and delete that 
which may pose threats to the harmony of the Internet, whereas the pseudo commentators 
are required to generate online content that is favourable to the authorities and 
synchronise the perspectives of users on the news pages. The role of being pseudo 
commentators is unique in online news, as the procedure of creating and pretending users 
is inapplicable in newspapers and TV. What has been observed here shows that in order 
to present to the public an image of the harmonious society, the censors are willing to – 
consciously or unconsciously – commit as such and create fake readership of the news. 
The discussion on user-generated content monitoring is, therefore, not limited to 
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discussion of professionalism or journalistic norm, but manipulation of the public 
opinions and objectivity. However, the fault of this malfunction of online news should 
not be laid on specific news workers. It is the whole system of censorship, which allows 
– perhaps even indulges – the manipulation of journalistic professionalism, should be 
responsible for.  
 
Overall, as chapters 5, 6 and 7 demonstrate, the construction of online news media and 
cyber police both ensure the Chinese authorities can influence the process of online news 
production and news content. The Chinese media has always been an important 
component of the CCP’s propaganda machine and the image-building of solidarity. The 
image of solidarity is socially accepted as the foundation for maintaining a harmonious 
society and a developing economy in China. The construction was firmly established in 
TV, newspapers and radio before the media transformation (Zhao, 1998 & 2000), and 
now the authoritarian control has extended to the online news organisation.  
 
8.2. How are the mechanisms operationalised? 
One of the main contributions of this thesis is its examination of how censorship protocols 
are optionationalised, and the formulation of the triangular model is a key finding of this 
research. At its core, the model recognises the different forces at play between the 
authorities and online news. A number of significant concepts such as journalism 
professionalism, news values, construction of online news media, and editorial process of 
censorship can be related to the context of Chinese online news through this model. In 
addition, the power flow and interaction between the authorities and the online news are 
expanded and detailed in this model. In the very first model, the authorities were 
understood as the arbiters of censorship pressure, whereas the online news was at the 
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receiving end. The interaction between them was unidirectional. Within this context, 
censorship of online news media is a passive and submissive approach: online news 
workers digest the pressure by conducting self-censorship on their online content, and 
delete, amend or alter their content in order to meet the requirements from the authorities. 
 
In addition, news briefing within the online newsroom ensures ideological control over 
online news. It allows directives to be effectively passed down from the Chinese 
authorities to individual online news workers. Within the online news organisations, the 
leadership of the authorities and the political demands of supporting the ideology can be 
ensured (Zhao, 1998; McNair, 2009). The institutional function of news briefings 
therefore affects the process of judging newsworthiness and news content. 
 
The triangular model of online censorship was further developed, and used to explain the 
power flow between online news media, the cyber police and the publicity departments 
in influencing the output of online content. The Chinese authorities coordinate with online 
news media to censor the online content that appears on the websites, whilst they also 
restrain each other in the matrix. The authorities fear the influence over public opinion of 
the online news, as online news can produce content criticising the government and its 
policies to a certain degree. On the other hand, the online news media are restrained by 
its hierarchy within the framework of Chinese governmental structure, and the power of 
sanctions that the authorities possess. In this sense, the models express the mechanisms 
of Internet censorship for level 2 and 3 by exploring the relationship between the 
authorities and online news media.  
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The authorities’ protocols of overseeing the online news and the different attitudes of the 
cyber police and the publicity departments in pressurising the online news are detailed in 
Chapter 7: 4. In short, the authorities’ control over online news media is achieved by their 
overpowering hierarchy and imposition of sanctions on those who fail to comply with the 
censorship. The sanctions are not only used for disciplining the online media 
organisations, but also for those users who generate content that poses threats to the 
harmony of the Internet. Also, through coordination with the publicity department, online 
news media who fail to comply and allow the existence of this user-generated content 
would be sanctioned. This is a decisive method of management for the authorities, to 
control and sanction online news media by pressurising the online news workers to 
regulate their online content. By doing so, the authorities exercise their deterrence on the 
online news media, forcing the online news workers to be alert. In this sense, the existence 
of cyber police arguably undermines the professionalism of online news workers. Some 
aspects of journalistic professionalism that have been discussed by western schools of 
thought, such as objectivity, quality, legitimacy and credibility (Soloski, 1989; Drechsel, 
2000; McNair, 2009; Schudson & Anderson, 2009), are also not relevant concerns for 
cyber police. Since their mission of maintaining the image of hegemony for the Chinese 
authorities is important above all else, cyber police also disregard some common news 
values, such as negativity, meaningfulness (Brighton & Foy, 2007: p.7), truthfulness, 
sense of humanity (Steel, 2009: pp.584-5), novelty, and story quality (Gans, 1980), as 
such values are meaningless and not relevant to their profession. The existence of the 
cyber police in the background conducting their activities out of the spotlight so to speak, 
adds to the sense within newsrooms that journalists are required to conform to appropriate 
norms of behaviour. In this sense, censorship and control are internalised (Jansen, 1991) 
because of the existence of such an office.  
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Hence, the development of this model was seen as one of the crucial findings of this study, 
because many of the other findings were derived from studies that based themselves on 
the notion that ‘online news media has its own autonomy’. In the online news, chief 
editors and directors were found to have power to negotiate with the officials; the rising 
southern media were seen as the optimiser of the online speech environment; censors’ 
fear of disclosure could also be leveraged by the supervision of public opinion, as censors 
were afraid that the exposure of their personal activities would threaten their political 
careers; and a large number of non-compromised online news workers existed in the 
newsroom. 
 
The triangular models present fluid loops where dynamic interactions, leveraging and 
negotiation were involved. These dynamic acts were not found or reviewed in the 
previous literature because they were not recorded. Some articles indicated that the online 
news media was submissive, and the Chinese authorities were manipulative (Qin, J. L. 
2000; He, Q. L. 2004; & He Q. L. 2008), whereas others had argued that the mechanism 
of censorship and the news workers’ responses to it are dynamic and transforming (Zhao, 
2000; Lo, et al. 2005; Esarey; 2005: p.56; Chan, et al. 2006). The triangular models 
support the latter. 
 
The triangular model also explains the necessity of coordination for the authorities in a 
time of happenstances, which might develop due to critical news. From the perspective 
of the authorities, coordinating with the online news could provide the solution for several 
problems of online censorship: 
1) Neither the publicity departments nor the cyber police have enough resources to censor 
online content thoroughly. Both of them have to press the online news workers to self-
censor, with the assistance of the news’ supervision system.  
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2) The ideological control from the publicity department was unsystematic. Publicity 
departments used briefings for pre-production periods in order to keep the online news 
workers in line. Some instructions were flexible and vague as they were debriefed by 
word of mouth. Thus, the publicity department needed the supervisors and directors of 
the online news to regulate and discipline their employees.  
3) Neither the publicity department nor the cyber police could interfere in online news 
production, as they were afraid of the public facing influence of the public that online 
news workers had. Therefore, coordination was chosen as a better solution.  
 
Another focus of the mechanism of Internet censorship in this research is to explore how 
it is operationalised within the online newsroom throughout the different stages of online 
news production. Firstly, briefings in the newsroom which are regularly scheduled are 
observed to be a significant method for web administrators to deliver censorship 
instructions from the authorities to news workers. The responsibilities of supervisors are 
particularly to remind and orientate online journalists and editors to maintain the political 
correctness of news content. The existence of supervision is important for the mechanisms 
of Internet censorship within the online newsroom as a way of highlighting political 
considerations for the news content. 
 
8.3. How do online news workers experience and perceive 
censorship? 
It was noted that cyber police have responsibilities in overseeing and censoring online 
news media in China. To be specific, they are responsible for overseeing the online 
content that is produced by online news workers and generated by users. This is a 
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significant mechanism that pressurises the online news workers to conduct censorship in 
the processes of online news production, whilst filtering and monitoring the user-
generated content on the news pages. This mechanism fits a number of tactics Petley 
(2009: pp.3-4) analyses as available to an authority to effectively control and censor news 
content. The pressure that comes from the cyber police is also understood as a main force 
for online journalists and editors to self-censor. In the processes of conceiving news and 
editing and sub-editing during news production, online journalists and editors have to 
make judgements for online content about whether it would cross the line.  
 
This thesis also highlights how the pressure of censorship influences the process of news 
conception and how individual online news workers deliberately avoid discussing 
politically sensitive topics in order to avoid trouble for both themselves and the news 
organisation. These sensitive topics, which Tong (2009: p.595) also calls ‘propaganda 
minefields’, are understood by online news workers through daily journalistic practices. 
But what content can be considered as propaganda minefields for online news? And what 
do online news workers mean when they refer a news topic as sensitive? This is a crucial 
question for this research, which has been raised many times in the text. For instance, P05 
interpreted this as “anti-nation or anti-Party content” and called it malicious content. Both 
cyber police officers and Chinese online news workers attempted to summarise the 
different kinds of news content that they feel may be considered as crossing-the-line or 
sensitive, such as anti-socialist, or over critical to the authorities and its ideological basis. 
However, few of these forbidden topics were found to be systematically regulated. The 
seven forbidden topics (Chapter 5: 4.2) was an exception that was disclosed by personal 
bloggers but not by mainstream media. The value of this disclosure is therefore 
undermined, as the existence of these forbidden rules were only endorsed by individuals. 
Yet the list of seven forbidden topics is also not the guide for Chinese online news workers 
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to reference when they are producing online news. These online news workers, however, 
experience a wider range of forbidden topics and are accustomed to work under the 
obstruction of the authorities and their superiors. Judgement about whether certain news 
content is harmonious is based on the individual experience of these online news workers, 
and determining whether a news story is harmonious is highly dependent on this 
individual judgement. Harmonisation or the harmony of society is, without doubt, a 
significant concept and key to the political agenda for the Chinese government and the 
Party (Chen, 2014; Winfield & Peng, 2005). However, the notion of synchronising with 
the tone of officials can be a problematic term in news production, because the notion is 
relatively ambiguous in terms of inclusion and exclusion of news material. What could 
be considered as an absolute news taboo? There is no standard answer to this question. 
Online news workers have to understand the raw material and approach stories carefully, 
and the skills involved in avoiding the minefield and bypassing the censorship of the 
authorities are acquired from their daily journalistic practices. 
 
The findings from the in-depth interviews also contributed to identify how Chinese online 
journalists and editors conceive the processes of online news production. In the process 
of analysing transcripts, this thesis demonstrates that the notion of self-censorship had to 
be clarified, in order to proceed with the analysis of censorship and editorial control 
within the newsroom. Interviewees were found to have different understandings of what 
‘self’ meant, and what ‘self-censorship’ included and excluded. Like the confusions that 
they might make for distinguishing the Party and the government, interviewees’ different 
understandings of the notion of self-censorship required further explication.  
 
To articulate this notion and clarify its scope, a model of self-censorship was established 
and developed step-by-step. It was realised during the interviews that online journalists 
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and editors talked about different notions of self-censorship. It inspired the identification 
of three stages of censorship in the online newsroom, which are individual conception, 
editorial control and administrative (See graphic details in figure 13, Chapter 6: 3.1). 
 
In short, the stage of ‘self-censorship of individual conception’ refers to the self-reflection 
and action during the online journalists’ self-digestion of the pressure of censorship 
regulation, editing the wording and the depth of their report before submitting to editors. 
This process of self-censorship appears to be similar to what happens in newsrooms in 
the West, such as the internalisation of control (Jansen, 1991), but at its core the 
understanding of news values for Chinese online news workers is significantly different. 
Online journalists were understood as chained to the regulations in producing online news 
content. On this stage, the sensibility, knowledge and experience that online journalists 
had would determine the approval chance for their news stories. During this stage, online 
journalists were self-disciplined about the importance of keeping their news stories 
“politically correct”. It was assessed that this pressure had influenced the news values, as 
participants emphasised their awareness of synchronising the official tone (Chen, 2014; 
Hu, 2007), and discussed what they understood as ‘minefield’ topics in news reporting 
which they did not intend to approach.  
 
Both editorial and administrative censorship also happened within the online newsroom, 
though it may be arguable if administrative involvement, where no online journalists and 
editors participated, could be seen as online newsroom activity. However, the Party 
infiltration heavily influenced the processes of news production, and the final online news 
content was produced as the work of all online journalists, editors and web administrators. 
Furthermore, both observation and interview results indicated that these three stages of 
censoring were not isolated. Online journalists, editors and web administrators were 
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interactive in one way or another, though the web administrators could be more dictatorial 
sometimes. Especially in the stage of editorial control, many editors and online journalists 
embraced an open and collaborative working environment, because it enabled them to 
share the responsibilities and produce news stories with collective ideas.  
 
This thesis has examined how online news workers are required, both administratively 
and institutionally, to maintain a hassle-free environment on the webpages of online news. 
This is not a part of the journalistic role of storytelling (Singer, 1997: p.97), or quality 
control (Canter, 2014: p.112), but rather a compromise made in response to the pressure 
of censorship. And for that reason, I see pseudo commentators and user-generated content 
monitors as reflections of the pressure of censorship within the online newsrooms.  
 
Supervision in online news is not considered journalistic practice, as supervisors of online 
news are not actually involved in the process of news production. The setting of 
supervision is part of the online censorship protocol that allows the Party to infiltrate and 
have representatives within the news organisations. It can be seen as an inherited form of 
news construction which Zhao (1998) calls the Party principle, which enforces the news 
media to accept the Communist Party’s guiding ideology and leadership and stick to the 
Party’s organisational principle and press policies (Zhao, 1998: p.19). This also shows 
that Chinese journalists are part of China’s institutional ideological apparatus (McNair, 
2009: p.240), and in times of media transformation their roles demand that they both serve 
the state authorities (Lee, 2005) and balance the influence of commercialisation and 
political control (Lo, Chan & Pan, 2005: p.156).  
 
295 
 
8.4. How does censorship impact on journalistic practice? 
This thesis highlights the specific ways in which the protocol of censorship impacts on 
journalistic practice. The most significant Party control over online news media was its 
infiltration into the hierarchical structure, and its impact on journalistic work in a way 
which caused the processes of online news production to be interfered with and obstructed 
by the Chinese authorities. As mentioned in Chapter 6: 4.3, the supervision team, which 
consisted of Party members, ranked as senior employees of the online news, and they 
oversaw the online journalists and editors. The supervisors, therefore, were likely to be 
ideological guides or political gatekeepers rather than actual online news workers. 
Although their work had little relevance to the journalistic practice in the newsroom, they 
were seen as symbols of the Party’s control. For the purpose of sustaining the Party’s 
interests, news values can be undermined or compromised. And in order to deliver the 
image of a harmonious society, social conflicts may need to be concealed (Tong, 2009: 
p.607). This can be considered a crucially negative aspect of maintaining the harmonious 
image in news.  
 
This infiltration was strong and stable in every sense. For online news workers, the Party’s 
supervision was rooted deeply in their routine. Due to the gatekeeping of supervisors, the 
self-censorship of individual conception (see details in chapter 6: 3.1) of online news 
workers sometimes reflected the readership of the censors more than of the public 
audience. The stability of the Party’s infiltration reinforced the strength of the media 
machinery of the state, as the latter controlled the whole online news media industry in 
China. In the introduction in Chapter 3:2, it was learnt that the GFW and the network 
system were controlled by the authorities. This study which was based on the networks 
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controlled by the Party, discussed the strength of this media control, and its impact on the 
online journalistic practice.  
 
Some researchers have argued that commercialisation has already made Chinese online 
news a freer place with less institutional interference (Qiu, 2000; Fries, 2000; Van De 
Donk, et al. 2004). This thesis has demonstrated, however, that it is still a huge challenge 
for online news workers to resist the political demands of authorities. China’s media 
transformation is shaping the way Chinese journalists judge what is newsworthy. Pan and 
Chan (2003: p.653) have argued that Chinese journalists have an enhanced awareness of 
professionalism, such as commitment to objectivity and truth. However, the findings of 
this thesis have highlighted the Party’s infiltration and demonstrated that this judgment 
might be overly optimistic. The failed online protest of the SW (see details in Chapter 6: 
3.3) was a reminder of the dominant status that the authorities had. Although the SW had 
inspired a large audience online and stirred a nationwide debate about free speech and a 
free press, it was extinguished shortly afterwards by the backlash from other state-owned 
media and the top-down instructions to replace staff.  
 
 
The significance of incidences such as Bo Xilai’s downfall and the Wenzhou train 
collision, which were too valuable to be overlooked for this study, reflected distinctive 
characteristics of how Internet censorship impacts on journalistic work, for example a 
stricter censoring standard for critical news that involved a larger-scale of the public 
sector and higher degree of public attention (Wu, 2012), the authorities’ practice of 
converting crisis into public relation campaigns, and the well-oiled machinery that 
infiltrated the organs of online news media.  
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In conceptual terms, despite its claim of limited freedom, Confucianism also contributes 
to journalistic professionalism in a way that leads public intellectuals and elites to have a 
sense of social conscience (Tong & Spark, 2009 & 2011). The self-conception of Chinese 
journalists places them into the category of public intellectuals and elites who are 
encouraged to be less dependent on political power (Tong & Spark, 2009: p.340) and to 
resist administrative interference. In this sense, Chinese online news workers who 
attempted and sometimes succeeded in serving the public with the truth can be considered 
professional journalists. Singer (2003: pp.156-7) has argued that such a commitment to 
truth is a core professional norm for news workers.  
 
As pioneers who struggle with censorship and strive to avoid administrative interference 
in the online news industry, southern media were highly praised by online news workers 
and enjoyed an optimistic reputation because of their pursuit of free speech and free press. 
Besides the geographical advantage, which gave them a lift in resisting censorship, 
Guangdong’s revolution history and strong economic status also heavily influenced the 
aggressiveness and liberal spirit of the southern media. The southern media arguably 
inherited the distinctive revolutionary character, and the region’s economic strength 
sustained its influence of the public in China’s political landscape, as these historical and 
economic reasons had assisted the media in the territory to reduce the influence of 
centralised media control from the authorities. 
 
This thesis has examined how news production passes through a continual process of 
censorship starting with uncensored news and raw news material at one end and censored 
news content at the other. This process involves individual online news workers, editorial 
control, gatekeeping and supervision. However, there is still room for news media to 
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argue and negotiate over the final news content, due to the unsystematic implementation 
of censorship (Lam, 2000: p.42) and the ambiguous notion of what it means to be 
harmonious. For Chinese online news workers the process of judging newsworthiness is 
particularly distinctive. It strongly demonstrates what is required of them as communist 
journalists, that is, to serve the political demands of the authoritarian state and to be the 
mouthpiece of the propaganda machine. However, experienced online news workers 
knew how to take advantage of grey areas, and produce news stories that normally would 
not be approved by the censors. Experienced online news workers were proud of their 
strategies and even some journalistic tricks to bypass censorship. Although Singer (2003: 
p.156) argues that sometimes the society tends to view journalism with less than 
admiration, many attributes of journalists still makes themselves to be professional. In 
defence of those Chinese online news workers who “battle” (Tong, 2007: p.534) the 
censorship pressure against the authorities, their strategies and journalistic tactics have to 
be highlighted. These tactics self-estimated as valuable assets for the journalists and 
editors, in order to report news stories that were likely to be interfered with, censored, or 
erased. One of the significant examples of bypassing censorship and administrative 
interference was WN’s report on an illegal strip club (see detail in Chapter 6: 4.4). 
Journalists and editors described this act as ‘dancing in chains’. Although the processes 
of ‘dancing in chains’ might put the online news workers in a position of struggling and 
wrestling with the censors, many would still choose to honour the professionalism that 
they were convinced was, in their terms, ‘to pursue the truth for the public’ (P02). These 
journalistic tricks may not scratch the surface of obstruction of free speech and free press 
in the whole picture, nor do they contribute to higher causes such as political reformation 
and media liberation in China, but they reflect the resistance of online news workers.  
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Significantly, this thesis has demonstrated that fear among censors can also be seen as a 
reflection of marketisation and the increased autonomy of online news workers. The 
government officials are dealing with media supervision that might have seemed 
harmless to them before this media transformation. It is worth noting that the process of 
gaining this autonomy was evolutionary. Previous literature has indicated that for a few 
decades after the establishment of PRC, Chinese news workers enjoyed limited freedom 
of choice in reporting news. The Cultural Revolution also demolished individuality and 
a free press environment (Gold, 1985; Robson, 1995). The media served the sole purpose 
of spreading propaganda to the benefit of the state, until the early 1980s. The news media, 
by that time, were perceived as a mouthpiece of the state or of a single leader, namely, 
Mao Zedong. I argue that such a conceptual framing of the parameters of speech and 
expression play an important role in understanding the specific ideological motivations 
and structural operationalisation of the protocols of censorship in China. 
 
This research, however, does not intend to discuss or speculate about the approaches 
China’s next generation of leaders may adopt to free press and censorship. Its primary 
focus is on the current situation. The keynote of stabilisation and harmonisation is hardly 
a good sign for liberals, because every proposal for political reformation, liberalising the 
media or reducing administrative intervention may be suppressed in the name of 
instability or disharmony. The southern media and its factions might have stirred debates 
on the subject of liberalism, reintroduced valuable ideas regionally about free press and 
free speech, and contributed to enlightenment to some extent, but these positive 
developments have not succeeded in overturning the censorship mechanism in the whole 
country. 
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8.5. Final remarks 
Setting out the mechanisms of Internet censorship of online news media in China, this 
research discussed the protocols of censorship that are applied by the cyber police to 
online news, and a coordinating but restraining relationship between the Chinese 
authorities and online news media regarding their influence over the output of online 
content. The censor roles of the cyber police are discussed, along with analysis of how 
the mechanisms of censorship are optionalised and how they impact on the processes of 
online news production. Picking up these findings of the thesis, this section makes final 
remarks about the research, including the limits of the findings and further developments 
that could be made in the study of censorship of online news media in China.  
 
8.5.1 Limitations 
From the perspective of methods and data gathering, this research has the same limitation 
that all other observation-based and interview-based researches have. Firstly, the non-
participating observation was not absolute. The ideal setting of conducting a non-
participant observation for a researcher is to be completely blind in the environment and 
be invisible. However, the ideal setting is impractical when the online journalists and 
editors were watched and recorded by an outsider sitting in the newsroom. It was 
perceived that certain behaviours of these online news workers were influenced, as 
interaction between the participants and the observer was unavoidable.  
 
To overcome this problem, several attempts were made to minimise the unnecessary 
interference during the process of observation: 1) A prep observation was conducted 
before the formal four-week observation, in order to build rapport beforehand. 2) 
Electronic recording devices were abandoned. Instead, pens and notebooks were used due 
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to their better quality for blending in. 3) Even during the pilot study, observers attempted 
to avoid interaction with other participants when recording. It allowed the online news 
workers to become familiar with the existence of an extra person in the newsroom.  
 
Interview has the disadvantage of being subjective and unsystematic (Kvale, 1996). To 
overcome this, I used cross validation and fact-check for minimising the disadvantages. 
For instance, in Chapter 6:1.2, in order to testify to the censorship of image that the online 
journalists and editors argued, edited news photos were found. Interviews are also 
criticised as unreliable, biased, and individualistic (Kvale, 1996, p.284- 291). Kvale (1996) 
and Wengraf (2001) argued that some of these weaknesses are unavoidable. The solution 
for this weakness in this study is the use of multiple sources of evidence. Inspired by 
Yin’s (2009) theory of triangulation, this research collected other second-hand data to 
verify, testify, and examine the individual perspectives from the interviews. Furthermore, 
the combined method of observation and interview also helped this research to triangulate, 
in order to increase the reliability of the findings (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000, pp.336-350). 
 
A regretful limitation is that the number of cyber police officer interviewees may be 
considered as insufficient. Giving the difficulties of approaching cyber police officers 
who were willing to take part in interviews, only two participants were accessed. 
Although the quality of analysis does not merely depend on the quantity of interviewees, 
this small amount of interviewees may leave the findings of this research vulnerable.  
 
Some findings about the cyber police may be difficult to revisit for further development, 
as I understand that the accessibility of cyber police officers cannot always be guaranteed. 
The difficulty of accessing cyber police participants for raw data was one of the most 
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challenging tasks throughout the whole process of data collecting. Before going to the 
field, unverified rumours were heard that approaching and contacting cyber police 
officers in China might be against certain rules or regulations, and attempters might be 
warned, even if it was for a research purpose. And I learnt that others who attempted 
interviewing cyber police officers were warned after the data collecting process of this 
research. Although I have no doubt that the credit for the successful contact belongs to a 
well-established strategy of snow-ball rolling participant recruiting, it is still worth noting 
that the experiment of accessing cyber police participants may require further efforts for 
reproduction. 
 
8.5.2 Future development 
There is a possibility that the findings regarding the online newsroom may be attacked 
because of the representativeness of the newsroom itself. As noted, Wenzhou News is 
localised, and interviewees also indicated that the setting, structure and routines might 
vary in different online newsrooms. To overcome this, another two online newsrooms 
were visited during the interview period. The online newsrooms of Qiangjiang News and 
Wuhai Online were used as comparisons for the observation. Although these two 
newsrooms were not observed at the same length and depth, the comparisons showed 
significant differences in the economic influence on the free press environment of the 
online newsrooms (See details in Chapter 6: 3.1)  
 
Like any other doctoral research, this research has its potentiality to be developed along 
different paths. An economic perspective can bring a new angle to this study. Although 
in a previous chapter, I have limited the scope of discussion to political censorship only, 
and eliminated other topics such as economic or pornographic unless they are political-
related, this research still has its potentiality to be expanded with an economic perspective. 
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In the fieldwork period, attention was paid to the impact of online news media 
marketisation, as news workers asserted that the protocol of online news producing was 
heavily shaped by the force of the market, and the online news content was observed as 
market-oriented. This data was reflected in the chapter on online news media. 
 
Online news workers who worked in a modern and marketised newsroom enjoyed a freer 
and more liberal atmosphere than those who worked in less marketised ones. The 
comparison of Qiangjiang’s, WN, and Wuhai’s online newsrooms proved this. The 
economic development status of these online newsrooms’ location also influenced their 
process of marketisation: Both Qiangjiang and WN were in an economically-developed 
area in the east coast, whereas Wuhai was rooted deeply in the inland and economically 
undeveloped. This study has made an attempt to prove that the decisiveness of the 
economy can influence the environment of free speech and free press. Due to the lack of 
a wide-ranging observation on online newsrooms in China, it did not succeed. But the 
prospect of examining this influence of marketisation or economy is still promising.  
 
The study on cyber police also has potentiality to be expanded with more depth and 
breadth if more data can be acquired. Doing fieldwork with cyber police officers is a new 
angle of studying online censorship in China, as it explores the perspectives of censors. 
As stated earlier in this and a previous chapters, the difficult accessibilities obstructed and 
stalled the process of data gathering, thereby limiting the depth of data analysis.  
 
Censorship of user-generated content can be another promising aspect to explore in the 
future. Although some of the interviewees answered questions about online censorship of 
user-generated content, I did not go into details in the analysis stage. The focus of this 
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study is on the censorship of online news media, therefore, I intentionally reduced but did 
not neglect the focus on the censorship of user-generated content. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Interview invitation letter 
 
Zhao Yiran 
Jop10yz@shef.ac.uk 
A8A IQ Brocco, 
34 Edward Street, 
Sheffield, UK 
S3 7GB 
 
 
 
(Participant’s address) 
 
 
(Dates) 
 
Dear Participant (specified name): 
Thanks for offering me this opportunity to invite you to be part of my research. Please 
allow me to explain what this research is about before you make the decision 
whether to take part. I’m a PhD student studying at the Department of Journalism 
Studies, University of Sheffield. My research interests are free speech on the Internet 
and the censorship over it. This project aims to critically provide a coherent 
description for the environment of freedom of speech on the Internet in China.  
I’m sincerely inviting you to the interview, which will be conducted as one of the 
crucial processes for my research. This interview is being conducted for the purpose 
of answering my research questions on the environment of free speech and 
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censorship on the Internet in China; the focus is on a selected case, (note: specified 
case name and a one or two sentence brief explanation of the case itself). It will take 
no more than two hours. Anything you and I communicate would be recorded using 
appropriate means, such as audio recording, and would be used and only be used for 
the purpose of this project. Details clarifying  data protection is written and 
presented to you in a separate sheet. Please find them in attachment. (See Appendix 
B) 
This information sheet claims several premises for conducting the interview using the 
data, listed below. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do 
decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to 
sign the form. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason. 
I will appreciate if you decide to accept my invitation. Your perspective will be 
significantly meaningful. We will be keeping in touch for further details if you find 
this interesting.  
 
 
 
Kindly regards, 
Yiran Zhao 
 
 
 
Supervised by Dr. John Steel (The University of Sheffield) 
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Appendix B: Participant information and consent sheet for 
the study of censorship of online news media. 
 
 
 
Party A: Interviewer 
Name: Yiran Zhao 
Position: PhD student of Journalism Department, The University of Sheffield 
Address (UK): A8A IQ Brocco, 34 Edward Street, Sheffield, S3 7GB, UK 
E-mail: jop10yz@shef.ac.uk 
 
Party B: Interviewee 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Party B is being invited to take part in a research study. Before Party B decides whether 
or not to take part, it is important to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
This interview, hereby, is conducted for the purpose of Party A’s study of the 
environment of free speech on the Internet in China. The data of this interview will 
be used in this project, and may be used for future research. This project aims to 
critically provide a coherent description for the environment of freedom of speech on 
the Internet in China. 
 
This information sheet claims several premises for conducting the interview and using 
the data, listed below. It is up to Party B to decide whether or not to take part. If 
Party B does decide to take part, he/she will be given this information sheet to keep 
and be asked to sign the form. If Party B decides to take part, he/she are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information 
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This information consent form must be signed by both parties before the interview is 
conducted.  Two separate copies are made. Each party keeps one of them.  
 
The articles are as follows: 
 
1) Party B can partly or entirely reject to answer Party A’s question in the interview.  
 
2) Party B remains anonymous at all times during and after the interview in this project. 
And it is Party A’s responsibility for consequences caused by the leak of Party’s 
name. 
 
3) It is also Party A’s responsibility to protect Party B’s identity during the process of 
data collecting, storing, analysing and publishing.  
 
4) This interview will be recorded electronically. 
 
5) The data of this interview will be used in this project, and may be used for future 
research.  
 
6) This interview does not involve any situation as follows: participation of under-aged 
person; participant has committed criminal activity and he/she is serving a sentence; 
participant feels harmed physically or mentally; against local laws and regulations.  
 
7) It is up to Party B to decide whether or not to take part. If Party B does decide to take 
part, he/she will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign the 
form. If Party B decides to take part, he/she are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason.  
 
 
 
Consent 
 
Interviewer’s name: Yiran Zhao 
Position: PhD student of Journalism Department, The University of Sheffield 
Address (UK): A8A IQ Brocco, 34 Edward Street, Sheffield, S3 7GB, UK 
E-mail: jop10yz@shef.ac.uk 
Contact Number: 0044 788353 7049 
 
Party B: Interviewee 
 
 
 Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
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2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving reason. 
  
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
  
 
4. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being audio recorded  
  
5. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being video recorded  
 
6. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications   
 
7. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been 
anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used for future research. 
 
 
Name of Party A    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Party B    Date    Signature 
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Appendix C: Interview guide 
 
 
No. of interview:  P01 
Occupation: Journalist 
Organisation: Wenzhou Evening Paper 
Education: Holds a Bachelor degree in media studies 
Age: 24 
Reason to be interviewed: Had experience in reporting the Wenzhou train collision; 
has accessibility to interviews and press conferences which related to the incident; 
has experience in self-censorship in printing and web media. 
 
 
 
Interview guide 
 
Introduction 
 
I’m a PhD student studying in the Department of Journalism Studies, University of 
Sheffield. My research interests are free speech on the Internet and the censorship 
over it. This interview is being conducted for the purpose of answering my 
research questions on a selected case, media reflection on the Wenzhou train 
collision. It will take no more than two hours. Anything you and I communicate 
will be recorded by an appropriate means, such as audio recording, and will be 
used for the purpose of this project. Details of data protection clarification are 
written and presented to you in a separate copy. Do you wish to sign it? Before we 
start, do you have any question at this stage? 
 
 
Background information 
 
Occupation: Journalist 
Organisation: Wenzhou Evening Paper 
Education: Holds a Bachelor degree in media studies 
Age: 24 
 
 
Opening questions 
 
1. What is your role in the Wenzhou Evening Paper? 
Probe: nature of work, journalistic experience 
 
2. What do you do during a working day? 
Probe: interviewing skills, contact of interviewees 
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3. How do you build up your relationship with your sources? 
Probe: sources, journalistic network, journalistic approaches working in Chinese 
media 
 
4. How do you compose a news story? 
Probe: journalistic approaches 
 
 
Questions about reporting the incident 
 
5. What was your role in reporting the train collision? 
Probe: the rescue scene, media coverage 
 
6. How did you compose this news story? 
Probe: Journalistic approaches, differences from normal procedure 
 
7. What happened when the rescue team was trying to bury the cars of the trains? 
Probe: rescue, chaos at the scene, suspect from the public 
 
8. What was your role in reporting the press conference held by Minister Wen? 
Probe: media coverage, conference content, government attitude 
 
9. What was your role in reporting the press conference held by the Ministry of 
Railways? 
Probe: media coverage, conference content, limit of accessibility 
 
 
Questions about the censorship of the incident 
 
10. Have you been told not to report some news? 
Probe: level of accessibility, authorisation of reporting 
 
11. After the crash, the Ministry of Railways immediately held a press conference. 
As far as I searched and researched, the whole version of this conference can only 
be found on the Internet. Why can we not have it on TV? 
Probe: Differences between censorship on the Internet and Newspaper 
 
12. In reporting this incident, how did you approach your contacts?  
Probe: autonomy, authorisation of reporting 
 
13. How do you rate your freedom of accessibility in reporting this incident? 
Probe: fair, highly unsatisfied, authorisation 
 
14. Before this interview, I collected questions from random civilians in my blog, 
“what would you ask if you could interview a journalist who participated in 
reporting the train collision?” I had this: “I have nothing to ask, I felt numb.” 
What do you think about this comment? 
Probe: Public awareness of free speech/press 
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15. Facing a serious accusation of forcing the press to produce false reports and the 
list of missing people, which might have provided crucial evidence to respond to 
withholding the accusation, why did the government still refuse to reveal the list? 
Probe: Media control, censorship 
 
16. What impressed you the most in reporting this incident? 
 
 
Closing questions 
 
17. What do you think of the term of “uncrowned king” for journalists? Do you agree 
that Chinese journalists are uncrowned kings? 
Probe: role of journalist, censorship and filtration  
 
18. What do you think about the list of banned foreign portals? (List enclosed) 
Probe: banning policy, Golden Firewall, content control 
 
19. What are your hopes for journalism in China in future? 
Probe: censorship, freedom of speech 
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Appendix D: Table of details of interviewees 
 
Code Gender Age Education background Administrative status Unit 
P00 F 24 Bachelor of Media 
Studies 
Journalist Wenzhou 
Evening Paper 
P01 M 33 Bachelor of Publishing 
and Editing 
Journalist Wenzhou News 
P02 F 30 Bachelor of Economics 
and Finance 
Editor Wenzhou News 
P03 M 54 Diploma of Chinese 
Literature 
Web administrator, editor Qianjiang 
Evening Paper 
P04 M 33 Diploma of Publishing 
and Editing 
Editor Wuhai Online 
P05 M 51 MBA Cyber police officer Director of 
Department of 
NIS, Bureau of 
Public Security 
P06 M 39 Bachelor of Politics Web administrator,  Qianjiang 
Evening Paper 
P07 M 36 Bachelor of Security and 
Law Enforcement 
Cyber police officer Cyber policeman 
of Bureau of 
Public Security 
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Appendix E: Viewpoints of interviewees 
P00 (Journalist, Wenzhou Evening Paper) 
- Defines what content can be considered as having crossed the line: anti-Communist 
Party, anti-nation, and obscene language and images. 
- For highly politically sensitive topics, such as Wenzhou trains collision, was 
instructed to “report less investigations” and avoid releasing pictures and news about 
causalities which may arouse public criticisms of the rescue process. 
- Our position in reporting this (collision), as we were instructed, was clearly and 
obviously advocating that Wenzhou was a city of great love. 
- Chose to be a journalist because was convinced that it was a profession that would 
allow him to pursue a higher cause. Pursuing the truth for the public. 
- A general protocol for news worker who covers the political news is to correspond 
with the news spokesman, or government correspondent (Tong Xun Yuan in 
Mandarin), in order to gain access to an official source. 
- Government correspondents are a group of government employees without whom 
the journalists would lose precious access to the official source. For this reason, 
journalists have to build cooperative relationships with government correspondents, 
even form a friendship with them.  
- Government correspondents are also very first people for journalists to turn to when 
incident news stories are relevant to the government or particular officials. For 
breaking news, the protocol for journalists is to pick up the phone and make calls to 
correspondents, and make sure to get the official standpoints. This helps the news 
production on the track as the official standpoints directly influence the phrasing, 
angles, and even prohibitions of the news stories.  
- Tong Gao is a compromised but also non-optional choice for incidents like Wenzhou 
trains collision. The public audience must be more interested in investigative report. 
But if the direct of the news is instructed to publish Tong Gao only, his journalists 
and editors should not go for investigative report at all. 
- The stereotype of Chinese journalist for some foreign, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
journalists is freedom-less and obedient. The hands of Chinese journalists are tied. 
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He admits that it is hard to deny this stereotype because the Tong Gao indeed limited 
the scope and depth of reporting. 
- The sensitivity of news topic can change. Some insensitive news topic may become 
sensitive in certain circumstances. For instance, the trains collided in a stormy and 
lightening-filled night. The journalists were instructed to not do weather reports and 
the correspondents from the weather bureau refused to give information about the 
lightening, as a speculation went over the web that it was the lightening that 
destroyed the orientation system of the trains. The lightening was blamed to be the 
direct cause of the collision, though this speculation was never proven. These kinds 
of changes in sensitivity may seem irrational, but the changes were necessary 
cautious procedures by the government for the harmonisation of the Internet.  
- Some interviewees do not trust journalists. Interviewees refuse to talk to journalists 
as they were convinced that their underprivileged voice would not be heard. Being 
interviewed and recorded by the journalists may put them at risk without 
remuneration.  
- Being politically correct sometimes is contradictory to journalistic professionalism. 
It is impractical to always satisfy one’s conscience and political correctness. 
- It is a shame for the authorities to attempt to conceal news facts. On the other hand, 
Chinese journalists are those who always pursue the facts that may never be reached, 
like the mythological figure Kua Fu who always pursues the sun but is never able to 
reach it.  
- Glad to see that the online news has had impact on the censorship and administrative 
authoritarianism. Internet may be an icebreaker for the blocking of authoritarian 
news. Weibo, for instance, provides a significant form of civil supervision for the 
oversight of corruption and governmental power abuse.  
 
P01 (Journalist, Wenzhou News) 
- The setting of Wenzhou News’ online newsroom was hardly changed since it was 
founded, news workers who work in this surrounding are adaptable, despite the 
inconvenience in communication which the physical barriers created. 
- Censorship of image is dramatic and regrettable, as some news pictures were 
excluded from the final version because they were disapproved by the web 
administrators. These pictures were, according to the administrators, either too 
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critical, or possibly would touch a nerve in the tension of the government and have 
the potential to assist in creating an image of a failing government. 
- Journalists were instructed to downplay the scandals and corruptions of officials, 
unless they were instructed to do otherwise. But whether they are reported on, 
cannot be curtained. It depends on what social impact the authorities are inclined to 
have. 
- Believes that censorship pressure that the online news workers experience is as 
rigorous as for those who worked in offline news. 
- To resist the censorship instructions, he believes there must be some necessity to use 
journalistic wisdom in the process of news production. He calls it “wining a battle” 
as he refers to the censors from the government side can be considered as enemies to 
the free press. 
- Pursuing the truth for the public was an initial drive to become a journalist.  
 
P02 (Editor, Wenzhou News) 
- The young journalists who left their schools and entered news industry appeared to 
lack imagination and creativity. Worried that this is caused by the failure of 
education, which the Chinese journalism schools and universities have to take 
account of. 
- Some young and seemingly talented journalists do not have the intention to resist the 
instructions of censorship. Rather, they seem adaptable to censorship. 
- On internal competition: the different sections in the news group have to raise their 
own funds or seek their own income from commercials, in order to maintain the 
website. 
- Encourages the journalists to be involved in the process of editorial censorship. 
Proactivity is welcomed whereas a submissive attitude is discouraged. He calls this 
part of journalistic professionalism.  
- Pursuing freedom of speech and a free press is a just and ethical virtue. 
- In highly politically sensitive topics, online news workers receive directives that 
some stories have to be prohibited and some voices have to be silenced. 
- A good relationship between the directors of the online news and the publicity 
officials can benefit the news production. On the other hand, the government is also 
an important source for the news, with whom the online news needs to build-up a 
good relationship. 
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- Speaks highly of southern media’s news workers for the spirit of resistance and 
bravery.  
- Admits that SW excelled because of their geographical advantage. The locale of SW 
is distant from the capital and beyond the reach of the full intervention force of the 
central government.  
- Being institutional alike, online and offline news are constructed in a similar way 
where the Party was influentially infiltrated. Otherwise, the website would not be 
licensed by the government and unable to run the business. There is no chance, 
therefore, for online news being constructed without the influence of the Party. 
- To pursue the truth for the public was once a young and enthusiastic dream, but it 
soon fell apart as he found the reality was not what he expected.  
 
P03 (Web administrator, Qiangjiang Evening Paper) 
- There was a trend of transformation from the mode of ‘planned-economic-like’ to a 
more market-oriented one. The interest of the public audience is paid more attention 
by the online news workers. 
- To think before to write. The process of journalistic self-conceiving is a process 
where journalists self-digest the censorship instructions, and balance the news value 
and safety of the stories. In this process, a good journalist knows how to conceive a 
story which lowers the risk of attracting trouble for the news group and him/her-self, 
while at the same time being publishable. 
- The publicity department sometimes only gives blur instructions or implications. 
News workers have to, in this sense, self-estimate the boundaries of sensitive topics 
and filter the online content accordingly. 
- Believes that the education and training for journalists have to take account for 
producing irresponsible young journalists who are easily compromised with 
censorship instructions. He defines the professionalism of journalists as “honest, 
determined and tactical”, characteristics which are rarely seen nowadays in young 
journalists. He further worries that without the flesh and blood the traditional 
journalistic professionalism would be lost in China.  
- In the process of editorial censorship, an over-active or over-resistant journalist is 
not welcomed, because they may slow down the workflow of news production. In 
addition, the boundaries of what phrase or expression is politically intolerable for the 
government is a matter of discourse, but a lower-ranked journalist who attempts to 
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overstep the seniority in the office is a matter of work ethics, which is already 
intolerable for editors.  
- For highly politically sensitive topics, such as Bo Xilai’s downfall which involved 
high-end political struggles in the central government, the directives from the 
authorities arrive in a top-down form which online news workers have to obey and 
have little room to negotiate.  
- The rapid growth of online news is an information boost, which may trouble the 
authorities in online censorship matters, because neither the cyber police nor the 
publicity department have sufficient resources to censor online news content 
thoroughly.  
- Online news may still benefit from a freer environment in terms of the insufficiency 
of manpower of the authorities. Based on the comparison made with the working 
environment of the newspapers, online news workers have more flexibility in 
determining the inclusion and exclusion of the news content.  
P04 (Editor, Wuhai Online) 
- “We know who the boss is” suggests that the government is dominant. The online 
news has to use strict filtering and censoring policies to comply with the government 
for its own good. 
- In the process of editorial censorship, preferably, the pressure of censorship can be 
shared by journalists and editors amongst themselves in order to provide an 
insightful story which is at the same time suitable to publish or broadcast. 
- Journalistic conceiving and “to think before to write” is a necessary journalistic skill 
without which the process of news production would be delayed.  
- Praises the southern media as admirable. 
- The boundaries of journalists and editors sometimes can be blurred, as some 
journalists may also be required to take on the responsibilities of editing in the news 
production process. These journalists are credited for their awareness of journalistic 
conception of self-censorship. 
 
P05 (Director of NIS, Zhejiang) 
- Supervises and executes in a non-technical working environment.  
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- Being extremely discreet. Distance himself from advanced electronic devices, as 
these devices would leave trails of online activities, which potentially leads to 
disclosure of personal identity to the public. 
- The disclosure of personal identity and exposure of privacy are seen as threats to a 
political career. 
- Firmly refused to be recorded by recorders in the interview, despite the promise of 
anonymity.  
- The briefing and reporting protocol in the NIS is separated from the other 
department of the public security because it is necessary, as the cyber police 
department is an independent section that receives direct instructions from the 
directors of the bureau, this indicates the important status of the cyber police in the 
public security system. 
- Fighting against the Internet crime, the cyber police have to monitor the Internet 
activities closely and discreetly for the benefit of what he calls the wellness of 
environment of the Internet. 
- Malicious content includes those anti-Communist Party, anti-nation, hate speech and 
sarcasm directed at the government. 
- One of the responsibilities of the cyber police, or the aim of protecting the wellness 
environment of the Internet, is to preserve regional stability and bolster civilian 
morale.  
- For highly politically sensitive topics, such as Bo Xilai’s downfall, the cyber police 
has to work closely with the online news and the publicity department in order to 
serve the purpose of maintaining wellness of the Internet, because the information 
boost for incidents like this can cause serious trouble for sensors: massive 
information boosts on the news websites, and malicious content may be mixed 
amongst them. 
- As to answering and defining what acts on the Internet can endanger the national 
security, he outlines advocating the corrupt thoughts from the west, attempting to 
spread a cult, and some agitation for mass incidents. The hostile mind-set has to be 
always alerted. 
- Restating the authority of the administrative disciplines is to disallow online news to 
appeal, as the decisions made by the government are final. 
- Distancing from the Internet social network base for the same reason as distancing 
from the advanced electronic devices.  
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- The disciplines for websites vary accordingly. The total hits count and the influence 
of the websites need to be considered. Also, the websites which contain users’ 
complaints and criticisms of the government may not be disciplined as it is a tactical 
way for underprivileged social group to vent their resentment.  
 
P06 (Web administrator, Qianjiang Evening Paper) 
- Cross the line: radical speech criticising particular officials, personal attacks, 
speculation and rumours, and advertising links could be considered as crossing the 
line and intolerable for the website.  
- Admits that the southern media excelled because of its geographical advantage.  
- The minefield of news reporting of the almost-prohibited topics which most 
journalists would attempt to report. And if a journalist attempts to do so, he/she has 
to be extremely careful of wording, phrasing and angle of the report, in order to 
avoid the risk of being censored. 
- Journalistic conception of self-censorship is a process for journalists to evaluate and 
balance the outcome and risk of reporting certain critical news.  
- What the southern media news worker did against the administrative interference, is 
an encouragement for all Chinese news workers.  
 
P07 (Cyber police officer, Jinhua) 
- Addresses that an important work routine for a cyber police officer is to serve and to 
obey. The daily work includes attending meetings and briefings for administrative 
instructions, and preventing and fighting against Internet crimes. 
- Admits that the cyber police do not require high-end Internet technique. Only basic 
Internet skills are required. This requirement determines that the scope of 
recruitment for cyber police is not limited to technical police trainees, but all kinds 
of police trainees. 
- Cautious towards disclosure, and refused to be recorded by an electronic recorder in 
the interview because he believes if the recording leaks, his career would be 
threated. 
- Confirms the uniformity of cyber police with other kinds of police in the public 
security, as he believes this can help the cyber police blend in and hardly be noticed 
by the public.  
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- For security and safety reasons, cyber police are prohibited from working alone 
under any circumstance, in order to avoid bias and corruption. 
- Verifies the Seven Forbidden Topics is a real instruction given by superiors. 
- Manual operation can assist the firewall to filter and detect sensitive content across 
the Internet. 
- Employing civil-reporting can also assist the filtering and detecting mission for the 
sensitive content on the Internet, as the cyber police do not have sufficient 
manpower to filter all alerted content. 
- Inspections and patrols that mainly target the Internet cafe are an important work 
responsibility for the cyber police. The Internet cafe is seen as the most ‘troubled’ 
place full of lower-social-class people who spread rumours and defame the image of 
the authorities, sometimes just for entertainment. 
- Worries that the average age of an Internet criminal is lowering. Some of the Internet 
hackers and rumour spreaders are almost kids who can only be educated but cannot 
be taken to the court. However, these kids who possess hacker technique can be 
destructive for the work of cyber police, as the skills for hacking and counter-
surveillance nowadays are easy to learn on the Internet.  
- Defends that the cyber police may violate users’ privacy at some point, but it is, in 
his defence, neither lawful nor unlawful, due to the fact that Internet legitimation 
lags behind the fast development of the Internet.  
- The Great Firewall is a powerful project that can deny users access to the Internet. 
But common users who are denied may regain their accessibilities in a certain period 
of time. The blockage of user access is only a form of temporary and minor 
discipline and the record of it may not be used against users’ violation of Internet use 
regulation because it would be overwritten before being traced.  
- The advanced electronic device, such as smart phones and personal computers, can 
be traced, monitored and located by the cyber police for purposes of counter-
Internet-crimes.  
- Although some civil hackers possess high-end technique which the cyber police do 
not have, the relationship between these civil hackers and the cyber police is hostile 
and not cooperative. The cyber police do not attempt to employ freelance hackers to 
advance their technique in Internet surveillance, because it is unnecessary at this 
stage.  
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Appendix F: Recruitment stages and criteria of the cyber 
police: 
 
1) A recruitment examination runs once a year by local police schools, normally starting 
from the end of May. The registration for the examination ends one month earlier. 
2) All candidates go through an overall assessment. That means candidates who register 
for cyber police examination are tested in the same subjects as other candidates.  
3) A candidate has to pass the written examination held by the police schools in the 
subject of literacy and fitness tests. 
4) A candidate has to fulfil the following criteria: 
a. Loving the country and the people, obeying the laws; having a strong sense of 
organisational disciplines and regulations; willing to participate in voluntary work for 
public security, and willing to obey the assignation after graduation. 
b. Aged under 22 years-old.  
c. Unmarried. 
d. Having a degree from either high school, technical secondary school, or vocational 
school; having registered permanent residence in the province where the test takes 
place.  
e. Physically healthy: in the North, the height of male candidates must not be less than 
1.70 meters (including 1.70 meters), and female candidates must not be less than 1.60 
meters (including 1.60 meters); in the South, the height of male candidates must not 
be less than 1.68 meters (including 1.68 meters), and female candidates must not be 
less than 1.58 meters (including 1.58 meters); the weight of male candidates must not 
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be less than 50 kg, female candidates must not be less than 45 kg; eyesight not less 
than 4.8 (including 4.8); strictly not any condition of achromatopsia, 
hypochromatopsia, weak-of-hearing, anarthria; no sign of obvious flaws on face, 
including harelip, heterotropia, cross-eye, torticollis, or scars; good sense of smell; no 
pigeon breast, bromhidrosis, severe varicosity, bowlegs, flatfoot, tattoos, hairy hair, 
humpback, or other kinds of disabilities; lineal relatives have no history of mental 
disorders.  
f. Not infected by contagions, including various kinds of hepatopathy. 
g. Reasonably athletic. 
5) Interviews may be required. 
6) Candidates who passed the written examination, fitness tests, and the interviews, need 
to go through the last stage of political background verification. In this stage, 
candidates’ political backgrounds are reviewed, and a successful candidate must not: 
have a history of criminal activity, be a suspect, or bad moral behaviour; have lineal 
relatives or close collateral relatives who have a history of betraying the country, 
harming the national security, or committing political crimes that resulted in the death 
sentence. 
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Appendix G: Clarification of terms and phrases 
There are a number of terms and phrases used in this thesis which require explanation. 
Some phrases emerge specifically from China’s political and cultural context. Phrases 
such as ‘the spirit of briefing’ and ‘public opinion orientation’, for example. Others are 
key to the analysis of censorship of online news, such as ‘autonomy within the newsroom’ 
and ‘institutional autonomy’, because they are considered as distinctive elements in 
understanding online news workers and online newsrooms in China.  
 
“Autonomy within the newsroom and institutional autonomy” 
Autonomy in the newsroom refers to the individual news workers’ autonomous power in 
the process of news production. It involves the power of disposition to revise, censor, 
amend and make further decisions in relation to news content. The most commonly seen 
professionals in the newsroom, journalists, editors and administrators, have limited 
autonomy. In the online newsrooms, such autonomy is dependant upon where the 
individual resides within the organisation. That is, the higher ranked news workers have 
more power and are more decisive than lower ranked news workers. For example, editors 
are more powerful in censoring and amending online news content than online journalists, 
as they are ranked higher than online journalists. The hierarchical structure of the online 
newsroom, therefore, is seen as an important aspect of analysing for this research, due to 
its determination of the power flow and protocol of online news censoring. 
 
In the context of Chinese online news, unlike the autonomy in the newsroom which 
focuses on individual disposition, the institutional autonomy is used to describe the news 
media’s organisational freedom in relation to the public. Although each of these terms 
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share the same phrase in Chinese (Hua Yu Quan), the institutional autonomy looks at the 
newsroom and all the news workers within the news media as a whole entity and refers 
to the public influence/social influence it possesses. This concept is significant for 
understanding some discussions and findings of this research. For instance, in the 
triangular models of online censorship that is examined in this study, the institutional 
autonomy of the online newsroom was asserted as an important restrictive force which 
restrains intervention of the authorities in the processes of online news production. It 
allowed the online news media in China the organisational freedom to negotiate the 
directives from the authorities over the subject of online news content. 
 
“Spirit of briefing” 
‘The spirit of the briefing’ (or ‘the spirit of meeting’) is a bureaucratic phrase translated 
from the Mandarin term ‘Hui Yi Jing Shen’. The term spirit of briefing is seen as a general 
term that is frequently used by the authorities. The Chinese online news media use it to 
describe the content of agendas for many meetings and briefings which the authorities 
pass on to the news workers (Chen, D. 2014; Liu, 2014b). 
 
In this study, ‘spirit of meeting’ refers to a form of mouth-to-mouth instructions or 
directives from the authorities to the online news. The phrase was firstly recorded in 
observation when I saw internal briefings in the online newsroom. The term ‘spirit’ was 
a vague concept that was used by the Deputy Director of Wenzhou News in the internal 
briefing to describe a general set of agendas that were delivered by the publicity 
department. I understand that the content of the agenda can vary, depending on the kind 
of instructions and directives that the publicity department intends to deliver. Here, in this 
study, the ‘spirit of the meeting’ indicates the publicity department’s intention to regulate 
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the online news and its news workers, by guiding public opinion and by creating the 
atmosphere of harmony in the online news.  
 
“Public opinion orientation” 
In the online newsroom in China, one of the most commonly seen agendas from the spirit 
of meeting is when the online news workers are instructed to orientate public opinion. 
The term ‘public opinion orientation’ (or public opinion guiding/orientation, Yu Lun Yin 
Dao in Chinese) refers to a unique functionality of Chinese online news workers, that is, 
Chinese online news workers have responsibility of being pseudo commentators and user-
generated content monitors. In short, they are responsible for monitoring the user-
generated content in their website, deleting content seen as either being politically 
sensitive or obscene, and pretending to be a common user and posting content. By doing 
these activities, the online content would be harmonised, thereby public opinion would 
be orientated.  
 
 
 
